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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff (s) , ) 
) MINUTE ENTRY 
VS . ) 
1 CASE NO. CV-06-140 
CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant (s) . ) 
On the 2Znd day of May, 2007, Defendant's motion to compel 
discovery and cross-motions for summary judgment came before the 
Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District Judge, in open court at 
Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Stephen Muhonen appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Winston Beard and Mrs. Penny North Shaul appeared on 
behalf of the Defendant. Mr. Scott Tallman was in attendance at 
counsel table. 
Mr. Beard presented Defendant's motion to compel discovery. 
Mr. Muhonen argued in opposition to the motion. Mr. Beard 
presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court will grant the motion in favor of Defendant 
Cornerstone. The subject matter may sensitive information, so 
the Court will impose a protective order wherein only Mr. Beard 
and Ms. Shaul will be permitted to view the subject matter. In 
order for anyone else to review, they will have to have 
-- 
permission from the Court. 
Mr. Beard will prepare a proposed order for the Court's 
signature. 
Mr. Muhonen presented Plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment. Ms. Shaul argued in opposition to Plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment and presented Defendant's motion for summary 
j udgment . 
The Court will take the motions under advisement and issue a 
decision as soon as possible. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the a d a y  of May, 2007, that 
I mailed or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document to the following: 
RONALD LONGMORE 
DEPUTY CLERK 
Daniel C. Green 
Stephen J. Muhonen 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
(P1 - American Pension Services, Inc. ) 
Penny North Shaul 
PO Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(Defendant ) 
Karl R. Decker 
PO Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Winston Beard 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff (s) , ) 
) MINUTE ENTRY 
vs . ) 
) CASE NO. CV-06-140 
CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant (s) . ) 
On the 6th day of June, 2007, a pretrial conference and 
Defendant's motion to continue trial and to extend discovery 
deadline came before the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District 
Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Lane Erickson appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Mrs. Penny North Shaul appeared on behalf of the Defendant. 
Trial is scheduled for June 19, 2007. 
Mrs. Shaul presented Defendant's motion to continue trial 
and to extend discovery deadline. Mr. Erickson responded. 
The Court granted the motion to continue the trial and reset 
the matter for court trial on August 28, 2007. No pretrial 
conference will be scheduled. Discovery deadline will be August 
1 5 ~ ~ .  
The Court denied the cross-motions for summary judgment. 
Mr. Erickson will prepare a proposed order for the Court's 
signature. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the k day of June, 2007, that 
I mailed or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the 




Daniel C. Green 
Stephen J. Muhonen 
Lane V. Erickson 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
(P1 - American Pension Services, Inc. ) 
Penny North Shaul 
PO Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(Defendant) 
Karl R. Decker 
PO Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Daniel C. Green (ISB No. 3213) 
Stephen J .  Muhoneil (ISB No. 6689) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-6101 
Fax: (208)232-6109 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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vs. 1 SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
1 JUDGMENT 
CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, ) 
LLC . , 1 
1 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, WC. ("Plaintiff"), by and 
tlxough its counsel of record and for a cause of action against the Defendant CORNERSTONE 
HOME BUILDERS, LLC. ("Defendant"), and respectfully inoves this Court, pursuant to Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure 56, for the entry of Suininaiy Judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the grounds 
and for the reasoil that there are no genuine issues of inaterial fact and that Plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
This motion is made and based upon the memorandum and affidavits in support of the same, 
which will be filed in accordance with Rule 56, together with the Court files and records. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page I 
DATED this jl);lday of June, 200'7. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
By: 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2 
fj 2- 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2 day of June, 2007, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Penelope North-Shaul , [,/I U. S. Mail 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC Postage Prepaid 
P. 0 .  Box 277 [ 1 Hand Delivery 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 [ ] Overnight Mail 
~~]'%acsimile - 745-8160 
'[ ] Elnail 
Winston V. Beard 1 ~ ~ 1 '  U. S. Mail 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. Postage Prepaid 
2 105 Coronado Street [ ] Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 [ ] Ove~~~ igh t  Mail
~f]*'%acsimile - 529-9732 , 
[ ] Einail 
,d/%2' 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN 
SECOND MOTION FOR SIJMMARY JUDGMENT - Pagc 3 
3 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB No. 2903 
Penny North Shaul, Esq., ISB No. 4993 j!,jfi 29 F[: I.$: i1 3 
David L. Brown, Esq., ISB No. 7430 
P.O. Box 277 
. , ' ,, .ii,iii' 
, a , ,  , : i i,ii',i lSIOF4 
477 Pleasant Couag. Lane . ,  ; !,; . , ; t : i l f<~ ' f  . 
. . 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Winston V. Beard, ISB No. 138 
Michael Gaffney ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: winston@beardstclair.com 
jeff@,beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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) DEFENDANT'S SECOND 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
vs . 1 JUDGMENT 
) 




COMES NOW Defendant, CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC., by 
and through its attorney of record, Penny North Shad, Esq., and hereby moves this 
Court for its Order Granting Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. This motion is brought based upon newly 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR 1 
CITll I DV TrTnnXr17xvv Ed- r l  
discovered evidence received by Defendant on May 31,2007, after this COW ordered 
disclosure of said evidence by Phiitiff, upon Defendant's Motion to Compel. 
Defendant herein asserts its Second Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted 
on the following grounds: 1) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure lZ@)(G); 2) Plaintiff is not 
the real party in interest as defined by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 17, and therefote 
cannot prosecute its Amended Complaint; 3) Plaintiff has no standing to assert the 
claims alleged in its Amended Complaint, and is therefore barred from recovery upon 
said complaint; 4) Idaho Code s9-508 precludes Plaintiff from any recovery against 
Defendant; and 5) Plaintiff's claim, as alleged ia the Amended Complaint, is an 
illegal transaction, and therefote, any recovery upon said complaint is barred. 
Further, this motion is brought pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 5G(c), 
based upon the record on Be, and depositions and affidavits to be lodged with the 
COW with Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment; and wherein there are no genuine issues of material fact as to all Counts 
contained in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, as set forth more fdiy in Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment. Oral argument 
is requested. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this --day & of June, 2007. 
d&,-& 
Penny ~ottdShaul,  Esq. 
~ t t o & e ~  for Defendant - 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR 2 6 7 - 
- - -- -. - . - - - - -- -. -- ". 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
& I HEREBY CERTIEY that on the & day of June, 2007, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by: 
- Hand Delivery 
Postage-prepaid mail 
& Facsimile Transmission 
Stephen J. Muhonen, Esq. 
RACINE, OLSEN, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
Winston V. Beard 
Michael Gaffney 
BEARD ST. C W R  GAFFNEY, P.A. 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
DEPENDANT'S SECOND MOTION POR 3 6 '- 
- -7.  -- - . -- -- A 6 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB No. 2903 
Pelmy North Shaul, Esq., ISB No. 4993 
David L. Brown, Esq., ISB No. 7430 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Willston V. Beard, Esq., ISB No. 1138 
Michael Gaffney, Esq., ISB No. 3558 
Lance J. Schuster, Esq., ISB No. 5404 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. 
2 105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




1 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
1 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
VS. 1 
1 




COMES NOW the Defendant, by atid througli its undersigned attorneys of record, and 
files this Memora~~dum in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend. 
MEMORANDUM IN ?@H',ORT OF TION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND Page 1 N$ 
MEMORANDUM 
Defendant has filed a Motion for Leave to Amend and requests this Court's order 
granting leave to the Defendant to file an Amended Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
Defendant makes this request pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) which states that 
"leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." 
Justice requires that leave be given for the simple reason that the Plaintiff mailed its 
Supplenlental Responses to Defendant's Second Set of Discove~y on the Defendant oil May 3 1''. 
(See Exhibit A to Affidavit of Michael D. Gaffney). The responses were not received by 
Defendant's counsel until June 4", 2007. (Affidavit of Michael D. Gaffi~ey). 
These responses confirm that the Plaintiff possessed information that was brought to the 
Court's attention during argument related to the Motion to Compel that brings the Plaintiffs 
investment scheme under ERISA rules and regulations since the funding of APS coines 
exclusively though pension monies, and more particularly IRAs, making the Plaintiff an EERlSA 
functional fiducia~y. In fact, the supplemental responses supplied by the Plaintiff, particularly 
the response to Request for Production No. 9, show that APS is exclusively funded with IRA 
pension monies. Thus, the amounts claimed in the Amended Complaint are either finder fees 
and are illegal under ERISA S 1 I06(b)(3) or are being collected for the benefit of the pension 
trusts (a position the Plaintiff appears to have recently adopted). See Plaintiff's SuppIelnental 
Respoilse to Interrogato~y No. 19. However, if that is the case, the Plaintiff carnot act as the real 
paxty in interest and /or has no standing to prosecute this lawsuit. 
It has already been established that Curtis DeYoung is the president and sole shareholder 
of APS and therefore cannot qualifji as a nonbank trustee of IRAs. U.S. Treasury Regulations 
$1.408-2(b)(4)(e); Defendant's Memorandum in Suppo~t of Surnrnary Judgment, Ex. C, 
MEMORANDUM IN S U P P P J  OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND Page 2 
i - 1 7  
Deposition excerpt of Curtis L. Young, 5 (6 - 18). 
In the recently produced Plaintiff's Supplemental Response to Request for Production 
No. 9,is a doc~~mer~t  enti led "American Pension Services, Inc. Trust Agreement." Section 6 of 
that agreement explicitly refers to the "Administrator's rights powers and duties as trustee ... ."  
The enuuierated powers that follow are clearly those of a trustee. Thus APS cannot clairn to be 
simply a pension administrator but is clearly attempting to act, improperly, as the trustee of said 
pension, which, as indicated consists exclusively &IRA funds. Since APS carinot legally act in 
this capacity, it cannot sue as a party who is "actually and substantially interested in the s~tbject 
matter" as defined in Idaho R. Civ. Pro. 17(a) and is therefore not a real party in interest. Carl N 
Christensen Family Trust v. Chvisterzsen, I33 Idaho 866, 870 (Idaho 1999). The Defendant 
should therefore be allowed to assert Rule 17(a), standing and illegality as affinnative defenses 
and should be allowed to proceed wit11 the defense of t h s  case based upon Plaintiffs recent 
4 supplemental dis% $y.eST 
Of Beard St. lair Gaffney P.A. r / 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPO OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND Page 3 8T- 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on July 3, 2007, I served a true 
and correct copy of the MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
AMEND on the following by the method of delivery designated below: 
/ 
Stephen J.  Muhonen US .  Mail R Hand-delivered f iacs imile  
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
FAX: (208) 232-6109 A 
penny North Shaul / d S .  Mail 0  and-delivered ~acsimile ~ u l m  Law Office 
PO Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
FAX: (208) 745-8160 /"' 
Bo~l~leville County Courthouse 4 s .  Mail 0  and-delivered a lacsimile 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF M,O FOR LEAVE TO AMEND Page 4 
c!'- p 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB No. 2903 
Pelmy North Shaul, Esq., ISB No. 4993 
David L. Brown, Esq., ISB No. 7430 
ICO. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Winstoil V. Beard, Esq., ISB No. 1138 
Michael Gaffney, Esq., ISB No. 3558 
Lance J. Schuster, Esq., ISB No. 5404 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. 
21 05 Corollado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5 17 1 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Attorneys for Defendant: 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, 1 Case No. CV-06-140 
m c . ,  ) 
1 









COMES NOW the Defendant, by and thsougl~ its undersigned attorneys of record, and 
moves for this Court's leave allowing Defendant to file the attached Amended Answer adding 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND Page 1 
6 :- 1% 
Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Affiniiative Defenses based upon recently received discovery 
responses pursuant to the Court's most recent Order Compellil~g Discovery. In support of this 
Motion Defendant's file the Affidavit of Cou~lsel and Me~norandurn in Support of Motion for 
Leave to Amend. D ndant also requests a hearing and the opportunity to present oral argument /7 
to the Court. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND Page 2 
G 2.- a :, 
/1- 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify 1 am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and oil July 3,2007, I served a true 
and collect copy of the MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND on the following by the nlethod of 
delivery designated below: 
Stephen J. Muhonen r] U.S. Mail IZ)  and-delivered 
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
FAX: (208) 232-6109 
Penny North Shaul U.S. Mail a Hand-delivered 0 Facsimile 
Dunn Law Office 
PO Box 277 
a'
Rigby, ID 83442 
FAX: (208) 745-5 160 
/ 
Mail 0 Facsimile 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND Page 3 
61- 13 
r 
r., ( : : I  .> 
,.,..,... : ::.;, ,. \> , , 8 
Daniel C. Green (ISB No. 3213) , , ,  
Stephen J. Muhonen (ISB No. 6689) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE , , 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idalio 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-6101 
Fax: (208)232-6109 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE C O W Y  OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC. ) 
1 Case No. CV-06-140 
Plaintiff, 1 
) 
VS. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
1 PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR 




COMES NOW Plaintiff, AMERlCAN PENSION SERVICES, INC., a Utah corporation 
authorized to do business i i i  the State of Idaho ("hereafier "APS"), by and through its attorneys 
of record, and hereby submits this Memorandum in Support of its Second Motion for Sutn~nary 
Judgment. 
I. RELIEF SOUGHT 
APS seeks an entry of Judgment in its favor holding the illegality defense alleged by 
Defendant CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC., an Idaho Limited Liability Corporation 
(hereafter "Coti~erstone") does not apply. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1 
6:- i9 
11. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
APS is seeking payment froln Cornerstone in an amount equal to $750 per lot sold or to 
be sold, in the real property development project identified in Exhibit B of the Amended 
Complaint. (See Am. Compl.). APS' claim for payment is based on an agreement between APS 
and Cornerstone wherein APS agreed to lend Cornerstone approximately twenty percent (20%) 
of the purchase price of certain real property, which would be repaid at 10% interest. 111 
addition, the parties agreed that since APS brought the developinent project to Cortlerstone's 
attention, Cornerstone would pay APS $750.00 per lot sold in the developmec~t project. 
Furthermore, APS was to have the option of being able to lend on the individual homes and 
development in the developlnent project. Cornerstolie has answered APS's Amended Cornplaint 
and adlnitted to the foregoing agreement, including the agreement to pay APS $750.00 per lot, 
hut alleges such obligation was co~~lingent upon APS providing full financing for the entire 
development project. (Answer 7 13). Cornerstone has paid APS tlie outsta~lditig principal and 
interest on a~nounts APS loaned Cornerstone, There are only two remaining issues: ( I )  whether 
Cornerstone's illegality defense applies and (2) whether APS' entitlement to $750 per lot is 
contillgent upon Cornerstone's allegation tbat APS provide financing for tlie entire developtnent 
project. 
Both parties have previously submitted Motions for Surn~nary Judgment. Cornerstone 
alleged illegality as a defense in its Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Suniiliary 
Judgment. (Def s. Reply Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 3). Cortierstone also alleged illegality in its 
Metnora~,dum in Support of Motion to Compel Response to Second Set of Discovery to Plaintiff. 
(Def s. Mem Supp. Mot. Compel Resp. Second Disc. to PI. at 4-9). Because Cornerstone's 
MEMORANDUM TN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2 
illegality defense was not raised until after APS's Response Mernorandum, APS was not 
afforded the opportunity to respond to this newly raised issue. 
The basis for Cornerstone's illegality defense appears to be that Cornerstone believes that 
the funds lent by APS to Cornerstone lnay have been obtained either unlawfully or in breach of a 
fiduciary duty APS had with its investors, thus lnalting the consideration paid by APS illegal and 
subsequently, the contract between APS and Cornersto~le illegal. Id. 
Curtis DeYoung, Dean DeYoung, Drew Downs, Dale Henderson and Harry Segura each 
established their own IRA account with APS. (Aff. of Curtis DeYoung Sj 4, Aff. of Dean 
DeYoung Sj 2, Aff. of Drew Downs Sj 2, Aff. of Dale lienderson 1 2, Aff. of H a r ~ y  Segura Sj 2). 
Dean DeYoung, Drew Downs, Dale I-Ienderson and Harty Segura all gave authority to Cutlis 
DeYoung to invest their IRA funds in a manner he deemed beneficial to them. (Aff. of Dean 
DeYoung Sj 3-5, Aff. of Drew Downs Sj 3-5, Aff. of Dale Henderson Sj 3-5, Aff, of Harry Segura 1 
3-5). Curtis DeYoung utilized his authority granted by the four individuals and directed APS to 
invest funds fiom his own and the other four individuals IRA accounts, into the property 
development project which is the subject matter of illis litigation. (Aff. of Curtis DeYoung i/ 5- 
8). APS invested the aforementioned individual's funds into the property development project as 
Inore pat-ticularly described above. (Id.). 
111. STANDAlW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions 011 fiie, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 
56(c). This rule facilitates the dismissal of factually unsupported claims prior to trial atrd leads 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAMTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 3 
6" -16 - 
to tlre economy ofjudicial resources. Garzee v. BarkIey, 121 Idaho 771, 828 P.2d 334 (Ct.App. 
1992). When an action will be tried before the court witliout a jury, tlie trial court becomes and 
acts as tlie trier of fact. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates. LLC, 140 Idalio 354, 360-61, 93 P.3d 
685, 691-92 (2004). It is well established that "[als the trier offact, tlie district court is free to 
arrive at the most probable inferences based up011 the evidence before it and grant suliitnary 
judgment, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences." Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189: 
19 I .  923 P.2d 434,436 (1996). If any co~iflict between inferences exists, as the trier of fact, the 
trial court is responsible for resolving the possible conflict between the itrferences. m, 129 
ldaho at 19 1-92, 923 P.2d at 436-37. The test for reviewing the inferences drawti by the trial 
court is whether the record reasonably supports the inferences ~nade by tlie trial court. Shakwer, 
140 ldaho at 361, 93 P.3d at 692. 
IV. CORNERSTONE'S ILLEGALITY DEFENSE DOES NOT APPLY 
T1ie Court s1iould grant APS' motion for summary judgrnent and hold Cornerstone's 
illegality defense does not apply. The illegality defense asserted by Coriierstone involves two 
separate contracts. The "first contract" is the agreement between APS and its investors. 
Cornerstone is not a party to tlie agreement between APS and its investors. The "second 
contract" is tlie agreement between Cortiersto~ie and APS regarding the loan of fuiids and 
Cornerstone paying $750 per lot. If APS understatids it coi~ectly, Cornerstone is arguing APS 
cannot cnforce the "second contract" requiring Cor~ierstone to pay $750 per lot because APS 
allegedly violated the Etnployee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). something relating 
solely to the "first contract" between APS and its investors (and not involving Cornerstone) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 4 
'The "first contract" is not at issue in this lawsuit and APS questions Cornerstone's ability 
to allege violations of a contract to which it is not a party. Regardless, APS did not violate 
ERISA and therefore, Corl1erstone's alleged illegality defense does not apply and the "second 
contract" between APS and Cornerstone is enforceable. 
The IRA funds lent to Cornerstone were lawfully obtained and lent. In addition, there 
was never a breach of the fiduciary relationship or other illegality involving APS and its 
i~lvestors. The funds lent by APS to Cotllersto~~e in this matter were from five (5) I~ldividual 
Retire~itent Accounts ("IRAs") with APS. (Aff. of Curtis DeYoung 11 7-8, Aff. of Dean 
DeYoung 5, Aff. of Drew Downs 1 5> Aff of Dale Henderson 1 5, Aff. of I-larry Segura 1/ 5). 
Rased on Cornerstone's Motion to Compel Responses to Second Set of Discovery, it is 
anticipated that Cornerstone will argue that variorrs provisions of the ERISA were violated. 
However, ERISA is not at issue because ERISA governs "employee benefit plans" as that term is 
defined in Section 3(3) of ERISA. See also ERISA Section 4. This nlatter involves IRAs, as 
opposed to einployee benefit plans. lRAs are governed by Section 408 of the 1ntei.nal Revenue 
Code (hereafter "Code") and the corresponding regulations. 
Code Section 408(e)(2) provides that an IRA may Lose its tax exempt status if the 
individual for whose benefit the IRA was established (or his or her beneficiary) engages in a 
transaction prohibited by Code Section 4975. Statutory exeinptions to prohibited transactions 
are found in Code Section 4975(d). 
Code Section 4975' provides that a prohibited transaction meails any direct or indirect: 
I For convenience of the COUII, 26 USC 5 4975 is attached hereto as Appendix "A". 
MEMOMNDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOT[ON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 5 
61- is" 
1 .  Sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property between a plan and a disqualified person; 
2. Lending of money or other extension of credit between a plan atid a disqualified 
person; 
3. Furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between a plan and a disqualified person; 
4. Transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a disqualified person of tlie incorne or 
assets of a plan; 
5. Act by a disqualified person wlio is a fiduciary whereby he deals with the income or 
assets of a plan in his own interests or for his own account; or 
6. Receipt of any consideration for his own personal account by any disqualified person 
who is a fiduciary from any party dealing with the plan in connection with a transaction 
involving the incorne or assets of the plan. 
For purposes of the foregoing, a plan includes an IRA. See Code Section 4975(e)(l)(B). 
A disqualified person includes (1) a person who is a fiduciary; (2) a person providing services to 
the plan; (3) a member of the family of a person described in (1) or (2); and (4) a corporation of 
which 50 percent or Inore of its stock is owned by a person described in  (1) or (2) . Code 
Section 4975(~)(2).~ 
A fiduciary means any person who: 
1 .  Exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting ~nanage~nent 
of such plan or exercises any authority or co~itrol respecting management or disposition 
of its assets; 
2. Renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with 
respect to any moneys or other prope~ty of such plan, or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so; 
There are additional disqualified persons defined in Section 4975(e)(2). The full 
definition is not set fotth, as it does not appear the relnaini~~g categories of tlie definition are at 
issue. 
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3. Has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of 
such plan; or 
4. Any persoil designated under Section 405(c)(l)(D) of ERISA 
See Code Section 4975(e)(3). -
In the instant case, evert if we assume for purposes of argument that APS and each of the 
five IRA holders are all disqualified persons, there is no identifiable prohibited transaction given 
the existing facts. 
The purpose of Cornerstone's Second Set of Discovery was to obtain facts that would 
assist it in identifying a prohibited transaction. The responses to that discovery, as well as the 
other facts of this case illustrate that there was 110 prohibited transaction or other illegality. 
IRA lnoiiey can be and is routinely invested. liere, tile lRAs each invested in the 
development project. Each IRA owner instructed and authorized Curtis DeYoung to make 
i~ivestmenls on their behalf. Each IRA was to share ill propo~tioli to the amount of its investment 
in any gains (or losses) on the investment. APS derived no ber~efit frorn these iilvestments. APS 
was not paid any fee or commission, nor was Curtis DeYoung paid any fee or colninissio~i 
relative to these investments. As  stated in Answer to Interrogatory No. 19, any recovery in this 
case will be paid to the IRAs. 
There are no facts indicating there was any sale, exchange or leasing of propeity between 
any of the 1RAs and any disqualified person. There are no facts indicating there was any le~idi~ig 
of money between any of the lRAs and any disq~lalified person. There are no facts itldicatitig 
there were any goods or services furnished between ally of the IRAs and a disqualified person.' 
Adrniliistrative services are provided by APS to the IRAs. To the extent such services 
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There are no facts indicating there was any hatisfer of IRA assets to, or for the use by or benefit 
of, any disqualified person. There are no facts indicating there were any acts of self-dealing by a 
fiduciary. There are no facts indicating there was any consideration received by a disqualified 
person from any party dealing with the IRA (k, there were no kickbacks of any kind). 
Accordingly, there are no identifiable prollibited t~at~sactions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based upot~ the foregoing, the coilsideration ~ltilized by APS in this matter was legal and 
APS did not breach any fiduciary duties, engage in any prohibited transactions, or other 
illegalities with regard to the IRAs that invested in the developlnent project. The Couit should 
grant APS' motion for summary judgment and hold Cornerstone's illegality defense does not 
apply. 
DATED this - day of July, 2007. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
- 
STEPHEN J. R)IO&~NEN --E 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
are viewed as a prohibited tratisaction under Code Section 4975(c)(l)(C), this type of transaction 
is exempted, and thus is pennissible. Code Section 4975(d)(20). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the L! day of July, 2007,I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing document lo the following person(s) as follows: 
Penelope North-Shaul [& U. S. Mail 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC Postage Prepaid 
P. 0. Box 277 [ ] I-fand Delivery 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 745-5160 
[ ] Elnail 
Winston V. Beard 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. 
2 105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
[k] U. S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
[ ] 1Haitd Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsirnile - 529-9732 
[ ] Eniail 
"-- mc STEPHEN J. MUIHONEN 
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within the taxable period, there is hereby imposed a tax and 
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imposed by this subsection shall be paid by any Quaiified Employee Pension Pians 
disqualified person who participated in the prohibited 56 150.04, 150.07. 
transaction (other than a fiduciary acting only as such). > 6 .Lbor a ~ l o v m e ~ . b b  
Matthew Bender), ch 153, 
Fiduciary Responsibility 00 153.07, 
(c) Prohibited transaction. 153.09. 
(1) General rule. For purposes of this Section, the term , 6 &hr ,,d Emlilovment L ~ W  
"prohibited transaction" means any direct o r  indirect--  atth thew Benderl. ch 15fi, ERISA's 
(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any property Administration and Enforcement Provisions 93 154.02, 154.04. 
between a plan and a disqualified person; 
(B) lending of money or other extension of credit 
.% m e G  
between a plan and a disqualified person; 
(C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between 
a plan and a disquaiified person; 
(D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a disqualified person of the income or 
assets of a plan; 
(E) act by a disqualified person who is a fiduciary w$,ereby he deals with the income or 
(j$* 
a. 
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assets of a plan in his own interest o r  for his own account; or 
(F) receipt of any consideration for his own personal account by any disqualified person 
who is a fiduciary from any party dealing with the plan in connection with a transaction 
involving the income or  assets of the plan. 
(2) Special exemption. The Secretary shall establish an exemption procedure for purposes 
of this subsection. Pursuant to such procedure, he may grant a conditional or unconditional 
exemption of any disqualified person or transaction, orders of disqualified persons or 
transactions, from all or part of the restrictions imposed by paragraph (1) of this subsection. 
Action under this subparagraph may be taken only after consultation and coordination with 
the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary may not grant an exemption under this paragraph 
unless he finds that such exemption is-- 
(A) administratively feasible, 
(B) in the interests of the plan and of its participants and beneficiaries, and 
(C) protective of the rights of participants and beneficiaries of the plan. 
Before granting an exemption under this paragraph, the Secretary shall require adequate 
notice to be given to interested persons and shall publish notice in the Federal Register of the 
pendency of such exemption and shall afford interested persons an opportunity to present 
views. No exemption may be granted under this paragraph with respect to  a transaction 
described in subparagraph (E) or (F) of paragraph (1) unless the Secretary affords an 
opportunity for a hearing and makes a determination on the record with respect to  the 
findings required under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this paragraph, except that in lieu 
of such hearing the Secretary may accept any record made by the Secretary of Labor with 
respect t o  an application for exemption under section 408(a) [26 USCS 5 408(aI] of title I of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [29 USCS Fc I108(a)]. 
(3) Special rule for individuai retirement accounts. An individual for whose benefit an 
individual retirement account is established and his beneficiaries shall be exempt from the 
tax imposed by this section with respect to any transaction concerning such account (which 
would otherwise be taxable under this section) if, with resped to such transaction, the 
account ceases to be an individual retirement account by reason of the application of section 
408(e)(Z)(A) [26 USCS 6 408feU2)(Al] or i f  section 408(e)(4) [26 USCS 6 408ik%lL&1 
applies to such account. 
(4) Special rule for Archer MSAs. An individual for whose benefit an Archer MSA (within the 
meaning of section 22O(d) 126 USCS 6 22O(dlJ) is established shall be exempt from the tax 
imposed by this section with respect to  any transaction concerning such account (which 
would otherwise be taxable under this section) if section 22O(e)(2) [26 USCS G 22O(e)(zJ] 
applies to such transaction. 
(5) Special rule for Coverdell education savings accounts. An individual for whose benefit a 
Coverdell education savings account is established and any contributor to such account shail 
be exempt from the tax imposed by  this section with respect to any transaction concerning 
such account (which would otherwise be taxable under this section) if section 530(d) [Z 
USCS &53O(dl] applies with respect to  such transaction. 
(6) Special rule for health savings accounts. An individual for whose benefit a health 
savings account (within the meaning of section 223(d) [ L 6 x S  6 223(dl]) is established 
shall be exempt from the tax imposed by this section with respect to any transaction 
concerning such account (which would otherwise be taxable under this section) if, with 
respect to such transaction, the account ceases to be a health savings account by reason of 
the application of section 223(e)(2) [26 USCS 6 223(e)(1).1 t o  such account. 
(d) Exemptions. Except as provided in subsection (f)(6), the prohibitions provided in 
subsection (c) shail not apply to-- 
( I )  any loan made by the plan to a disqualified person who is a participant or beneficiary of 
the plan if such loan-- 
(A) is available to ail such participants or beneficiaries on a reasonably equivalent basis, 
(6) is not made available to highiy compensated employees (within the meaning of 
section 414(q) [-CS 6 414(al]) in an amount greater than the amount made available to 
other employees, 
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(C) is made in accordance with specific provisions regarding such loans set forth in the 
plan, 
(D) bears a reasonable rate of interest, and 
(E) is adequately secured; 
(2) any contract, or reasonable arrangement, made with a disqualified person for office 
space, or legal, accounting, or other services necessary for the establishment or operation of 
the plan, if no more than reasonable compensation is paid therefor; 
(3) anv loan to a leveraged employee stock ownership plan (as defined in subsection (e) . . 
(7j), if-- 
(A) such loan is primarily for the benefit of participants and beneficiaries of the plan, and 
(B) such loan is at a reasonable rate of interest, and any collateral which is given to a 
disqualified person by the plan consists only of qualifying employer securities (as defined in 
subsection (e)(8)); 
(4) the investment of ail or part of a plan's assets in deposits which bear a reasonable 
interest rate in a bank or similar financiai institution supervised by the United States or a 
State, i f  such bank or other institution is a fiduciary of such plan and if-- 
(A) the plan covers only employees of such bank or other institution and employees of 
affiliates of such bank or other institution, or 
(B) such investment is expressly authorized by a provision of the pian or by a fiduciary 
(other than such bank or institution or affiliates thereof) who is expressly empowered by the 
plan to so instruct the trustee with respect to such investment; 
(5) any contract for life insurance, health insurance, or annuities with one or more insurers 
which are qualified to do business in a State if the plan pays no more than adequate 
consideration, and if each such insurer or insurers is-- 
(A) the employer maintaining the plan, or 
(B) a disqualif~ed person which is wholly owned (directly o r  indirectly) by the employer 
establishing the plan, or by any person which is a disqualified person with respect to the 
plan, but only if the total premiums and annuity considerations written by such insurers for 
life insurance, health insurance, or annuities for all plans (and their employers) with respect 
to which such insurers are disqualified persons (not including premiums or annuity 
considerations written by the employer maintaining the plan) do not exceed 5 percent of the 
total premiums and annuity considerations written for ail lines of insurance in that year by 
such insurers (not including premiums or annuity considerations written by the employer 
maintaining the plan); 
(6) the provision of any ancillary service by a bank or similar financial institution 
supervised by the United States or a State, i f  such sewice is provided at not more than 
reasonable compensation, if such bank or other institution is a fiduciary of such plan, and if-- 
(A) such bank or similar financiai institution has adopted adequate internal safeguards 
which assure that the provision of such ancillary service is consistent with sound banking and 
financial practice, as determined by Federal or State supervisory authority, and 
(8) the extent to which such ancillary service is provided is subject to specific guidelines 
issued by such bank or similar financial institution (as determined by the Secretary after 
consultation with Federal and State supervisory authority), and under such guidelines the 
bank or similar financiai institution does not provide such ancillary service-- 
(i) in an excessive or unreasonable manner, and 
(ii) in a manner that would be inconsistent with the best interests of participants and 
beneficiaries of employee benefit plans; 
(7) the exercise of a privilege to convert securities, to the extent provided in regulations of 
the Secretary, but only if the plan receives no less than adequate consideration pursuant to 
such conversion; 
(8) any transaction between a plan and a common or collective trust fund or pooled 
investment fund maintained by a disqualified person which is a bank or trust company 
supervised by a State or Federal agency or between a plan and a pooled investment fund of 
an insurance company qualified to do business in a State if-- 
(A) the transaction is a sale or purchase of an interest in the fund, 
(8) the bank, trust company, or insurance company receives not more than reasonable 
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compensation, and 
(C) such transaction is expressly permitted by the instrument under which the plan is 
maintained, or by a fiduciary (other than the bank, trust company, or insurance company, or 
an affiliate thereof) who has authority to  manage and control the assets of the plan; 
(9) receipt by a disquaiified person of any benefit to which he may be entitled as a 
participant or beneficiary in the plan, so long as the benefit is computed and paid on a basis 
which is consistent with the terms of the plan as applied to all other participants and 
beneficiaries; 
(10) receipt by a disqualified person of any reasonable compensation For services rendered, 
or for the reimbursement of expenses properly and actually incurred, in the performance of 
his duties with the plan, but no person so sewing who already receives full-time pay from an 
employer or an association of employers, whose employees are participants in the plan or 
from an employee organization whose m e m b e ~  are participants in such pian shall receive 
compensation from such fund, except for reimbursement of expenses properly and actually 
incurred; 
(11) service by a disqualified person as a fiduciary in addition to being an officer, 
employee, agent, or other representative of a disqualified person; 
(12) the making by a fiduciary of a distribution of the assets of the trust in accordance with 
the terms of the plan if such assets are distributed in  the same manner as provided under 
section 4044 of title I V  of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [29 USCS 5 
-1 (relating to allocation of assets); 
(13) any transaction which is exempt from section 406 of such Act [29 USCS 6 11061 by 
reason of section 408(e) of such Act 129 USCS $ 1108{el] (or which would be so exempt if 
such section 406 [ U S C S  6 4061 adplied to such transaction) o r  which is exempt from 
section 406 of such Act [29 USCS 6 11061 by reason of section 408(b)(12) of such Act [a 
USCS 6 1108(b)(121]; 
(14) anv transaction reauired or ~ermi t ted  under part 1 of subtitle E of title I V  or section 
42'23 b f  the Employee ~et i rement  income Security Act of 1974 [29 USCS 66 138L et seq, or 
F,], but this paragraph shali not appiy with respect to  the application of subsection (c) 
(1)(E) or (F); 
(15) a merger of multiemployer plans, or the transfer of assets or liabilities between 
muitiemployer plans, determined by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to meet the 
requirements of section 4231 of such Act [29 USCS 6 14111, but this paragraph shall not 
appiy with respect to  the application of subsection (c)(l)(E) or (F); 
(16) a saie of stock held by a trust which constitutes an individual retirement account 
under section 408(a) [26 USCS 6 408(al] to the individual for whose benefit such account is 
established if-- 
(A) such stock is in a bank (as defined in section 581 126 USCS $ 5811) or a depository 
institution holding company (as defined in  section 3(w)( l)  of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act (xU.5 .C.  1813[wUl) ,  
(6)  such stock is held by such trust as of the date of the enactment of this paragraph 
[enacted Oct. 22, 20041, 
(C) such sale is pursuant to an election under section 1362(a) 126 USCS 6 1362(al] by 
such bank or  company, 
(D) such saie is for fair market value at the time of sale (as established by an 
independent appraiser) and the terms of the sale are otherwise at least as favorable to such 
trust as the terms that would appiy on a saie to an unrelated party, 
(E) such trust does not pay any commissions, costs, or other expenses In connection 
with the saie, and 
(F) the stock is sold in a single transaction for cash not later than 120 days after the S 
corporation election is made; 
(17) Any transaction in connection with the provision of investment advice described in 
subsection (e)(3)(8) to a participant or beneficiary in a plan and that permits such participant 
or beneficiary to direct the investment of plan assets in  an individual account, If-- 
(A) the transaction is-- 
(i) the provision of the investment advice to the participant or beneficiary of the plan 
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with respect to  a security or other property availabie as an investment under the plan, 
(ii) the acquisition, holding, or sale of a security or other property available as an 
investment under the plan pursuant to the investment advice, or 
(iii) the direct or indirect receipt of fees or other compensation by the fiduciary adviser 
or an affiliate thereof (or any employee, agent, or registered representative of the fiduclary 
adviser or affiliate) in connection with the provision of the advice or in connection wlth an 
acquisition, holding, or sale of a security or other property available as an investment: under 
the plan pursuant to  the investment advice; and 
(8) the requirements of subsection (f)(8) are met, 
(18)any transaction involving the purchase or sale of securities, or other property (as 
determined by the Secretary of Labor), between a plan and a party in interest (other than a 
fiduciary described in subsection (e)(3)(B)) with respect to a plan if-- 
(A) the transaction involves a block trade, 
(B)at  the time of the transaction, the interest of the plan (together with the interests of 
any other plans maintained by the same plan sponsor), does not exceed 10 percent of the 
aggregate size of the biock trade, 
(C) the terms of the transaction, including the price, are at least as favorable to the plan 
as an arm's length transaction, and 
(D) the compensation associated with the purchase and sale is not greater than the 
compensation associated with an arm's length transaction with an unrelated party,[;] 
(19) any transaction involving the purchase or saie of securities, or other property (as 
determined by the Secretary of Labor), between a plan and a party in interest if-- 
(A) the transaction is executed through an electronic communication network, alternative 
trading system, or similar execution system or trading venue subject to regulation and 
oversight by-- 
(i) the appiicable Federai regulating entity, or 
(ii) such foreign regulatory entity as the Secretary of Labor may determine by 
regulation, 
(8) either-- 
(i) the transaction is effected pursuant to rules designed to match purchases and sales 
at the best price available through the execution system in accordance with appiicable ruies 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission or other relevant governmental authority, or 
(ii) neither the execution system nor the parties to the transaction take into account 
the identity of the parties in the execution of trades, 
(C )  the price and compensation associated with the purchase and saie are not greater 
than the price and compensation associated with an arm's length transaction with an 
unrelated party, 
(D) if the party in interest has an ownership interest in the system or venue described in 
subparagraph (A), the system or venue has been authorized by the plan sponsor or other 
independent fiduclary for transactions described in this paragraph, and 
(E) not less than 30 days prior to the initial transaction described in this paragraph 
executed through any system or venue described in subparagraph (A), a plan fiduciary is 
provided written or electronic notice of the execution of such transaction through such 
system or venue,[;] 
(20) transactions described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D) of subsection (c)(l) 
between a plan and a person that is a party in interest other than a fiduciary (or an affiliate) 
who has or exercises any discretionary authority or control with respect to the investment of 
the plan assets involved in the transaction or renders investment advice (within the meaning 
of subsection (e)(3)(8)) with respect to those assets, solely by reason of providing services 
to the plan or soiely by reason of a relationship to such a service provider described in 
subparagraph (F), (G), (H), or (I) of subsection (e)(Z), or both, but only if in connection with 
such transaction the plan receives no less, nor pays no more, than adequate consideration, 
r . 1  
L l i  
(21) any foreign exchange transactions, between a bank or broker-dealer (or any aFfiliate 
of either) and a plan (as defined in this section) with respect to  which such bank or broker- 
dealer (or affiliate) is a trustee, or other party in Interest person, if-- 
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(A) the transaction is in connection with the purchase, holding, or sale of securities or 
other investment assets (other than a foreign exchange transaction unrelated to any other 
investment in securities or other investment assets), 
( 8 )  at the time the foreign exchange transaction is entered into, the terms of the 
transaction are not less favorable to the plan than the terms generally available in 
comparable arm's length foreign exchange transactions between unrelated parties, or the 
terms afforded by the bank or broker-dealer (or any affiliate of either) in comparable arm's- 
length foreign exchange transactions involving unrelated parties, 
(C) the exchange rate used by such bank or broker-dealer (or affiliate) for a particular 
foreign exchange transaction does not deviate by more or less than 3 percent from the 
interbank bid and asked rates For transactions of comparable size and maturity at the time of 
the transaction as displayed on an independent service that reports rates of exchange in the 
foreign currency market for such currency, and 
(D) the bank or broker-dealer (or any affiliate of either) does not have investment 
discretion, or provide investment advice, with respect to the transaction,[;] 
(22) any transaction described in subsection (c)(l)(A) involving the purchase and saie OF a 
security between a plan and any other account managed by the same investment manager, 
if-- 
(A) the transaction is a purchase or sale, for no consideration other than cash payment 
against prompt delivery of a security for which market quotations are readily availabie, 
(8 )  the transaction Is effected at the independent current market price of the security 
(within the meaning of s.gilo~_?10.17a-7ib) of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations), 
(C) no brokerage commission, fee (except for customary transfer fees, the fact of which 
is disclosed pursuant to  subparagraph (D)), or other remuneration is paid in connection with 
the transaction, 
(D) a fiduciary (other than the investment manager engaging in the cross-trades or any 
affiliate) for each plan participating in the transaction authorizes In advance of any cross- 
trades (in a document that is separate from any other written agreement of the parties) the 
investment manager to engage in cross trades at the investment manager's discretion, after 
such fiduciary has received disclosure regarding the conditions under which cross trades may 
take place (but only if such disclosure is separate from any other agreement or disclosure 
involving the asset management relationship), including the written poiicies and procedures 
of the investment manqger described in subparagraph (H), 
(E) each plan participating in  the transaction has assets of at least $ 100,000,000, 
except that i f  the assets of a plan are Invested in a master trust containing the assets of 
plans maintained by employers in  the same controlled group (as defined in  section 407(d)(7) 
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [?9 USCS 6 1107(dU711), the 
master trust has assets of a t  least $ 100,000,000, 
(F) the investment manager provides to the plan fiduciary who authorized cross trading 
under subparagraph (D) a quarterly report detailing all cross trades executed by the 
investment manager in which the plan participated during such quarter, including the 
following information, as applicable: (i) the identity of each security bought or sold; (ii) the 
number of shares or units traded; (iii) the parties involved in  the cross-trade; and (iv) trade 
price and the method used to establish the trade price, 
(G) the investment manager does not base its fee schedule on the plan's consent to 
cross trading, and no other service (other than the investment opportunities and cost savings 
available through a cross trade) is conditioned on the plan's consent to cross trading, 
(H) the investment manager has adopted, and cross-trades are effected In accordance 
with, written cross-trading poiicies and procedures that are fair and equitable to all accounts 
participating in  the cross-trading program, and that include a description of the manager's 
pricing poiicies and procedures, and the manager's policies and pr'ocedures for allocating 
cross trades in an objective manner among accounts participating in the cross-trading 
program, and 
(I) the investment manager has designated an individual responsible for periodically 
reviewing such purchases and sales to ensure compliance with the written policies and 
procedures described in  subparagraph (H), and following such review, the individual shall 
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issue an annual written report no later than 90 days following the period to which i t  relates 
signed under penalty of perjury to the pian Fiduciary who authorized cross trading under 
subparagraph (D) describing the steps performed during the course of the review, the level 
of compliance, and any specific instances of non-compliance. 
The written report shall also notify the plan fiduciary of the plan's right to terminate 
participation in the investment manager's cross-trading program at any time,[;] or 
(23) except as provided in subsection (f)( l l ) ,  a transaction described in subparagraph (A), 
(B), (C), or (D) of subsection (c)(l) in connection wi.th the acquisition, holding, or disposition 
of any security or commodity, i f  the transaction is corrected before the end of the correction 
period. 
The exemptions provided by this subsection (other than paragraphs (9) and (12)) shall not 
apply to any transaction with respect to a trust described in section 401(a) [26 USCS 6 4 0 1  
m] which is part of a plan providing contributions or benefits for employees some or all of 
whom are owner-employees (as defined in section 401(c)(3) [&USCS 6 401fc)(3~J) in 
which a plan directly or indirectly lends any part of the corpus or income of the plan to, pays 
any compensation for personal services rendered to the plan to, or acquires for the plan any 
property from or seiis any property to, any such owner-employee, a member of the family 
(as defined in section 267(c)(4) [26 USCS c267(cl(41]) of any such owner-employee, or a 
corporation controlled by any such owner-employee through the ownership, directly or 
indirectly, of 50 percent or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock 
entitled to vote or 50 percent or more of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of the 
corporation. For purposes of the preceding sentence, a shareholder-employee (as defined in 
section 1379 [&LJSCS 6 13791, as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of 
the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982 [enacted Oct. 19, 19821), a participant or beneficiary 
of an individual retirement account o r  an individual retirement annuity (as defined in section 
408 [26 USCS-]), and an employer or association of employees which establishes such 
an account or annuity under section 408(c) [ U S C S  6 408(_cl] shall be deemed to be an 
owner-employee. 
(e) Definitions. 
(1) Plan. For purposes of this section, the term "plan" means-- 
(A) a trust described in section 401(a) [26 USCS 6 401(al] which forms a part of a plan, 
or a oian described in section 403(a) T2LUSCS 6 403fal], which trust or plan is exemot from . - 
tax inder  section 501(a) [26 USCS 6 501(al], 
(8) an individual retirement account described in section 408(a) [26 USCS ri408(aZ], 
(C'I an indiv~dual retirement annuity described in section 408(b) [ U S C S  fi 408(bIl. -, ,
( ~ j  an Archer MSA described in se;tion 220(d) 126 USCS UO(d) . ] ,  
(E) a health savings account described in section 223(d) [26 USCS 5223(d],  
iF) a Coverdell education savinas account described in section 530 [26 USCS Ei 5301. or \ ,  
(G) a trust, plan, account, or annuity which, a t  any time, has been determined by the 
Secretary to be described in  any preceding subparagraph of this paragraph. 
(2) Disqualified person. For purposes of this section, the term "disqualified person" means 
a person who is-- 
(A) a fiduciary; 
(8) a person providing services to the plan; 
(C) an employer any of whose employees are covered by the plan; 
(D) an employee organization any of whose members are covered by the plan; 
(E) an owner, direct or indirect, of 50 percent or more of-- 
(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or the totalvalue 
of shares o f  all classes of stock of a corporation, 
(ii) the capital interest or the profits interest of a partnership, or 
(iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise, , , 
which is an employer or an employee organization described in subparagraph (C) or (D); 
(F'I a member of the family (as defined in paragraph (6)) of any individual described in 
subia;agraph (A), (B), (C), o ~ ( E ) ;  - ') i) 
3 
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(G) a corporation, partnership, or trust or estate of which (or in which) 50 percent or 
more of-- 
(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or the total value 
of shares of all classes of stock of such corporation, 
(ii) the capital interest or profits interest of such partnership, or 
(iii) the beneficial interest of such trust or estate, 
is owned directly or indirectly, or held by persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), 
(C), (D), or (E); 
(H) an officer, director (or an individual having powers or responsibilities similar to those 
of officers or directors), a 10 percent or more shareholder, or a highly compensated 
empioyee (earning 10 percent or more of the yearly wages of an employer) of a person 
described in subparagraph (C), (D), (E); or (G); or 
(I) a 10 percent or more (in capital or profits) partner or joint venturer of a person 
described in subparagraph (C), (D), (E), or (G). 
The Secretary, after consultation and coordination with the Secretary of Labor or his 
delegate, may by regulation prescribe a percentage iower than 50 percent for subparagraphs 
(E) and (G) and iower than 10 percent for subparagraphs (H) and (I). 
(3) Fiduciary. For purposes of this section, the term "fiduciary" means any person who-- 
(A) exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management 
of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its 
assets, 
( 6 )  renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with 
respect to any moneys or other property of such pian, or has any authority or responsibility 
to do so, or 
(C) has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of 
such plan. 
Such term includes any person designated under section 405(c)(l)(B) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [ ~ 0 5 ( c 2 [ 1 1 ~ ] .  
(4) Stockholdlngs. For purposes of paragraphs (2)(E)(i) and (G)(i) there shali be taken into 
account indirect stockholdings which would be taken into account under section 267(c) [,& 
USCS 6 267(cl], except that, for purposes of this paragraph, section 267(c)(4) 126 USCS 6 
267(~)(41] shall be treated as providing that the members of the famiiy of an individual are 
the members within the meaning of paragraph (6). 
(5) Partnerships; trusts. For purposes of paragraphs (2)(E)(ii) and (iii), (G)(ii) and (iii), and 
(I) the ownership of profits or beneficial interests shali be determined in accordance with the 
rules for constructive ownership of stock provided in section 267(c) [26 USCS ~~] 
(other than paragraph (3) thereof), except that section 267(c)(4) 126 USCS 6 267CcWl  
shall be treated as providing that the members of the family of an individual are the 
members within the meaning of paragraph (6). 
(6) Member of family. For purposes of paragraph (2)(F), the family of any individual shall 
include his spouse, ancestor, lineal descendant, and any spouse of a lineal descendant. 
(7) Employee stock ownership plan. The term "employee stock ownership plan" means a 
defined contribution plan-- 
(A) which is a stock bonus plan which is qualified, or a stock bonus and a money 
purchase plan both of which are qualified under section 401(a) [23L.!JXCS 6 401{alJ, and 
which are designed to invest primarily in quaiifying employer securities; and 
(8 )  which is otherwise defined in regulations prescribed by the Secretary. 
A plan shall not be treated as an employee stock ownership plan unless it meets the 
requirements of section 409(h) [26 USCS 6 409[hf], section 409(0) [&!JSCS 6 409(01], 
and, if applicable, section 409(n), 409(p) [26 USCS 6 409inl, 3Efe)], and section 664fgj. 
126 USCS 6 6641p)J and, if the employer has a registration-type class of securities (as 
defined in section 409(e)(4) [26 USCS 6 409(e)f4n), it meets the requirements oFsection 
409(e) [26 USCS 409fe).]. 
(8) Qualifying employer security. The term "quaiifying empioyer security" means any 
employer security within the meaning of section 409(1) [26 USCS 6 409(1)]. 
If any moneys or other property of a plan are invssted in shares of an investment company 6;- s i  
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registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 [ I 5  USCS 99 80a-1 et seq.], the 
investment shall not cause that investment company or that investment company's 
investment adviser or principal underwriter to be treated as a fiduciary or a disqualified 
person for purposes of this section, except when an investment company or its investment 
adviser or principal underwriter acts in connection with a plan covering employees of the 
investment company, its investment adviser, or its principal underwriter. 
(9) Section made applicable to withdrawal liability payment funds. For purposes of this 
section-- 
(A) I n  oeneral. The term "oian" includes a trust described in section 501icH22) T26 . , .  , - -  
uscs 6 ~O;-(~(ZJJ]. 
(6) Disqualified person, In the case of any trust to  which this section applies by reason of 
suboaraaraoh (A). the term "disaualified oerson" includes anv Derson who is a disauaiified " ~ ,, 
person with' respect to any plan ;o which ;uch trust is permitted to make payments under 
section 4223 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [29 USCS 6 1-1. 
(f) Other definitions and special rules. For purposes of this section-- 
(1) Joint and several liability. I f  more than one person is liable under subsection (a) or (b) 
with respect to any one prohibited transaction, all such persons shall be jointly and severally 
liable under such subsection with respect to such transaction. 
(2) Taxable period. The term "taxable period" means, with respect to any prohibited 
transaction, the period beginning with the date on which the prohibited transaction occurs 
and ending on the earliest of-- 
(A) the date of mailing a notice of deficiency with respect to the tax imposed by 
subsection (a) under section 6212 126 USCS 55ZL1 ,  
(8) the date on which the tax imposed by subsection (a) is assessed, or 
(C) the date on which correction of the prohibited transaction is completed. 
(3) Saie or exchange; encumbered property. A transfer of real or personal property by a 
disqualified person to a plan shall be treated as a sale or exchange if the property is subject 
to a mortgage or similar lien which the plan assumes or if it is subject to a mortgage or 
similar lien which a disqualified person placed on the property within the 10-year period 
ending on the date of the transfer. 
(4) Amount involved. The term "amount invoived" means, with respect to a prohibited 
transaction, the greater of the amount of money and the fair market value of the other 
property given or the amount of money and the fair market value of the other property 
received; except that, in  the case of services described in  paragraphs (2) and (10) of 
subsection (d) the amount involved shall be only the excess compensation. For purposes of 
the preceding sentence, the fair market value-- 
(A) in the case of the tax imposed by subsection (a), shall be determined as of the date 
on which the prohibited transaction occurs; and 
(6) in the case of the tax imposed by subsection (b), shall be the highest fair market 
value during the taxable period. 
(5) Correction. The terms "correction" and "correct" mean, with respect to  a prohibited 
transaction, undoing the transaction to the extent possible, but in any case placing the plan 
in a financial position not worse than that in  which it would be if the disqualified person were 
acting under the highest fiduciary standards. 
(6) Exemptions not to apply to certain transactions. 
(A) I n  general, I n  the case of a trust described in section 401(a) 126 USCS $~4.Q!a>.] 
which is part of a plan providing contributions or benefits for employees some or all of whom 
are owner-employees (as defined in section 401(c)(3) [26 USCS 6 4011c)131]), the 
exemptions provided by subsection (d) (other than paragraphs (9) and (12)) shall not apply 
to a transaction in  which the plan directly or indirectly-- 
(i) lends any part of the corpus or income of the plan to, 
(ii) pays any compensation for personal services rendered to the plan to, or 
(iii) acquires for the plan any property from, or sells any property to, 
any such owner-employee, a member of the family (as defined in section 267(c)(4) [25. 
USCS 6 267[c)I41]) of any such owner-employee, or any corporation in which any such 
6 2  3 ~ ,  "" 
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owner-employee owns, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more of the total combined voting 
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or 50 percent o r  more of the total value of 
shares of all classes of stock of the corporation. 
(B) Special rules for shareholder-employees, etc. 
(i) I n  general. For purposes of subparagraph (A), the following shall be treated as 
owner-employees: 
(I) A shareholder-employee. 
(11) A warticiwant or beneficiary of an individual retirement plan (as defined in section 
7701(a)(3?) [&JSCS 6 7 7 0 1 ( a ~ 3 a ] ) .  
(111) An emolover or association of emwlovees which establishes such an individual 
retiremekt ];\an under iection 408(c) [USCS 6 408(~1]. 
(ii) Exception for certain transactions involving shareholder-employees. Subparagraph 
(A)(iii) shall not apply to a transaction which consists of a sale of employer securities to an 
employee stock ownership plan (as defined in subsection (e)(7)) by a shareholder-employee, 
a member of the famlly (as defined in section 267(c)(4) [26 USCS3 267(c)(4)]) of such 
shareholder-employee, or a corporation in which such a shareholder-employee owns stock 
representing a 50 percent or greater interest described in subparagraph (A). 
(iii) Loan exception. For purposes of subparagraph (A)(i), the term "owner-empioyee" 
shall only include a person described in subctause (11) or (111) of clause (i). 
(C) Shareholder-employee. For purposes of subparagraph (B), the term "shareholder- 
employee" means an employee or officer of an S corporation who owns (or is considered as 
owning within the meaning of section 318(a)(l) [26 USCS %318(a).Q]) more than 5 percent 
of the outstanding stock of the corporation on any day during the taxable year of such 
corporation. 
(7) S corporation repayment of loans for qualifying employer securities. A plan shall not be 
treated as violating the requirements of section 401 or 409 126 USCS 6 401 or 4091 or 
subsection (e)(7), or as engaging in a prohibited transaction for purposes of subsection (d) 
(3), merely by reason of any distribution (as described in section 1368(a) 126 USCS 6 1368 
m) with respect to S corporation stock that constitutes qualifying employer securities, 
which in accordance with the plan provisions is used to make payments on a loan described 
in subsection (d)(3) the proceeds of which were used to acquire such qualifying employer 
securities (whether or not allocated to participants). The preceding sentence shaii not apply 
in the case of a distribution which is paid with respect to any employer security which is 
allocated to a participant unless the plan provides that employer securities with a fair market 
value of not less than the amount of such distribution are allocated to such participant for the 
year which (but for the preceding sentence) such distribution would have been allocated to 
such participant. 
(8) Provision of investment advice to participant and beneficiaries. 
(A) I n  general. The prohibitions provided in subsection (c) shall not apply to transactions 
described in subsection (b)(14) i f  the investment advice provided by a fiduciary adviser is 
provided under an eligible investment advice arrangement. 
(6) Eligible investment advice arrangement. For purposes of this paragraph, the term 
"eligible investment advice arrangement" means an arrangement-- 
(i) which either-- 
(I) provides that any Fees (including any commission or other compensation) 
received by the fiduciary adviser for investment advice or with respect to the sale, holding, or 
acquisition of any security or other property for purposes of investment of plan assets do not 
vary depending on the basis of any investment option selected, or 
(11) uses a computer model under an investment advice program meeting the 
requirements of subparagraph (C) in connection with the provision of investment advice by a 
fiduciary adviser to  a participant or beneficiary, and 
(ii) with respect to which the requirements of subparagraphs (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), 
and (I) are met. 
(C) Investment advice program using computer model. 
(i) I n  general. An investment advice program meets the requirements of this 
subparagraph if the requirements of clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) are met. 
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(ii) Computer modei. The requirements of this clause are met if the investment advice 
provided under the investment advice program is provided pursuant to a computer modei 
that-- 
(I) applies generally accepted investment theories that take into account the historic 
returns of different asset classes over defined periods of time, 
(11) utilizes relevant information about the participant, which may include age, life 
expectancy, retirement age, risk tolerance, other assets or sources of income, and 
preferences as to certain types of investments, 
(111) utilizes prescribed objective criteria to provide asset allocation portfolios 
comprised of investment options available under the plan, 
(IV) operates in a manner that is not biased in favor of investments offered by the 
fiduciary adviser or a person with a material affiliation or contractual relationship with the 
fiduciary adviser, and 
(V) takes into account all investment options under the plan in specifying how a 
participant's account balance should be invested and is not inappropriately weighted with 
respect to  any investment option. 
(iii) Certification. 
(I) I n  general. The requirements of this clause are met with respect to any 
investment advice program if an eligible investment expert certifies, prior to the utilization of 
the computer model and in accordance with rules prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, that 
the computer model meets the requirements of clause (ii). 
(11) Renewal of certifications. If, as determined under regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary of Labor, there are material modifications to a computer modei, the requirements 
of this clause are met only if a certification described in subclause (I) is obtained with respect 
to the computer model as so modified. 
(111) Eligible investment expert. The term "eligible investment expert" means any 
person which meets such requirements as the Secretary of Labor may provide and which 
does not bear any material affiliation or contractual relationship with any investment adviser 
or a related person thereof (or any employee, agent, or registered representative of the 
investment adviser or related person). 
(iv) Exclusivity of recommendation. The requirements of this clause are met with 
respect to any investment advice program if-- 
(I) the only investment advice provided under the program is the advice generated 
by the computer modei described in clause (ii), and 
(11) any transaction described in subsection (b)(l4)(B)(ii) occurs solely at the 
direction of the participant or beneficiary. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall preclude 
the participant or beneficiary from requesting investment advice other than that described in 
clause (i), but only if such request has not been solicited by any person connected with 
carrying out the arrangement. 
(D) Express authorization by separate fiduciary. The requirements of this subparagraph 
are met with respect to an arrangement i f  the arrangement is expressly authorized by a plan 
fiduciary other than the person offering the investment advice program, any person providing 
investment options under the plan, or any affiliate of either. 
(E) Audits, 
(I) I n  general. The requirements of this subparagraph are met if an independent 
auditor, who has appropriate technical training or experience and proficiency and so 
represents in writing-- 
(I) conducts an annual audit of the arranyement for compliance with the 
requirements of this paragraph, and 
(11) foliowing completion of the annual audit, issues a written report to the fiduciary 
who authorized use of the arrangement which presents its specific findings regarding 
compliance of the arrangement with the requirements of this paragraph. 
(ii) Special ruie for individuai retirement and similar plans. I n  the case of a plan 
described in  subparagraphs (8) through (F) (and so much of subparagraph (G) as relates to 
such subparagraphs) of subsection (e)(l), in lieu of the requirements of clause (i), audits of 
the arrangement shaii be conducted at such times and in  such manner as the Secretary of 6.J- 34 
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Labor may prescribe. 
(iii) Independent auditor. For purposes of this subparagraph, an auditor is considered 
independent i f  it is not related to the person offering the arrangement to the plan and is not 
related to any person providing investment options under the plan. 
(F) Disclosure. The requirements of this subparagraph are met if-- 
(i) the fiduciary adviser provides to a participant or a beneficiary before the initial 
provision of the investment advice with regard to any security or other property offered as an 
investment option, a written notification (which may consist of notification by means of 
electronic communication)-- 
(I) of the role of any party that has a material affiliation or contractuai relationship 
with the financial adviser in  the development of the investment advice program and in the 
selection of investment options available under the pian, 
(11) of the past performance and historical rates of return of the investment options 
available under the plan, 
(111) of all fees or other compensation relating to the advice that the fiduciary adviser 
or any affiliate thereof is to receive (including compensation provided by any third party) in 
connection with the provision of the advice or in connection with the sale, acquisition, or 
holding of the security or other property, 
(IV) of any material affiliation or contractual reiationship of the fiduciary adviser or 
affiliates thereof in the security or other property, 
(V) the manner, and under what circumstances, any participant or beneficiary 
information provided under the arrangement will be used or disclosed, 
(VI) of the types of services provided by the fiduciary adviser in connection with the 
provision of investment advice by the fiduciary adviser, 
(VII) that the adviser is acting as a fiduciary of the plan in connection with the 
provision of the advice, and 
(VIII) that a recipient of the advice may separately arrange for the provision of 
advice by another adviser, that could have no material affiliation with and receive no fees or 
other compensation in connection with the security or other property, and 
(ii) at  all times during the provision of advisory services to the participant or 
beneficiary, the fiduciary adviser-- 
(I) maintains the information described in clause (i) in accurate form and in the 
manner described in subparagraph (H), 
(11) provides, without charge, accurate information to the recipient of the advice no 
less frequently than annually, 
(111) provides, without charge, accurate information to the recipient of the advice 
upon request of the recipient, and 
(IV) provides, without charge, accurate information to the recipient of the advice 
concerning any material change to the information required to be provided to the recipient of 
the advice at a time reasonabiy contemporaneous to the change in information. 
(G) Other conditions. The requirements of this subparagraph are met if-- 
(i) the fiduciary adviser provides appropriate disclosure, in connection with the sale, 
acquisition, or holding of the security or other property, in accordance with ail applicable 
securities laws, 
(ii) the sale, acquisition, or holding occurs solely at the direction of the recipient of the 
advice, 
(iii) the compensation received by the fiduciary adviser and affiliates thereof in 
connection with the sale, acquisition, or holding of the security or other property is 
reasonable, and 
(iv) the terms of the sale, acquisition, or holding of the security or other property are 
at least as favorable to the plan as an arm's iength transaction would be. 
(H) Standards for presentation of information. 
(i) I n  general. The requirements of this subparagraph are met if the notification 
required to be provided to participants and beneficiaries under subparagraph (F)(i) is written 
in a clear and conspicuous manner and in a manner calculated to be understood by the 
average plan participant and is sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonabiy apprise 
6%. Cfp. - %Jd 
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such participants and beneficiaries of the information required to be provided in the 
notification. 
(ii) Model form for disclosure of fees and other compensation. The Secretary of Labor 
shall issue a model form for the disclosure of fees and other compensation required in 
subparagraph (F)(i)(III) which meets the requirements of clause (i). 
(I) Maintenance for 6 years of evidence of compliance. The requirements of this 
subparagraph are met if a fiduciary adviser who has provided advice referred to in 
subparagraph (A) maintains, for a period of not less than 6 years after the provision of the 
advice, any records necessary for determining whether the requirements of the preceding 
provisions of this paragraph and of subsection (d)(17) have been met. A transaction 
prohibited under section 406 [29 USCS 5 11061 shali not be considered to have occurred 
solely because the records are lost or destroyed prior to the end of the 6-year period due to 
circumstances beyond the control of the fiduciary adviser. 
(I) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph and subsection (d)(17)-- 
(i) Fiduciary adviser. The term "fiduciary adviser" means, with respect to a plan, a 
person who i s  a fiduciary of the plan by reason of the provision of investment advice by the 
person to the participant or beneficiary of the plan and who is-- 
(I) registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
(15 U.S.C. 80b-1 et seq.) or under the laws of the State in which the fiduciary maintains its 
principal office and place of business, 
(11) a bank or similar financial institution referred to in  section 408(b)(4) 129 USCS 6 
408(b)(4)] or a savings association (as defined in section 3(b)(l) of the Federal Deposit - 
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(b)(ll), but only if the advice is provided through a trust 
department of the bank or similar financial institution or savings association which is subject 
to periodic examination and review by Federal or State banking authorities, 
(111) an insurance company qualified to do business under the laws of a State, 
(IVI a oerson reaistered as a broker or dealer under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (15' U : S . C ~  et seq.), 
- 
(V) an affiliate of a person described in any of subclauses (I) through (IV), or 
(VI) an employee, agent, or registered representative of a person described in 
subclauses (I) through (V) who satisfies the requirements of applicable insurance, banking, 
and securities laws relating to the provision of the advice. For purposes of this title, a person 
who develops the computer model described in subparagraph (C)(ii) or markets the 
investment advice program or computer model shali be treated as a person who is a fiduciary 
of the plan by reason of the provision of investment advice referred to in subsection (e)(3) 
(8) to the participant or beneficiary and shall be treated as a fiduciary adviser for purposes of 
this paragraph and subsection (d)(17), except that the Secretary of Labor may prescribe 
rules under which only 1 fiduciary adviser may elect to be treated as a fiduciary with respect 
to the plan. 
(ii) Affiliate. The term "affiliate" of another entity means an affiliated person of the 
entity fas defined in section 2(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C.8Oa- . . .  . &is)). 
(iii) Registered representative. The term "registered representative" of another entity 
means a person described in section 3(a)(18) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (L5_ 
U=a>(l8)) (substituting the entity for the broker or dealer referred to in such 
section) or a person described in section 202(a)(17) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
(15 U.S.C. 8Ob-2Lal(JA) (substituting the entity for the investment adviser referred to in 
such section). 
(9) Block trade. The term "block trade" means any trade of at least 10,000 shares or with a 
market value of at least $ 200,000 which will be allocated across two or more unrelated 
client accounts of a fiduciary. 
(10) Adequate consideration. The term "adequate consideration" means-- 
(A) in  the case of a security for which there is a generally recognized market-- 
(i) the price of the security prevailing on a national securities exchange which is 
registered under section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [ I 5  USCS 6 78f3, taking 
into account factors such as the size of the transactirqn,and marketability of the security, or 
6 1- sl, 
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(ii) if the security is not traded on such a national securities exchange, a price not less 
favorable to the plan than the offering price for the security as established by the current bid 
and asked prices quoted by persons independent of the issuer and of the party in interest, 
taking into account factors such as the size of the transaction and marketability of the 
security, and 
(B) in the case of an asset other than a security for which there is a generally recognized 
market, the fair market value of the asset as determined in good faith by a fiduciary or 
fiduciaries in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor. 
(11) Correction period. 
(A) I n  general. For purposes of subsection (d)(23), the term "correction period" means 
the 14-day period beginning on the date on which the disqualified person discovers, or 
reasonably should have discovered, that the transaction would (without regard to this 
paragraph and subsection (d)(23)) constitute a prohibited transaction. 
(B) Exceptions. 
(i) Employer securities. Subsection (d)(23) does not apply to any transaction between 
a plan and a plan sponsor or its affiliates that involves the acquisition or sale of an employer 
security (as defined in section 407(d)(l) [of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
19743 [29 USCS 6 1107(d)(ll]) or the acquisition, sale, or lease of employer real property 
(as defined in section 407(d)(2) [of such Act] 129 USCS Ei 1107fd)(&]). 
(ii) Knowing prohibited transaction. I n  the case of any disqualified person, subsection 
(d)(23) does not apply to a transaction if, at  the time the transaction is entered into, the 
disqualified person knew (or reasonably should have known) that the transaction would 
(without regard to this paragraph) constitute a prohibited transaction. 
(C) Abatement of tax where there is a correction. I f  a transaction is not treated as a 
prohibited transaction by reason of subsection (d)(23), then no tax under subsections (a) 
and (b) shall be assessed with respect to such transaction, and if assessed the assessment 
shall be abated, and if collected shall be credited or refunded as an overpayment. 
(D) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph and subsection (d)(23)-- 
(i) Security. The term "security" has the meaning given such term by section 475(c)(2) 
[26 USCS 5 475(c1(2)] (without regard to subparagraph (F)(iii) and the last sentence 
thereof). 
(ii) Commodity. The term "commodity" has the meaning given such term by section 
475(e)(2) [26 USCS 6 475(eU21] (without regard to subparagraph (D)(iii) thereof). 
(iii) Correct. The term "correct" means, with respect to a transaction-- 
(I) to  undo the transaction to the extent possible and in any case to make good to 
the pian or affected account any losses resulting from the transaction, and 
(11) to restore to the plan or affected account any profits made through the use of 
assets of the plan. 
(g) Application of section. This section shall not apply-- 
( I )  in the case of a plan to which a guaranteed benefit policy (as defined in section 401(b) 
(2)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [29 USCS 9_Ll01(bH2>(81]) 
is issued, to  any assets of the insurance company, insurance service, or insurance 
organization merely because of its issuance of such policy; 
(2) to a governmental plan (within the meaning of section 414(d) [26 USCS Ei 414(d21); or 
(3) to a church plan (within the meaning of section 414(e) [26 USCS ~ ~ 1 )  with 
respect to which the election provided by section 410(d) 126 USCS 6 410f.dJ.l has not been 
made. 
I n  the case of a plan which invests in any security issued by an investment company 
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 [ I S  USCS 56 Boa-1 et seq.3, the 
assets of such plan shall be deemed to include such security but shall not, by reason of such 
investment, be deemed to include any assets of such company. 
(h) Notification of Secretary of Labor. Before sending a notice of deficiency with respect to 
the tax imposed by subsection (a) or (b), shall notify the Secretary of Labor 
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and provide him a reasonable opportunity to obtain a correction of the prohibited transaction 
or to comment on the imposition of such tax. 
(i) Cross reference. For provisions concerning coordination procedures between Secretary of 
Labor and Secretary of the Treasury with respect to application of tax imposed by this section 
and for authority to waive imposition of the tax imposed by subsection (b), see section 3003 
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1924 [29 USCS 6 12031. 
History: 
(Added Sept. 2, 1974, P.L. 93-406, Title 11, 5 2003(a), 88 Stat. 971; Oct. 4, 1976, P.L. 94- 
455, Title XIX, 5 1906(b)(13)(A), 90 Stat. 1834; Nov. 6, 1978, P.L. 95-600, Title I, Tj 141(f) 
(5), (6), 22 Sbt .  7725; April 1, 1980, P.L. 96-222, Title I, 5 lOl(a)(7)(C), (K), (L)(iv)(III), 
(v)(XI), 94 Stat. 198-201; Sept. 26, 1980, P.L. 96 -3a ,  Title 11, 55 208(b), 209(b), 94 Stat. 
12.@, 1290; Dec. 24, 1980, P.L. 96-596, 5 2(a)(l)(K),(L), (2)(I), (3)(F), 94 Stat. 3469, -- 
3471; Jan. 12, 1983, EL .  97-448, Title 111, 5 305(d)(5), 96 Stat. 2 a ;  July 18, 1984, E L  
w, Div A, Title IV, 5 491(d)(45), (46), (e)(7), (a), 98 Stat. 851-853; Oct. 22, 1986, ELC, 
99-514, Title XI, 5 1114(b)(lS)(A), Title XVIII, 55 1854(f)(3)(A), 1899A(51), lQ!LSL&. 
2452, 2882, 2961; Nov. 5, 1990, P U O l - 5 0 8 ,  Title XI, 5 11701(m), 104 Stat.1388-513; -- 
Aug. 20, 1996, P.L. 104-188, Title I, 55  1453(a), 1702(g)(3), 110 Statt 1817, 1873; Aug. 
21, 1996, P.L. 104-191, Title 111, 5 301(f), -tat. 2051; Aug. 5, 1997, P.L. 105-34, Title 
11, g 213(b), Title X, 5 1074(a), Title XV, 55 1506(b)(l), 1530(c)(10), Titie XVI, 5 1602(a) 
(S), 111 Stat. 816, 949, 1065, 1079, 1094; July 22, 1998, L L .  105-206, Title VI, 5 6023 
(19), 112 Stat. 825; Dec. 21, 2000, P.L. 106-554, 5 l(a)(7) (Title 11, 5 202(a)(7), (b)(7), 
( lo)), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-628, 2763A-629; June 7, 2001, P.L. 107-16, Title VI, gg 612 
(a), 656(b), 115 Stat. 100, 134; P.L. 107-22, 5 l(b)(l)(D), (3)(D), July 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 
197; Dec. 8, 2003, P.L. 108-173, Title XII, 5 12Ol(f), .I17 Stat. 2479; Oct. 22, 2004, -- 
108-357, Title 11, Subtitle D, 55 233(c), 240(a), -Stat. 1434, 1437; Dec. 21, 2005, P.L. 
109-135, Title IV, Subtitle A, 5 413(a)(2), 119 StatL2m; Aug. 17, 2006, U. 109-280, Title 
VI, Subtitle A, I j  601(b)(l), (2), Subtitle 8, 55 611(a)(2), (c)(2), (d)(2), (e)(2), (g)(2), 612 
(b), 120 Stat. 958, 967, 969, 970, 971, 974, 976.) 
- + History; Ancillary Laws and Directives: 
;t; 1. Explanatory notes 
2. Amendments 
& 3. Other provisions 
- + 1. Explanatory notes: 
Bracketed semicolons have been inserted in subsec. (d)(17)(8), (la)@), (19)(E), (20), 
(21)(D) and (22) to indicate the punctuation probably intended by Congress. 
'The words "of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974" and "of such Act" 
have been inserted in subsec. ( f ) ( l l )  to indicate the probable intent of Congress to include 
such language. 
'S 2. Amendments: 
I n  2006, &log-280, Sec. 601(b)(l), (2) (applicable to advice referred to in subsec. (c)(3) 
(B) [(e)(3)(6)] of this section provided after 12/31/2006, as provided by Sec. 601(b)(4) OF 
P.L. 109-280, which appears as a note to this section), amended subsec. (d) by deleting "or" 
at the end of para. (IS), substituting ";orv for a concluding period in para. (16)(F), and 
adding para. (17); and added subsec. (f)(8). 
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Cornerstone submits this brief in support of its second rnotion for summaty judgment. 
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RELEVANT FACTS FOR SUMMARY JUDMENT 
The facts presented here are abbreviated because this case has been previously briefed 
and this motion relies only on some v e ~ y  discrete parts of the record, most of which were just 
recently produced through compelled discovery on May 3 I ,  2007. In its amended complaint, the 
plaintiff, American Pension Services, Inc. (APS) alleges: 
13. Prior to Plaintiff's ageetl?ent with Cornerstone and/or its manager(s) and/or 
member(s) or individual(s) affiliated thereto, to provide the foregoing stream of 
financing for the above mentioned construction and subdivision project, 
Cornerstone and Plaintiff verbally agreed to certain repayment terms, including, 
but not limited to, an interest rate of ten percent (1 0%) per annun1 on the monies 
lent, a promissory note and deed of trust on the land in the construction and 
subdivision project, as well as an agreement between Conterstone and Plaintiff 
that Plaintiff was to receive $750.00 per lot sold in the project. 
14. This oral financing agreement made by Cornerstone with Plaintiff was based 
upon the parties' prior course of dealings as well as in consideration to Plaintiff 
for his experience and knowledge and contracts in the finance industry, all of 
which ultimately led to Cornerstone's introduction and purchase of the 
subdivision properly. 
19. Despite repeated demands and contrary to the parties' agreement, Cornerstone 
has failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to pay Plaintiff $750.00 per 
lot for each lot sold. . . 
24. Cornerstone's failure to . . . to pay Plaintiff$750.00 per lot sold, constitutes a 
breach of said agreement. 
On May 31,2007, the plaintiff served, pursuant to an order compelling production the 
following supplemental responses to Cornerstone's written discovery requests: 
Answer to interrogatory No. 19: . . . Plaintiffhoped and hopes to benefit by 
receiving $750.00 per closing, a mere ffaction of what Defendant stoodlstands to 
gain. Iflwhen Plaintiff receives the $750.00 per lot from Defendants, such 
proceeds will be distributed to the individual accounts listed herein above. 
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Answer to i~lterrogatory no. 14: . . . Additionally Curtis DeYoung has the verbal 
and/or written authority of each previously identified individual to "contribute to, 
withdraw Erom and deposit funds in any type of retirement. plan . . .; select and 
change payment options for the principal under any retirement plan; make rollover 
contributions from any retirement plan to other retirement plans or individual 
retirement accounts; exercise all investment powers available under any tyye of 
self directed retirement plan; and, in general, exercise all powers with respect to 
retirement plans and retirement plan account balances which the principal could if 
present and under not disability. 
Answer to interrogatory no. 15: . . . The owners of each IRA Account as set forth 
herein above are fiduciaries along with Curtis L. DeYoung and APS, who are 
fiduciaries as well. 
Answer to interrogatory no. 17: . . . Each answer to Interrogatory No. 11 is a 
separate account as identified therein, for which Plaintiff has the right to exercise 
control over or exercise discretion regarding the investment, use, or disbursement. 
Curtis L. DeYoung exercised control over and/or discretion regarding the 
investment, use, or disbursement of the k i d s  distributed in this matter. 
AJfidavit ofMichael D. Gafiey, Ex. A, submitted wit11 Defendant's Motion to Antend Artswer 
Also attached to plaintiffs' supplernenta1 responses to defendant's request for production 
second set of discovery is a document entitled American Pension Services, Znc., Trust Agreement, 
identifying American Pension Services Inc., as the "Administrator" and First Utah Bank as the 
"Custodian". Paragraph 6 of that agreement states that " . . . subject to the provisions of this 
Agreement that empower you to direct the Administrator, Administrator's tights, powers, and 
duties as trustee ofyout. nzoizics and other assets shall include but not be limited to the following 
Id. [emphasis added] 
The following testimony from page 5 of deposition of Curtis L. DeYou~~g has been 
previously submitted to the court: 
Q. (Ms. Shaul): AII right. And is this a company - it's a11 incorporation, correct? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Okay. And are there shareholders? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Approximately how many? 
A. One. 
Q. Okay. And so does that mean you are the only shareholder? 
A. Yes. 
Deferzdaizt's Memor-andunz in Support of fFirsi/ Sztnzmaq Judgment, Ex. C, Depositiorz excerpt 
of Curtis L. DeYozlng, p. 5, lines 6-18. 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 11 of the supplemental responses identifies five individuals 
for whom APS was acting as an adminislrator. Those five are Drew Downs, Dale Henderson, 
Dean DeYoung, Hany Seyra, and Curtis L. DeYoung. Included in the documents attached to 
the pIaintifP s supplemental responses is an IRA account agreement with each of those five 
persons. Ga@y Afidavir, Ex. A. 
COMMENTS 
In the anended complaint, APS alleges it is contractually entitled to the $750.00 per lot 
fee. All causes of action are plead as contract or quasicontract claims. Nowhere in the amended 
complaint can one glean a trustee-beneficiary claim. OnIy in the supplemental responses to 
Conlerstone's second set of discovery is it claimed that APS was going to pass the money to the 
IRA accounts. See Gaffney Aff., Ex. A, Response to Interrogatory 19. Moreover, this position 
first appears in supplemental response served after an order compelling production less than 60 
days ago. APS has never alleged it made a contract with cornerstone under which the IRA 
accounts were third party beneficiaries and in the facts set forth it claims i t  was acting as a 
trustee. 
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At the hearing regarding the motion to compel, it was argued that it appeared that the 
$750/lot fee was to be paid to APS and that any such payment would be illegal. The arnerlded 
complaint is explicit in claiming the $750/lot fee was due to APS. This view is consistent with 
Martin Pool's deposition testimony: 
Q. Did you ever participate in any convel-sations with Curtis regarding the funding 
and the terms that would be required to obtain funding from - from hiin? 
A. You blow we had talked about, you know, Curtis putting up some capital in 
the deal, Curtis getting a - you know, an equity piece, participating in the profit on 
the deal, you know, Curtis potentially providing construction dollars. And that 
was - you know, that was - that was really it. 
Defendant's Memorarzdum in Support of [Firs$' Summary Judgment, Ex. B, Deposition excerpt 
of Martin Pool, p. 42, lines 9-18. 
Brad Kendrick, in his deposition staled: 
Q. In this context, Mr. Kendrick, what did it mean? 
A. 111 this context, it meant Curtis was going to have APS lend 200 some odd 
thousand dollars, in addition to other costs, to get us started. And for that, he 
wanted a $750 per lot equity position for bringing the project. End of story. 
Defendant's Menzorandum in Support of [First] Stirnmary Judgment, Ex. A, Depositiotz exceTpt 
of Brad Kendriclc, p, 83, lines 18-24. 
It has already been factually established that the underlying loan transaction has been 
fulfilled. In response to Request for Admission No. 1, the plaintiff admitted that "The principal 
and interest tias been paid in fuil, however, $750 per lot is owing for additional cot~sideration for 
the arrangement of the loans and financing. Dejendantrs Mer?zouandum in Support of[First] 
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Sumrizary Judgment, Ex. D, Plaintifrs Responses to Defendant S Discovery Requests, p. 5 
[emphasis added]. In answer to Interrogatory No. 19, the plaintiff has said that all recoveries 
will be distributed to the five IRAs that funded the loans. The 1RAs did not arrange for the loans 
and the financing; yet the fee was to be paid in collsideration for arrailging for the financing - not 
for the financing itself It is only logical that the consideration was supposed to be paid to the 
one that had access to the IRA funds. That payment would have been illegal as was argued in the , . 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Response to Second Set of Discoveiy to Plaintiff. 
However, the seeming change of position in the supplemental answer to interrogatory no. 19 
does not avoid the problem. It avoids one illegality only to step into another illegality. The 
second illegality is that it is illegal for APS to be the trustee of an IRA. If it was illegal for APS 
to be the trustee, then it cannot bring a claim as a real party in interest and cannot have standing 
to sue. 
I'LAINTIFE' IS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 
The issue raised in this second motion for summary judgment is whether APS possesses a 
legal right giving it standing to sue and making it a real party in interest under IRCP 17(a). If a 
party is not the real party in interest then it "lacks standing. " Scona, Inc. v. Green Willow Trust, 
133 Idaho 283, 985 P.2d 1145 (1999). If aparty is not the real party in interest, and thereby lacks 
standing, that party and the corresponding lawsuit brought by that party should be dismissed. 
Pro Iizdiviso v. Mid-Mile Holding Trust, 13 1 Idaho 741, 746 (Idaho 1998). Idaho Courts have 
]-led that a real party in interest "is the person who will be entitled to the benefits of the action if 
successfill." Id, at 288, 985 P.Zd at 1150; citing Carrington v. C~ann'all, 63 Idaho 651, 658, 124 
P.2d 914, 917 (1942). Similarly, the following is fro111 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil 
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paragraph 17.10 (3d ed. 2007): 
Real parties in interest are the persons or entities possessing the right or interest to 
be enforced through the litigation. The real party's right or interest must be Legally 
protected. A party not possessing a substantive legal right is not the real party in 
interest. 
A. Status of American Pension Services, IIIC. 
APS is not suing for money owed to AIPS. It has stated that the money will be distributed . . 
to the IRA'S for which it is the administrator. Thus APS is not a real party in interest and does 
not have standing unless it comes under one of the exceptions under Rule 17. Those exceptions 
allow persons acting as a guardian, administrator, executor, bailee, etc to sue in their own name 
for the benefit of the person they are acting for. There are two exceptions under Rule 17(a) that 
might apply to this case - trustee and third party beneficiary 
B. APS cannot sue as a trustee 
Treasury Regulation 1.408-2 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) An individual retirement account must be a trust or a custodial account. . . . 
(b) An individual retirement account must be a trust created or organized in the 
United States . . . for the exclusive benefit of an individual or h is beneftciaties. . 
(2) The trustee must be a bank (as defined in sectjon 408(n) and the regulations 
there under) or another person who demonstrates in the manner described in 
paragraph (e) of this section to the satisfaction of the commissioner, that the 
manner in which the tnrst will be administered will be consistent with the 
requirements of section 408 and this section. (En~pliasis added). 
APS is not a bank nor a credit union nor any other type of regulated financial institution. 
Furthennore, it is not "another person" that applied and obtained the authorization of the 
Treasury to serve as a trustee of IRA accounts. That can be definitively stated because the 
requirements to obtain that authorization include a diversity requirement as follows: 
(A). . . the applicant cannot be an individual (B) Sufficient diversity in the 
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ownership of an incorporated applicant is demonstrated in the following 
circu~nstances: (1) il.ldividuals each of whom owns more than 20 percent of the 
voting stock in the applicant own, in the aggregate, no more than 50% of such 
stock. . . 
APS is a corporation and is wholly owned by Curtis DeYoung. Therefore it cannot qualify to act 
as a trustee under the Treasury regulations. 
Even thougb APS is not a bank and is not authorized to be a trustee of IRAs, it has 
illegally assumed trustee powers and has illegally acted as a trustee. Since those actions are 
illegal, APS cannot be allowed to claim any benefit or rights under the trustee exception to Rule 
17. See: Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276,240 P.2d 833 (1952). 
It should be noted that an administrator of retirement funds does not handle funds. It does 
the accounting and files the necessary reports for compliance with Department of Labor and 
Department of the Treasury regulations. It has no fiduciary function. Administration is separate 
and distinction from fiduciary holding and control of hnds. In the case of IRAs, the fiduciary 
role is restricted to hanks. The five IRAs at issue were self directed IRAs. The self direction is a 
right of a participant to direct hislher own investme~lts. The regulations require that the owller of 
the IRA exercise independent control. The following is from 29 CFR 2440.404~-1(c)(2): 
Whether a participant or beneficiary has exercised independent control in fact 
wit11 respect to a transaction depends on the facts and circu~nstances of the 
particular case. However, a participant's or  beneficiary's exercise of control is not 
independent in fact if: (i) the participant or  beneficiary is subjected lo improper 
influence by a plan fiduciary or a plan sponsor with respect lo the hansaction. 
The right of a participant to independently direct a bank to make certain investinents is different 
from APS's outright exercise of fiduciary powers as a trustee. APS's misuse or misunderstanding 
of its position as an administrator does not give it the right to act for the IRA as if it were a 
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trustee. 
C. APS eaunot sue for the benefit o f  a third party. 
Allowing APS to sue under the contract made for the benefit of another would allow APS 
to have the rights of a trustee which is a position it has illegally assumed. It would give to APS 
the h i t s  of its illegal activity. Generally courts should not allow a party to benefit *om their 
illegal activity 
Ilowever, a proper understanding of the Rule 17 exception of a contract made for the 
benefit of another, leads to the conclusion that it does not give APS the right to sue in this 
I 
instance. The notes of the advisory committee for the o~iginal Rule 17 states that it was taken 
I 
I 
verbatim from a former equity rule. The same language was in the old Idaho Procedure Code 
I section 5-301 which has been replaced by Rule 17. The purpose of the "contract for the benefit 
I 
I of another" portion of Rule 17 was explained in United States v. Thomas B. Bourne Associates, 
I 
I 367 F. Supp. 919 (ED PA 1973). In that case the United States governlnent contracted with an 
engineering firm for services relating to the construction of an alrport in Guyana. The 
I 
governlnent sued the engineering firm for breach of contract. The issue before the court was 
whether the US government was the real party in interest. The court said: 
The inclusion of a "party with whom or in whose name a contract as been made 
for the benefit of another, however was purely 
". . . upon the ground of caution. The inclusion was to make clear that a party with 
. .  . 
whom or in wliose natiiea contract had been made for the benefit of another was 
not to be deprived ofhis colnlnoli law light because another was the beneficial 
I owner, and also to make certain that he need not join the beneficial owner." 
! 3A Moore's Federal Practice para. 17.13 (2d ed. 1970). 
I Its purpose then was to protect the right of the prolnisee to sue, where he had such 
! a right under the substantive law. That is, ifthe promisee had such a substantive 
I right, then it was the real party in interest under Rule 17. But since Rule 17 is 
I simply a rule of procedure, it did not, and could not, create rights were none exist 
I under the substantive law. McDaniel v. Dursf Manufucturbzg Company, 184 F .  
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Supp. 430,432 (D.D. C. 1960). Thus the words of art "real palty in interest" 
should be understood, as Moore suggests, ibid., para. 17.07 to mean that "[a]n 
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by the substantive law, 
has the right sought to be enforced." 
Another way of saying tl~is is that if the promisee does not have a right at common law to 
sue, this provision protected the promisee's right to relief. However, if the statutory law gives the 
promisee the right to sue then, the promisee becomes the only real party in interest. In Thomas B. 
. . 
Bourne, the United States was not allowed to recover the damages that belonged to Guyana. 
The Idaho court came to the same position under the prior equity section of the Procedure 
Code that incotporate the same language. In Gauchey v. George .lenserr & Sons, 74 Idaho 132, 
258 P.2d 357 (1953), the court approved the following: 
The real party in interest is the one who has a real, actual, material or substantial 
interest in the subject matter of the action, the primary object being to save the 
defendant frotn further suits covering the same demand or subject matter, i.e., the 
real party in interest is the person who can discharge the claim upon which the suit 
is brought and control the action brought to enforce it, and who is entitled to the 
benefits of the action, if successful, and can fully protect the one paying the claim 
or judgment against subsequent suits covering the same subject matter, by other 
persons. 
Idaho Code section 29-1 02 changed the common law that "no claim can be sued 
upon contractually unless it is in a contract between the parties to the suit." 17A Am JUT 2d 435. 
Idaho Code section 29- 102 is important to this case because it gave the third party beneficiary the 
right to sue. It provides that "[a] contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may 
. . .  . . . 
be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it." 
This simple rule is important in this case because it gives a right to the holders of the 
IRAs that APS cannot take away or diminish. Thus, if APS is allowed to sue Cornerstone and if 
it recovers &om cornerstone and does not pay the money in full to the IRAs, the IRA holders 
would still be entitled to sue Cornerstone and recover again. The purpose of Rule 17 would be 
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defeated since it would not protect Cornerstone from subsequent litigation. The only reasonable 
conclusion is that the owners of the IRAs are indispensable. A secondary conclusion is that since 
APS is not suing to recover ailytl~ing for itself and does not claim any right to the supposed $750 
per lot fee, it is not only an unnecessary pa~ty, but a party without an interest, or in legal 
tenninology a party,yithout standing, 
/,( -, 
DATED this,$#& of July, 2 
, ,' B 
f&y, ISB No. 3558 
lair GaFfney P.A. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I aln a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on JuIy 6,2007, I served a true 
and correct copy of the BRIEF IN SUPPORT 01: DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the following by the method of delivery designated below: 
Stephen J. Muhonen 0 U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered 
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
FAX: (208) 232-6109 
Penny North Shaul a U.S. Mail a W a n d - d e l i v e r e d ~ m i l e  
Dun11 Law Office 
PO Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
FAX: (208) 745-8160 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC., ) 
1 
Plaintiff (s) , ) 
) MINUTE ENTRY 
vs . ) 
) CASE NO. CV-06-140 
CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC, ) 
I 
Defendant (s) . ) 
-- 
On the 12th day of July, 2007, Plaintiff's motion to amend 
answer came before the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District 
Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Lane Erickson appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
No one appeared for or on behalf of the Defendant. (After 
the hearing counsel were Eound waiting on the bench in the hall.) 
Mr. Erickson presented argument in opposition to Plaintiff's 
motion to amend answer. 
The Court granted Plaintiff's motion to amend answer. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
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1 Defendant's Brief Supplen~enting 
its Second Motion for Summary 
) Judgment and in Oppositioll to 
1 Plaintiffs Second Motion for 
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1 
1 
The defendant, through counsel of record, files this brief supplementing its second 
motion for sumnary judgment and in opposition to the plaintiff's second motion fot 
summary judgment. This memorandum is supported by the Affidavit of Michael D. 
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Gaffney filed conte~nporaneously. 
INTRODUCTION 
The facts in this matter are in a state of flux. The deposition of Curtis DeYoung 
(DeYoung), the president of Arnerican Pension Services Inc. (APS) was taken last Friday, 
July 13,2007. Fro~n that deposition have come new facts directly relevant to defendant's 
second niotion for sumna~y j~~dgrnent 
The defense of illegality is also in a state of flux. The defenses are changing as 
new facts come to light. Initially the evidence suggested the $75011ot finder's fee was to 
be paid to and received by APS. That raised question that the payment of that fee would 
be illegal. Additional discovery was allowed to determine the facts relevant to that 
suspected illegality. As soon as the defendant's motion to compel was granted 
supple~nental answers to intenogatories were served. It1 those Mr. DeYoung stated that 
the finder's fee was to be paid to 5 IRA accounts and that APS would not be receiving it. 
That was confirnied in his subsequent deposition testimony. 
As a result of the recent deposition of DeYoung, the defendant subl~~its the 
following supplemental brief in support of its second motion for summary judgment and 
in opposition to the defendant's second n~otion for sumlnary judgnlent 
FACTS 
The facts in this matter have previously been asserted by the defendant and are 
incorporated here as if set forth in their entirety. Additionally, the deposition of Cultis 
DeYoung (DeYoung), the president of American Pension Services Inc. (APS) was taken 
July 13, 2007. Fronl that deposition have come new facts directly relevant to the parties' 
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9 Plaintiffs Second Motion for Su~nmaq Judgment - Page 2 65- 6- 
cross inotions for suinmary judgment. 
1. APS or DeYoung never talked to any of the five I M  account holders about 
investing in cornerstone. DeYoung Dep. 47:9-13. 
2. DeYoung individually and not APS made the decisions with regard to the 
Cornerstone investment. DeYoung Dep. 49:5-9 
3. According to DeYoung, APS filed the present lawsuit as the IRA account 
holders' agent. DeYoung Dep. 49:lO-20. 
4. I-lowever, DeYoung admits that the five IRA account holders did not authorize 
him to file the present lawsuit. DeYoung Dep. 33: 19-21. 
5. DeYoung clai~ns that APS was not acting as the IRA account holders' trustee 
or custodian. DeYoung Dep. 49:21-50:l. 
6. APS admits that it does not have any interest or right in the $750-per-Iot-fee 
which is the subject of this litigation. DeYoung Dep. 50:2-12 
7. The following exchange fiom DeYoung's deposition demonstrates APS' lack 
of interest in this litigation: 
Q. [By defense counsel] But APS did not, itself, expect to get paid and, itself, 
receive rnoney did it? 
A. No. It was doing it on behalf of the accounts. 
Q. All right, In bringing this litigation, what benefit does APS expect to get out 
of this litigation? 
A. Nothing. 
DeYo~mg Dep. 64:14-22. 
8. Of the five IRA account holders the only one who signed a power of attorney 
to allow DeYoung to act on his behalf was Drew Downs. DeYoung Dep. 4.8:4-6, Ex. 14. 
Defendant's Brief Supplementing its Second Motion for Sunxnary Judgment and in Opposition to 
fj 5- 3 Plaintiffs Second Motion for Sunmary Judgment - Page 3 
9. All of the other IRA account holders orally gave general statements to go 
ahead and invest their money. DeYoung Dep. 48:7-49:l. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
A motion for s~nn~nary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any matelid fact and that the nloving party is entitled to judg~nent as a matter 
of law." IDANOR. CIV. P. 56(c) (2007); GUFarnzs  v. FzazlcIrrigatiorz Co., 119 Idaho 
514, 516-17, 808 P.2d 851, 853-54 (1991). It is recognized that when assessing the 
motion for surti~nary judgment, the court must draw all facts and inferences in favor of 
the non-moving party. G &MFarrns v. FunkIrvigatiorz Co., 119 Idaho at 517, 808 P.2d 
at 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872,874,876 P.2d 154, 156 
(Ct. App. 1994); Haessley v. Safeco Etle Ins. Co. ofldaho, 121 Idaho 463, 825 P.2d 1119 
The moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of 
rnate~ial fact. Tingly v. Iiaruison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). The non- 
moving party is entitled to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding the elements 
challenged by the rnoving party's motion. Olseiz v. .LA. Freel7zart Co., I17 Idaho 706, 
720,791 P.2d 1285, 1299 (1990), citing, Celotex v. Cahett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); see also 
, , ,  , . . , 
Radell ii. Beelcs, 115 ldaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). 
If reasonable people could reach different coilclusions or inferences from the 
evidence, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Thonzpsoiz v. Pike, 125 
Idaho 897, 900, 876 P.2d 595,598 (1994); Doe v. Durbschi, 110 Idaho 466,470, 716 P.2d 
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ARGUMENT 
The defendant's second motion for summary judgnent has five bases. Bases two 
and three are that the plaintiff has no standing and is not the real party in interest. Those 
two bases came about because of the inquily into the perceived illegality, but are not 
based on an illegality defense. The recent deposition of DeYoung clearly sllows that APS 
lacks standing and is not the real party in interest and APS' cornplaint warrants dismissal. 
The defendant's fifth basis for its second rnotion for summary judgnent is that the 
plaintiffs claim is an illegal transaction. It is this sole basis which the plaintiff takes 
issue with in its second rnotion for summary judgment The claimed agreement on the 
$750/1ot fee was at most an oral discussion between APS and Cornerstone. APS was 
acting under a general power of attorney that for four of the Eve IRA account holders that 
was as general as "do whatever you want." Four of the five IRA accounts bad not 
adopted m y  written IRA agreement of an existing financial institution. Those IRA 
accounts were oral and a bank was not acting as a trustee or custodian of the funds after 
they were loaned to cornerstone. There was no note. Such conduct is a gross violation of 
the rules applicable to IRAs. The defendant is entitled to assert its defense of illegality. 
I. APS IacBs standing and is not a real party in interest. 
Since APS lacks standing, its co~nplaint warrants dismissal. If a party is not the 
real party in interest then it "lacks standing.'' Scotza, Inc. v. Green FEllow Trust, 133 
Idaho 283, 985 P.2d 1145 (1999). If aparty is not the real party in interest, and thereby 
lacks standing, that party and the corresponding lawsuit brought by that party should be 
dinnissed. Pro indiviso v. Mid-Mile IToldiizg Trust, 13 1 Idaho 741, 746 (Idaho 1998). 
Defendant's Brief Suppleznenting its Second Motion for Sumnlary Judgment and ill Opposition to 
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Idaho Courts have iuled that a real party in interest "is the person who will be entitled to 
the benefits of the action if successfi~l." Scona, I n c ,  a133 Idaho at 288, 985 P.2d at 1150. 
Standing is the legal right to initiate a lawsuit. To do so, a person must be 
sufficiently affected by the inalter at hand, and there must be a case or controversy that 
can be resolved by legal action. There are t l ~ e e  requirements for standing: (1) injuvy in 
fact, wl~ich ineans an invasion of a legally protected iitterest that is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypotlietical; (2) a causal 
relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, wltich means that the illjury 
fairly can be traced to the challenged actio~t of the defendant, and has not resulted from 
the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) a likelihood that 
the inju~y will be redressed by a favorable decisioii, which means that the prospect of 
obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling is not too speculative. 
Lujait v. DeJendevs of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130,2136 (1992). 
Standing is founded "in concern about the proper--and properly limited--role of 
the courts in a de~nocratic society. " U'arth, 422 U.S. at 498. When a11 individual seeks to 
avail himself of the courts, he nlust show that he "is immediately in danger of sustailxing a 
direct injury." Expavte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937). This requirement is necesssuy 
to ensure that courts reserve tlieir judicial power for 'concrete legal issues, presented in 
actual cases, not abstractions. Assoc. Gen. Cont~adors ofCalfo~nia v. Coalition,fov 
Economic Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1991) 
DeYoung unequivocally testified that APS has no right to the clailned $750 fee. 
DeYoung Dep. 50:2-12. When asked wltat APS expected to get out of the litigation 
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DeYoung responded, "nothing." DeYoung Dep. 64:14-22. Under those circumstances 
APS has sustained no injtuy and, therefore, has no standing to bring this case. 
Tlte plaintiff has tried to use the real party in interest rule to circunvent its lack of 
standing. IRCP rule 17 recognizes that a suit can be brought in the name of a trustee or a 
contracting party that makes a contract giving right to a third party beneficiary. It should 
be noted that Rule 17 does not allow an agent who makes a contract for a principal to sue 
in the agent's name. If the president of a cornpany makes a contract for his company, the 
cornpany is the proper pa~iy plaintiff not the president. DeYoung's deposition closes the 
door 011 APS' ability to assert its trustee, third party beneficiary, axid agent arguments. 
The plaintiff cannot and does not claim it is suing as trustee. The following 
exchange ffonom DeYoung's deposition demonstrates: 
Q. Okay. And the five individuals have authorized the corporation to do it as its 
agent? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. You're not doing that as a trustee because you're not a trustee, right? 
A. That's correct. 
DeYoung Dep. 49:15-23. Therefore, the plaintsf cannot claim he was acting as the 
trustee in bringing the lawsuit. 
Further, the plaintiff did not claim to have made a contract with the-defendant in 
which the IRA's were third party beneficiaries. DeYoung was clear that he made the 
contract as an agent of the IRA's and under the oral, and in the case of one IRA written, 
power of attorneys. Id.; 48:4-13 
Defendant's Brief Supplementing its Second Molioil for Summary Judgment a ~ d  in Opposition to 
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The legal analysis of why the third party beneficiary exception to Rule 17 does not 
apply in this case was set forth in the brief in support of defe~ldant's second  notion f o ~  
summary judgment and will not be restated here. 111 essence the rule is to ailow a third 
party beneficiary to sue to enforce the rights conferred on hiinlher. That is not an issue in 
Idaho since the common law rule now allowing third party beneficiaries to sue directly 
was changed by statute. 
Rule 17 does not specie that an agent may sue in his own name. Therefore, the 
question wit11 regard to agent and principal is a traditional analysis of standing. It is a 
question of who has been injured. In the case of a president making a contract for 
company A; if the contract is breached it is company A that has been injured. There is no 
injury to the president who inerely acted as an agent. The reverse is also true, the agent 
on a contract has no liability for a breach by the principal. It is solely the principal that 
can sue or be sued because only the principal has stax~ding, that is, an injury for which 
redress can be sought. 
Only parties to a contract can sue on the contract. "It is axiomatic in the law of 
contract that a person not in privity cannot sue on a contract. 'Privity' refers to 'those 
who exchange the [contractual] promissory words or those to whom the pronlissory 
words are directed." Wing v. Martin, 107 Ida110 267,272 (1984). The Court in Wiizg 
. . .  . ...,. ~ % . . . ,  .., ~ , , . . .  . .  , . ,  . . . . . .  
Eurther elaborated that "[a] party must look to that person with whom he is in a direct 
contractual relationship for relief, in the event that his expectations under the contract are 
not met." Id. Further, neither unjust enriclunent or quantum ~neruit allow recovery by a 
party who lacks a direct contractual relationship to the defaulting party. Great Plairzs 
Equip. v. N. W. Pipeline, 132 Idaho 754, 767 (1999). 
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The dete~mination of whether APS is a proper party plaintiff turns 011 whether 
APS has any rights under the agreeinent about the $750/1ot fee and whether APS will be 
inj~tred by its non-payment. DeYoung foreclosed any argument that would suggest 
otherwise. Thus, APS lacks standing and its claitns warrant dismissal 
11. Cornerstone is entitled to assert its illegality defense. 
A. Cornerstone is entitled to assert its illegality defense as it relates to 
standing. 
The issue of illegality, while not central to the issue of standing, does have solnc 
relevance. If APS had any rights to the $750/lot fee, it would then be an illegal 
agreement. There has beer1 some coilFusion about the application of ERISA. The ERISA 
legislatioil was divided into four titles. Title one applied to Depa~tmerlt of Labor and title 
two applied to the Department of the Treasury or IRS. It is true that title one does not 
apply to IRAs, but title two was amended to make it specifically applicable to IRAs. 
The ERISA title two prohibited transactions are set forth in 26 USC 5 4575. 
Subsection (e) states: "For puposes of this section the tern1 'plan' means . . . an 
individual retirement account described in section 408(a)." 
The illegality arises under 26 USC 4575(c) which lists the prohibited transactions 
and specifically lists as a prohibited transactions "any act by a disqualified person who is 
a fiduciary whereby he deals with tlie income or assets of a plan in his own interest and .. . -. . .=  . 
for his own account," and "receipt of any consideration for his ow11 personal account by a 
disqualified person who is a fiduciary froin any party dealing with the plan in connection 
with a transaction involving the income or assets of the plan." 26 USC S 4975(c)(l)(E) 
and (F). A disqualified person includes any fiduciary and any person providing services 
Defendant's Brief Supplemet~ting its Second Motion for Sun11nar-y Judgment and it1 Opposition to 
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to the plan. 26 USC 4975(e)(2). Additionally, APS is a fiduciary. 26 USC 4975 (e)(3) 
defiiles a fiduciaiy as "ally person who exercises any discretionary authority or 
discretionary control respecting management of such plan." DeYoung testified that he 
exercised total discretionary control over the IRAs. DeYouirg Dep.71:8-72:21; 74:20- 
77: 12. 
The plaintiff seeks to avoid the illegality argun~ei~t 011 the basis that the prohibited 
transactions applicable to IRAs are mere tax rules that have tax penalties and that only 
Title 1 prohibited transactions are illegal. However, the pui-pose of coults in recognizing 
I an illegality defense is so that the courts do not condone or act in furtherance of activities 1 
I that are not permitted by statute or that are in breach of fiduciary duties. The Idaho 
I 
I Suprenle Court has held that courts should not take any action that would have the effect 
I 
I of recognizing or giving effect to a breach of fiduciary duty that would resuIt in a benefit 
j 
I to the fiduciary. Steavns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 240 P.2d 833 (1952). 
The illegality defense is being asserted in this instance as an additional reason for 
APS not being allowed to claim it is a proper party plaintiff. If it is a proper paity 
plaintiff it must have an interest in the $75011ot Tee. It has disclaimed having such an 
interest, it is not a tiustee, there was no contract for the benefit of a third party. There was 
an alleged co~ltract made by an agent for the benefit of a principal and if the agent has any 
I . , .  , ,,. ., . .. . . . . .  ~ , . , , , .  ~ , .  , , .  .. , ,  , ,  . .  , 
I 
benefit from or rights in that contract it would be an illegal right or benefit. Thus, APS 
simply is not and cannot be a proper party plaintiff. 
This is not even a Rule 17 issue. Since APS does not claim to be suing as a trustee 
I 
I 
and since it did not make a contract that incidentally gave a third party a bellefit, rule 17 
I 
does not apply. Rather the correct analysis is that APS was a illere agent and has no 
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standing to sue. An agent is not a party to a contract and has no rights under the contract it 
is making for its principal. Thus, the portions of Rule 17(a) that provide for a change in 
parties rather than a disnlissal or not applicable. This case should be dismissed because 
standing is a jurisdictional issue. If a plaintiff has no rights and there is no controversy 
between these parties the court has no jurisdiction. 
B. Cornerstone's illegality defense goes beyond the standing issue. 
The illegality defense in this case goes beyolld its application to the standing 
issue. The claimed agreement on the $750/lot fee was at nlost an oral discussion between 
APS and Cornerstone. APS was acting under a general power of attorney that for four of 
the five IRA account holders was as about as general as "do whatever you want." The 
following exchange for DeYou~~g's deposition demonstrates: 
Q. [By counsel for the defendant] At least, Mr. Downs gave you a power of 
attorney? 
A. He gave me a written power of attorney. 
Q. And the others, what did they give you? 
A. Verbal. 
Q. What, just a general statement, go ahead and invest it? 
A. Yes. 
. , Q: And that wasadequate? . . , ,. , . . . , , ,  : , , .  
A. Adequate for me, yes. 
DeYoung Dep. 48:4-13. 
That is a gross violation of the rules applicable to IRAs. Generally the IRA 
account must be held by a bank. 26 USC § 408(a)(2) and TI-easuly Regulation 1.408-2 
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Bank for that purpose includes any regulated financial institution There is an exception 
for entities that get approval from the CRS to act as a bank, hut Mr. DeYoung said APS 
had not applied for nor obtained pertnission to so act. See DeYoung Dep. 21 :9-20, Ex. 2. 
Under ERISA title I individual account plans are allowed to be self directed. 29 
CFR tj 2550.404(c). That same thinking has been applied to IRAs since they are 
irldividual account plans; however, there are no regulations specifically dealing with self 
directed IRAs. The title one regulations give some idea of what self direction under title 
two means. 111 essence it means the owner must direct the investment without influence 
from disqualified persons. In this case, there was no self direction, the owners did not 
direct the loan to Cornerstone and did not ask for a $750/lot fee. They didn't even know 
of the transaction. DeYoung Dep. 47:9-13. DeYoung in his deposition said he never 
talked to them about the loan to Cornerstone, DeYoung Dep. 47:9-13; 106:7-10. 
Additionally, each of the IRA owners other than DeYoung has submitted an 
affidavit stating they have no knowledge of any facts or circutnslances of the underlying 
litigation. APS pursued a possible loan to Cornerstone, got the parties together, and 
participated in the entire transaction without any involveinent of the IRA owners. The 
only self direction was the general oral directed to invest the h ~ d s  as you see fit. When 
the funds were disbursed to Cornerstone, APS did not obtain a pro~nissory note and thus 
was not the custodian of that asset. 
The actions of APS were one of an agent exercising total discretion. ?The agent 
was acting like a trustee, but the law does not allow APS to be a trustee or custodian of an 
IRA. 26 USC 408(a) witliout express written pennission of the Department of the 
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Treasury and there was no such authorization. APS was exercising discretion illegally. 
APS seemed to think that a power of attonley was equivalent to being a trustee. The 
~llaster bust agreement that APS had each IRS participate adopt says that APS is a trustee, 
yet in his deposition he said that was a typing error. DeYoung Dep. 36:lO-44:2; 74:l-19; 
Ex. 2, 7 6. That is only the start of the illegality. That docunlent is between APS and 
First Utah Bank. Only one of the five IRA account holders adopted that agreeinent. 26 
USC section 408(a) requires that the IRA agreement be in writing. DeYoung admitted 
there was no current adoption agreement on four of the five IRAs and there had been :xilo 
adoption agreement for many years. See DeYoung Dep. 36:lO-52:23; Ex. 2. 
This court should not lend the sanctity of its decisions and the power of its 
judgments to confirm rights that APS is seeking which would only validate its gross 
disregard of the law. Thus, the defendant's second inotion ihr sumrnary judgment should 
be granted and the plaintiffs claims should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the defendant respectfully requests that it's summary 
judgment be granted and the plaintiffs claims dismissed in their entirety. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOPWEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SEICVICES, INC. 1 Case No. CV-06-140 
1 
Plaintiff, 
) PLAINTIFF'S RJ3SPONSE TO 
vs. DEPENDANT'S SECOND MOTION 
) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CORNERSTONE I-IOME BUILDERS, ) 
LLC., 
I 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, n\iC., a Utah colporatioll 
(hel-eafrer "APS"), that is authorizedto do and is doing busitless in the State of Idaho, by a ~ d  tlzough 
its attorneys of record, a id  hereby submits its response to Defendai~t's ("Cornerstone's") Second 
Motiorz for Summary Judgme~lt. 
INTRODUCTION 
Cornerstone is seeking an entry of Judgmellt in its favor based upon its Brief i11 Suppoit of 
its Secolld Motion for Stu,zmary Judgmellt. In its inemormdum, Cornerstone argues it is entitled 
to judgment in its favor as a matter of law based upoil Conlerstone's allegatio~l that APS is not the 
real pa13 in illterest. For the following reasolls APS is properly named in this action and is the real 
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party in interest in accordance with Rule 17(a) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. APS is entitIed 
to this Court's denial of Cornerstone's Second Motion for Sumina~y Judginellt and this Court's elltry 
of Judgment that APS is the proper party in this action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In its prior  netn nor and urns submitted in support of its Motions for Su~ninaly Judgment, APS 
has already briefed the applicable standard in Idaho which supports tliis Court's awarding suiiunaty 
judgment in favor of APS. As a convenience for the Court, APS incorporates in this response the 
standard for summaryjudgn~ent set forth in its previously submitted memorandu~lls and respectfully 
refers the COLW to said memorandums. 
II. APS IS PROPERLY NAMED IN THIS ACTION. 
APS has standing in this action and has been properly named in accordance with Rule 17(a) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to invoke 
a court's jurisdiction must have stai~diag. Van Valkenburvh v. Citizens for Term 
w, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). Standi~lg is a preliminary 
question to be determined by this Court before I-eaching the merits of the case. @&z 
v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,637,778 P.2d 757,759 (1989). The doctrine of 
standing is a subcatego~y ofjusticiability. Id. at 639, 778 P.2d at 761. As this Court 
has previously noted, the doctrine is imprecise and difficult to apply. Id. at 641, 778 
P.2d at 763 (citing VallevForge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1 982)). 
Standing foc~~ses on tlle party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to 
have adjudicated. Van VaIkenburgh at 124, 15 P.3d at 1132; Boundaw Backpaclters 
v. Boundaw County, 128 Idaho 371,375,913 P.2d 1141,1145 (1996) (quotingb&% 
at 639, 778 P.2d at 761). To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, 
a litigant inust "allege or demonstrate a1 injwy in fact and a substantial likelihood the 
relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed illjury." Id. (citations omitted). 
This requires a showi~lg of a "distinct palpable inju~y" and "fairly traceable causal 
connectio~l between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." at 639, 
778 P.2d at 761 (internal quotations omitted). 
Young V. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). 
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Ida110 Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides: 
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An 
executor, administrator, personal representative, guardian, coilservator, bailee, trustee 
of an express trust, aparly with ~wkorn or in whose nanze a contract /?as been made 
for the benej?? ofnnoiher, or a party authorized by statute may sue jn this capacity 
i.~irhoz6t joiniizg theparty for whose benejt the action is brought; and when a statute 
of the state of Idaho so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be 
brought it1 the name of the state of Idaho. No action shall be dismissed on the ground 
that it is not prosecuted in the ilame of t11.e red party in interest until a reasonable 
time has been allowed after objeclio~l for ratification of cornrnenceinent of the action 
by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such mt{ficatioiz, 
joinder, or stibstitution shall hai~e the sanle efiecl as f the nclion /?ad been 
comnzenced in the name of  the real party in interesl. 
IRCP 17(a) (emphasis added) 
"A real party in interest is the person w-ho will be entitled to the benefits of the action if successful, 
one who is actually and substantially interested in the subject matter." Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 
In this action Cornerstone readily admits it entered into the contract in issue with APS. 
(Answer tj 13). Cornerstone is now attempting to rid itself of its contractual obligations by alleging 
that APS is not the real party in interest, tllus not entitled to recover under the contract. (& Def s. 
Br. Supp. Second Mot. Surnm. J.). As established in APS's discovery responses it] this matter as 
well as tile affidavits submitted in support of APS's Secolld Motion for Summa~y Judgment, five 
individuals, Curtis DeYoung, Drew Downs, I-iany Segura, Dale He~lderson and Dean DeYoung each 
had and continue to have their owl1 Individual Retire~ne~tt Accounts (IRAs) maintained by APS. 
(Aff. Micl~ael D. Gaffney 7 2); (Aff. of Curtis DeYoung qj 4, Aff. of Dean DeYoutlg tj 2, Aff. of 
Drew Downs I/ 2, Aff. of Dale Henderson 7 2, Aff. of I-farry Segura 1 2). Four of these five 
il~dividuals authorized Curtis DeYoung (the fifth I F 4  holder) to invest their IRA funds as he deemed 
would be beneficial to them. (Aff. wf Dean DeYoung tj 3, Aff. of Drew Downs tj 3, Aff. of Dale 
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Henderson f j  3: Aff, of H a i ~ y  Segura f j  3). Curtis DeYoung did exercise the authority give11 to him 
by tllese fbur IRA holders by having APS invest these four IRA holders funds, as well as his own 
personal IKA f~tiids, into a property development project, which is the subject matter of this 
litigation, which APS subsequently did. (AfE of Curtis DeYouug 77 5-81 
Each ofthe five IRA holders signed an Adoption Agreement to the A.P.S. Master Individual 
Relire~nent Trust Account as evidenced by the docuinents submitted in the Affidavit of Michael D. 
Gaffney. (Aff. Michael D. Gaffney 7 2, Adoption Agreement to the A.P.S. Master Individual 
Retirement Trust Account). I11 the APS Master Individual Retirement Trust Agl-eerne~tt ("Trust 
Agreement"), the five individuals contractually entered into an agreenlent wherein APS was granted 
certain administrative rights and duties. Specifically, each of the five investors authorized APS "To 
settle, compromise, or submit to arbitration any claims, debts, or damages, due or owing to or from 
your interest in the Depository Accouut and to commence or defend suits or legal proceedings with 
respect to sucl~  interest in the Depository Account, and to represent you in all such suits or legal 
proceedings." (Aff. Michael D. Gaffney 7 2, APS Master Ii~dividual Retirement Trust Agreement, 
16.12) AI'S's filing of suit in this matter was done so in compliance of this contractual obligation. 
Assunling arguendo that APS is not the real party in interest, which APS affiinlatively asserts 
that it is as more fully described below, "[U]nder the terins of Rule 17(a), an action may not be 
dismissed if the real parties in interest have ratified its colnixxencetnent by a third party." Uniorz 
I.ifar*ehouseanclSz~p~~ly Co. Inc., v. Illin0isR.B. Jones, Inc., 128 ldalxo660,665,917 P.2d 1300, 1305 
(1996). As evidenced by the contractual provision outlined above, the IRA holders allowed APS to 
file suit in this matter. The affidavits of each IRA holder submitted herewith ratify APS's 
prosecution of this inaner and as such, APS is the proper party in this case. 
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APS is also the real party in interest in this matter by the fact that APS has a contractual 
relationship with the IRA holders mentioned above. Since APS has a contractual relationship as the 
Administrator of each IRA holder's IRA h l d s  and the fact that those IRA funds were utilized in this 
matter, APS is exposed to certain liabilities with each IRA holder. In Idaho Lumber v. Buck, 109 
Idaho 737, (Ida110 Ct. App. 1985) the Court was faced with a similar real party in interest issue. In 
Idaho Lunber, Plaintiff entered illto a contractual agreement to remodel a building and construct a 
parking lot on property which Defendant had an interest in. Defendant defaulted on the contract and 
Plaintiff brought suit to recover under the terms of the contract. @. at 739. On appeal, Defendant 
raised the proper party issue, arguing that a portion of the rnoney allegedly owed to Plaintiff was 
actually owed to Plaintiff's subcontractors, thus Plaintiff was not the proper party to bring suit. @. 
at 743. Tile Court denied Defendant's argument by acknowledging the sums owed to the 
s~~bcontractors, then stating, "However, if Idaho Lumber has potential liability to these 
subcontractors t l~en it would be a real party in interest as to the sun] claimed. . . . We therefore reject 
the argument that Idaho Lumber is not the real party in interest as to the full a~~loutlt of its claim." 
Id. at 743-44. -
Such are the circun~stances at hand in this case. By and though APS's contract with 
Con~el-stone and the contractual agreement between APS and the IRA holders, APS is exposed to 
liability to the IRA holders. Because this liability exposure arises from the contract between APS 
and Cornerstone, APS is properly named and the real party in interest as it stands to benefit if this 
action is successful. 
For the foregoing reasons, MS has standing and is the proper party in this action. 
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111. CORNERSTONE'S ALLEGATION OF APS 
SUING AS TRUSTEE IS MISPLACED 
Cornerstone further argues that APS cannot sue as at- on behalf of the IRA holders 
because APS is not a trustee as defined under Treasury Regulation 1.408-2. (De's. Br. Supp. 
Second Mot. Su~nm. J. at 6-8). Cornerstone's argument to the effect that APS cannot sue as a trustee 
is misplaced because APS is not making any assertion that it is a trustee under Internal Revenue 
Code ("Code") Section 408(a)(2) or Treasury Regdation 1.408-2(b)(2). APS is suing on behalf of 
the accounts as the "administrator." (Aff. of C ~ ~ r t i s  DeYoung qj 3); (Dep. of Cu~i is  DeYoung at 7, 
lines 2-7.) 
APS is clearly identified in the APS Plaster Individual Retirement Trust Agreenlent as the 
"Administrator." (Aff. Michael D. Gaffi~ey 7 2, APS Master Individual Retirenlent Trust 
Agreement, opening 7). The "Custodian" is First Utah Bar&. Id. APS agrees that "[aln individual 
retiremeut account must be a trust or a custodial account." Treas. Reg. 1.408-2(a). now eve^; APS 
does not assert that it is the trustee or the custodian 
Cornerstone also contends that administrators cannot be fiduciaries. (Def s. Br. Supp. 
Second Mot. SLIIIII~. J. at 8). It is not clear how this unsupported contentio~l relates to Cornerstone's 
instant motion regarding real parties; however, the statement is inaccurate.' With regard to 
prohibited transactions involving IRAs, a fid~~ciary means ally person who: 
' In this pocTion of Cornerstone's argument (page 81, Conrerstot?e also quotes 29 CFR 2440.404~-l(c)(2), which is a 
Department of Labor regulation under Section 404(c) o f l l ~ e  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as 
amelided ("ERISA). ERISA Section 4041~) and the associated regulations pertain to participant directed investn~ents 
under "employee benefit plans." ERISA Section 401fa). There at-e no emplovee benefit plar~s at issue in this case, 
only lRAs are at issue in this case, and thus the cited regulation (and ERISA itsel0 has 110 releva~~ce to the real party in 
interest issue raised by the instaiit motiopi or to this case as a whole. &e ERJSA Sections 3(3) and 4. The regulation 
cited by Cornerstone is futther irrelevant because it applies to situations where a fiduciary of an employee betiefit plan 
seeks to avoid iiabiliiy for losses when a palticipant exercises cotitrol over the assets in his or her own account. 29 
CFR 2550.404c- l(a)(l) and (2). ERISA Section 404(c) and the safe harbor afforded thereunder has absolutely nothing 
to do with this case. 
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1. Exercises any discretionary authority or discretiona~gi control respectirig 
mar~agement of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting 
management or disposition of its assets; 
2. 1Xeienders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, 
wit11 respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any 
authority or responsibility to do so; 
3. Ilas any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan; or 
4. Any pel-son designated under Section 405(c)(l)@) of ERISA. 
See Code Section 4975(e)(3) -
Fiduciary responsibility is not limited to "trustees." Fiduciaries can be identified through 
various means and may often ii~clude adininistrators. There is ~lotliing to prohibit IRA administrators 
fsom exercising discreti011 or administering IRA accou~lts. See Code Section 408. The suggestion 
that it is illegal for ail IRA to have an administrator goes far beyond any identifiable statutory or 
regulatory prohibitions (and accepted practice). There is iiothing illegal or uncomnn~on about a 
trustee or custodial holding assets and taking direction from another party including an 
administrator. 
The listing of irnproper IRA investments and the associated methodologies for accomplishing 
such is shout. Code Sections 408(a)(3) and 408(m). The acquisition of"colIectibles" by anIRA 
are for all practical purposes. d. Investments in collectibles are not expressly pi-ohibited, 
t~ither, they are treated as distributions. d. Collectibles are not at issue here. I~lvestment in life 
insura~ice colltracts is also prohibited. See Code Sectio11408(a)(3). Life insurance contracts are not 
at issue here. The other prohibilio~ls are those listed as prohibited traiisactions it1 Code Section 4975. 
There are no prohibited transactions at issue 
The issue o'prohibited transactions is discussed in detail in Plaintiff's Second Motion for Smrimary Judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
For these reasons and those el~ulnerated in APS's lnemorandutn submitted in support of its 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Cornerstone's assertion that APS is not the real party in 
interest fails and APS is entitled to judgment on this issue as a matter of law. 
3 0 ~  DATED thisL day of July, 2007 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CI-IARTERED 
,-> 
Fdg. STEPHEN J~MUHONEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS SECOND JUDCblENT - Page 8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on of My,  2007, I served a true and correct copy of ,h o v e  and forewing document to the following persoll(s) as follows: 
Penelope North-Shaul [ ] U.S.Mail 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC Postage Prepaid 
P. 0 .  Box 277 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ 2 1  Facsilnile - 745-91 60 
Winston V. Beard [ ] U. S. Mail 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. Postage Prepaid 
2105 Coroslado Street [ ] Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 [ ] Ovelxigllt Mail 
r xl Facsiiliile - 529-9732 
R ~ ~ p ~ ~ ~ ~  TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTlON FOR SURl*lARY JtJDG'IENT - "Be ' 
"3 65' " 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB No. 2903 
Penny Nofill Shaul, E s ~ . ,  ISB No. 4993 
David L. Brown, Esq., ISB No. 7430 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) i 
i 2 0 R  529 9732 # 2 ,  1 2  
SC. 
RUfibdi: $ i i .  i i r g g p . ~ y  
Winston V. Beard, Esq., ISB No. 1138 
Michael Gaffney, Esq., ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. 
2 105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-51 71 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Attolneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, ) Case No. CV-06-140 
INC., 
I 
Plaintiff, 1 DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
1 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSfTION TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. 1 
) 






Defendant, Colllerstone Home Builders, LLC, by and through counsel of record, hereby 
submit their reply to Plaintiffs inernorandu~~l in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Surnlnary 
Judgment as follows. 
Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Oppositioll to Motion for Summary Judgment - Page 1 
@c-, r, ,' S t& &k 
Part I 
In section I1 of its Menlorandum in Opposition, Arnericau Pension Services, Inc. (APS) 
sets forth its factual argument for why APS is a real party it1 interest. The argument is pretnised 
011 the claimed presence of a contract between APS and the IRA owners. That claim is incorrect. 
To show the inconsistency between the APS brief and the facts. the key facts concerning 
tile claimed contract as stated in section 11 of APS's brief are set forth below and aRer each claim 
the facts drawn from discovery are set fo14-1. 
Claimed fact I: "Each of the five IRA 11olders signed an Adoption Agreement to the 
A.P.S. Master Individual Retirement Trust Account." 
From Discovery: 
The APS Master Individual Retirement Trust Agreement, along with all of the documents 
related to the underlying transaction, are attached under Exhibit A of the Affidavit of Michael 
Gaffney on record. The Trust Agreement is a 2006 agreement with First Utah Bank. That T~us t  
Agreement was adopted only by Drew Downs 
In 1952 Mr. Henderson and his wife signed an adoption agreement adopting a master 
tlust ageelnent between APS and Utah C.V. Federal Credit Union. In 1982 Dean DeYoung and 
Curtis DeYoung similarly adopted an IRA withUtah C.V. Federal Credit Union. Finally, in 
1993 Mr. Segura did the same. The following excerpt from Mr. Curtis DeYoung's deposition is 
typical: 
Q. Okay. Do you have anyfhing signed by the Hendersons that would show they 
adopted Deposition Exhibit 2 as their IRA account agreement. 
A. No. 
Q A11 right. Do you have anything indicating -- anything in writing indicating that 
they knew that their account had been changed and that the adoption agreement was 
different? 
A. No. 
Depo of Curtis DeYoung, page 35 lines 15-23. 
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Mr. DeYoung explained that the credit union went out of business so he changed the 
accounts. Id. at 40. Since the credit u~lioil is no longer in existence, the adoption agreements 
signed by four of the five IRA owners are no longer in force and there is no subsequent document 
showing that any of the four set up an IRA account under the First Utah Balk Master Trust 
document. 
Thus four of the five so called IRAs are asselteed where the owners had never signed an 
IRA agreelnent wit11 the bauk that was holding their money at the time it was loaned to 
Cornerstone. These accounts are not IRAs but inere savings accounts held by First Utah Bank for 
the benefit of the four owners. Only Mr. Downs signed an adoption agreement adopting the 
Master Trust established with First Utah Bank. He is the only IRA owner. The others are mere 
account owners. 
There are strict rules for establishing IRA accounts. 26 USC 408(a) requires a tsust 
az-rangeinent setting up a written governing document that incorporates the restrictions imposed 
by section 408. IRAs do not simply exist because someone intended to create an IRA. They do 
not exist is the absence of a written trust document incorporating the terms of section 408. Any 
recognition of an account as an IRA when there is no written trust agreement adopted by the 
owner would amount to a judicial repeal of section 408. 
Claimed fact 2: "In the APS Master Individual Retirement Trust Agreement . . . the five 
individuals colltractually entered into an agreement wherein APS was granted certain 
administrative rights and duties." Specifically each of the five investors authorized APS "to 
settle, compromise, or submit to arbitration any claims, debts, or damages, due or owning lo or 
from [their] interest in the Depository Account and to commence or defend suits or legal 
proceedings with respect to such interest in the Depositoly Account, and to represent [ihem] in 
all such suits or legal proceedings." 
From Discovery: 
The facts are that the quoted material giving APS authority to file suit is in paragraph 
6.12 of tlre blaster Trust Agreement with First Utah Bank. Only Mr. Downs adopted that 
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agreement. The other four account owners never adopted that agreement and never gave the 
claimed authorization. 
~l though APS's brief does not nieiition the power oEattorney that has been at issue in 
this case, it slrould be noted that the only one power of attorney exists and that was signed by Mr. 
Downs. The other account owners gave no power of attorney and signed no agreement adopting 
the First Utah Bank Master Trust. That single power of attorney is in the documents attached to 
MI. Gaffney's affidavit. 
With regard to Mr. Downs, the Master T~ust Agreement with First Utah Bank that he 
adopted provides: 
"6.17.2 The responsibility for initiating any investment transaction is solely that of you [the 
account owner]." 
On page 47 of his deposition, Mr. DeYoung states: 
Q. Okay. And, in fact wit11 regard to the Cornerstone loans that we're talking about 
here, did you evw go back and talk to any of the five IRA accounts about making that 
investment? 
A. No. 
Thus, even the investment of Mr. Downs' funds was made outside the context of Master Trust 
ageenlent. 
It could be argued that the investment was made under APS's trust powers that are set 
forth in the First Utah Master Trust Agreement. However, Mr. DeYoung said that the reference 
in the Master Trust Agreement to APS having tiust powers was a typographical error and that 
APS was not acting as a trustee. Id. at page 74. 
APrer claiming that a contract existed between APS and the account holders, APS in its 
brief analogizes the APS/account holder relationship to a contractor / subcontractor relationship 
and cites Idaho Lui7zbei- v. Buck, which is a contractor/subcontractor case. Property owners 
contract directly with builders. The builder then subcontracts portions of the construction project 
such as the roofing. The builder has a direct contractual relationship with the owner. A 
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subcontractor has no contract with the homeowner. That fact scenario is inapplicable here. First, 
there are no documents between any account owner and any trustee or custodian of the account. 
Second, under no circumstatlces would a Bank acting as trustee or custodian be a subcontractor 
of APS nor would APS be a subcontractor of the bank. There are no documents to suggest such a 
subcol~tractor elation existed. 
Since APS could not be a trustee or custodian, it had 110 light to hold the accounts. It 
would have been illegal for APS to hold the accounts or to assume the role of bank or trustee. 
APS is a third part adminishator that handles adtlliixistrative details but does not hold the firnds. 
If it does not hold the firnds, it had no contractual relationship with Cornerstone. Mr. ReYoung 
affirmed this fact at pages 50-51 of his deposition: 
Q. Okay. But, in fact, who made the decisions wit11 regard to the Cornerstone 
investment? 
A. I did. 
Q. Individually? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, Now, what about with regard to bringing this suit. Are you doing that as an 
agent of these five individuals? 
A. No. I'm actually doing it as a corporation. 
Q. Okay. And is the corporation doing it as an agent of those five individuals? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. You're not doing that as a trustee because you are not a trustee, right? 
A. That's correct 
Q. Okay. Or, as a custodian because you are not a custodian? 
A. That's correct. 
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Q. All tight. You've -- I think you indicated in answers to discove~y that if you 
recover money in this lawsuit, that $750-per-lot fee, that that will go to the various 
IRA accounts -- 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that correct? Will APS get any of that money? 
A. No of the 750, no. 
Q. Okay. So APS doesn't claim any right or interest to that money? 
A. No. 
In its briefAPS argues that it is a proper party plaintiff because APS "stands to benefit if this 
action is successful." However, Mr. DeYoung testimony demonstrates that this assertion is not 
true. 
Part 11 
Since APS has no interest in any recovery from Cornerstone, it is not a proper party 
plaintiff. Unlike a trustee a mere agent does not possess real party status. FIanna Milzing Co. v. 
Minn. Power & Light Co., 573 F. Su~pp. 1395, I398 (1). Minn. 1983) aff d 739 F.2d 1365 (8th 
Cir. 1954). Thus the primary question before this Court is what is the appropriate action to take 
it1 light ofthe fact that APS, at most, can claim it was acting as an agent for the puqorted IRA 
holders? 
Idaho R. Civ. Pro.17 seelcs to avoid dismissals when it was difficult for a plaintiff to 
determine at the beginning of the suit who is the real party in interest. Wien it is discovered that 
tlie named plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the court is required to ailow the plaintiff a 
reasonable time to cure. The cure can be effected through ratification, joinder, or substitution. 
Whichever option the court chooses, the rule requires that it "have the same effect as if the action 
had been commenced in the name of the real party in intel-est." The end result is what ukitirniltely 
matters, not which option is cllosen. 
APS argues for tile ratification option. Ratification is effected through a forrhal notice to 
the court that that the ratifying party (1) authorizes continuation of the action and (2) agrees to be 
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bound by its results. See Moore's Federal Practice section 17.12 footnote 6. Joinder or 
substitution is more common, Moore's Federal Practice section 17.12 u 8. 
Notwithstanding APS's expressed preference for ratification, substitution would bettel- 
serve the end of having the same effect as if the suit had been commenced with the proper parly 
plaintiffs. Since APS clearly has no claim to the alleged $750 fee, leaving APS as a patty 
plaintiff would only tend to confuse who has the rights. There is also the practical question of 
separate counsel being needed for the various named patties. This is particularly t ~ v e  as to APS 
and the four non-IRA account owners. Given that the complaint and mended complaint 
consistently allege that APS is seeking recovery based upon a direct contractual relationship with 
cornerstone, without reference to or an assettion of claims for the individual account holders, a 
clear conflict of interest now exists based upon the pleadings. 
The essence of Rule 17 is to make the real parties in interest effective parties that will be 
bound by the results. The position of the account holdel-s may have preclusive effect on any 
subsequent claim those account holders may clioose to make against APS. Certainly the 
statements made in this litigation by those account holders will affect their rights against APS. 
Because of the consequetlces of this litigation on the rights of the account holders, it is important 
they know they are the proper parties and that their rights are beiflg affected. It is also important 
that they have separate counsel since there is a significant conflict of interest between APS and 
the account owners. 
The danger wising Erom the account holders not being parties and not having separate 
counsel is readily apparent. The account owners have filed two affidavits. In the first affidavit 
they have stated that they have an IRA account and that they have given Cultis DeYoung 
authority to invest those funds. Those affidavits were no doubt given at the request of DeYoung 
or his counsel. When the affidavits were requested and given, DeYoung knew that four of the 
five accounts were not IRA accounts and that no account holder had signed any document giving 
hiin authority to invest. Furthermore, investment authority belongs to a trustee and Curtis 
DeYoung lcnew he was neither a trustee nor a custodian. The first affidavits also state that the 
owners granted DeYoullg authority to invest their IRA funds in a property development project. 
However, Mr. DeYoung, in answer to defendant's interrogatory 16, states that the "[pllaintiff 
Defendant's Reulv to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Sununary Judg~llent - Page 7 
7-27-07:10:3SPM;Be~rd S t  ' s i r  
rnade no suggestions, recomn~nendations, or other communications about any loans to defendant 
to any person, entity, plan, trust, or account." Gaffley Affidavit, Ex A. A second set of affidavits 
was then filed with the cou~t  by APS's counsel. 
If there is a recovery, it is important that the money go to the owners of the IRA and not 
to APS. If it went to APS it would reward APS for illegal activity. All negotiations, payments, 
settlements, if any, must be between cornerstone and those IRA accounts. 
The lights of the five account owners in any recovery, iF there is one, are not uniform. 
Those five account owners appear to have'different tights. This is based upon an unclear , . , 
rationale underlying the $750 per lot fee APS originally laid clailn to. It is unclear whether the 
fee was for reimbursement for land acquisition, land development or simply for putting the 
investors together. For example, Henderson put up $226,000 for the down payment on the 
cornerstone property. That occurred in September of 2003. None of the other account owners 
participated in funding for the land; however, the $750 fee per lot fee appears to have been 
calculated in relation to the down paynent and the value of the land. See pages of 97-99, Curtis 
DeYoung deposition. Otller accounts disbursed money at Cornerstone at later times to fund 
development and improvements See pages 97-102 of DeYoung deposition. DeYoung states 
however that the claimed per lot fee had nothing to do with funding development, but rather 
related to "bringing the ppaies together." This was presumably done for Henderson's benefit. See 
DeYoung deposition pages 101-104. Mr. DeYoung was asked if the fee sharing among the five 
accounts would recognize any difference in the timing of when the money was put in or the 
reasons for which the money was disbursed. He said no. DeYoung deposition p. 105-6. 
Nowever, we do not know what positions the real parties in interest inay take nor has there been 
any consideration of what would be fair as to each account owners since there is no agreement as 
to how the fees are to be disbursed. APS assumes there is no difference in the rights or interests 
ofthe account owners now that it claims that it was siinply "passing through" these fees. Only a 
party with no Gnancial interest in the outcome would make such an assumption. 
Cornerstone has been seeking to depose the five IRA owners. It has been told it must go 
to Utah to do that. If they were parties, they would have to come to Idaho and would have to 
answer questions about their claims. To date, that has not happened. Cornerstone has had to pay 
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Utah attotneys to obtain subpoenas to serve on the real parties in interest. It should not have to 
incur that expense. If they assume their riglltful position as proper party plaintiffs, the true facts 
and true claims will come out with n~ucll less expense to all parties. 
The best way to make sure that tights of all involved are protected is to l~ave the proper 
parties assume their role as named plaintiffs and to have thein represented by counsel separate 
and independent of APS. Substitution would seein to do that best, but in either event the effect of 
ratification or substitution must be the same. 
Part 111. 
APS assumes that dismissal of this action is in appropriate. Rule 17(a) certainly favors 
non-dismissal; however, that is not an absolute rule and dislnissal may still be appropriate is this 
case. 
When APS filed the amended complaint, it knew it  was not a trustee or custodian of the 
claimed funds. APS knew it was not entitled to any money from Cornerstone. Nonetheless the 
amended complaint alleges tl~at APS provided funding to Cornerstone and that APS was entitled 
to the $75011ot fee because of its "knowledge, experience and relationship with individuals in the 
finance industry." APS filed its amended complaint in bad faith with full knowledge that it was 
not entitled to recover the $750 / Iot fee and transparently changed its claims once cornerstone 
pointed out to the court the illegality of the alleged agreement. 
The following sets forth a good summary of the applicable law: 
The last sentence of Rule 17(a) provides that "no action shall be dismissed on the 
ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a 
reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of 
the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest." FED. R. CN. P. 
17(a). According to the Advisory Committee's Notes, this provision was added. 
"simply in the interests of justice" and "is intended to prevent forfeiture when 
determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or when an understandable 
mistake has been made." FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a) Advisory Committee Notes, 1966 
Amendment. 
In accordance with the Advisory Committee's note, most courts have interpreted the last 
sentence of Rule 17(a) as being applicable only when the plaintiff brought the action in her 
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own name as the result of an understandable mistake, because the determinatiorl of the c o ~ ~ e c t  
party to bring the action is difficult. See Advanced Magizefics, Inc. v. Baj+>oiit Partners, Iizc., 
106 F.3d 1 1, 20 (2d Cir. 1997) (district court retains discretion to dismiss action where there 
was no reasonable basis for naming incorrect party); Feist, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 276 ("Rule 17(a) 
should not be applied blindly to permit substitution of the real party in interest in every case. In 
order to substitute the trustee as the real party in [**I61 interest, Plaintiff must first establish 
that when he brought this action in his own name, he did so as the result of an honest and 
understandable mistake."); Lam v. Gateway 2000, lizc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1 12, I20 (D.D.C. 1999) 
("it is appropriate to liberally grant leave to substitute a real party in interest when there has 
been an llonest mistake in choosing the nominal plaintiff, meaning that determination of the 
proper patty was sornehow difficult at the time of the filing of the suit, or that the mistake is 
otherwise understandable."), afld, 252 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Soutlz Afiica~z Marine 
Corp. 1). United States, 10 C.I.T. 415,640 F. Supp. 247,254-55 (Ct. ht ' l  Trade 1986) (Rule 
17(a) "should be used to prevent forfeiture and injustice where the detennination as to who 
may sue is difficult"). 
Wieburg v. GTE Southwest Inc., 272 F.3d, 308-309 (5"' Cir. 2001). 
In this case APS clearly knew or should have known wlie~l it filed the coinplaint that it 
was not entitled to the $750 per lot fee. It clearly knew or should have known that the allegations 
of its amended cornplaint were false. It brought the suit without ever talking to the IRA owners 
about it. 
There is no statute of limitations issue; therefore, the rights of the five accounts owners 
would not be prejudiced by a dismissal of this suit. Because of the apparent bad faith by APS in 
filing the amended co~nplaint in its own name when it knew it had no rights against cornerstone, 
. . ,  , . .  . ,  . . .  .. . 
and the absence of prejudice to the five account owners makes dismissal an appropiate course 
for the court to t 
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1 PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM 
vs. 1 IN SUPPORT OF PLAXNTIFF'S 
1 SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, ) JUDGMENT 




COMES NOW, Plaintiff, AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC., A Utah corporation 
(hereafter "APT'), that is authorized to do and is doing business in the State of Idaho, by and tluough 
its attorneys ofrecord, and hereby sub~nits this Reply Memorandum in Support of its Second Motion 
fbr Summary Judgment 
INTRODUCTION 
The sole issue before this Cou~t  is whether there existed a contingency that APS had to 
provide full fuildiilg of the property development project in issue in order to be paid $750.00 per lot 
developed or to be developed. In attempt to rid itself of its col~tractual obligatio~l to APS, 
Cornerstone has engaged itself into a collateral attack upon APS, atten1pti:lg to discredit the 
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administration and internal operations of APS to flush out an illegality argument. Such attack 
appears to be made to support the ave~ment by Corixerstone that to allow e~lforceinent ofthe contract 
between APS and Co~nerstone would then be sanctioning APS to violate ERISA and IRA 
regulations. 
For t l ~ e  following reasons and Chose outlined in APS's Second Motion for Su~nrnaty 
judgment, with its supporting memorandum, and APS's Response Meinoraildun1 to Cornerstone's 
Second Memorandum in support of its Secohd Motion for Summary Judgment, each of 
Cotnerstone's new defenses fails. APS is entitled to this Court's Order that APS is the proper patty 
and that the contract between APS and Cornerstone is legal and binding. 
ARGUMENT 
X. Cornerstone's Collateral Attack On APS Cannot Be Lawfully Made. 
Cornerstone attempts to call into questiol~ the inte~nal operations, administration and conduct 
ofAPS to avoid its contractual obligation to APS. In Cornerstone's briefing. it goes to great lengths 
to attempt to demonstrate to the Cout-t that the way APS conducts its business is in violation of 
various federal regulations. The resultant assertion made by Co~nerstone is that ifthis Court upholds 
the contract between the patties, then APS's "illegal" conduct is being sanctioned. APS's operations 
are legal and nonetheless, have no bearing on the legality of the contract between the parties 
(The following was previously provided to this Court in response to Cornerstone's Motion 
to Cornpel and is re-inseifed here to assist the Cout  from having to peruse the voIuminous filings 
to locate.) The United States Supreme Court has dealt with this illegality defense ill a case similar 
to the defense as presented by Conlerstone. though not for quite some tiine. In D.R. Wilder Manuf. 
Co. v. Corn Prod. Refinine. Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1 91 5), the defe~ldant was t~ying to escape its colrtract 
with Plaiiltiffcompany, alleging that the contract between the two was illegal because the Plaintiff 
organized itself in violation of the Shennan antiitrust act. a. at 170. In upholding the contract 
bet\veen the parties, the Court wrote: 
Having dealt with the Refining Company as an existing concern possessing the 
capacity to sell, speaking generally the assertion that it had no legal existence because 
it was an ~t~llawlul combiiatioi~ in violation of tile Anti-Trust Act was irrelevant to 
the question of the liability ofthe Manufacturing Coinpaily to pay for the goods since 
such defense was a Inere collateral attack on tile organization of the corporation 
which could not be lawfully made. Besides, considered from the point of view of the 
alleged illegality of the corporation, the attack on i ts existence was absolutely 
immaterial because the right to enforce the sale did not involve the question of 
combination, since conceding the illegal existence of the corporationn~aI<ing the sale, 
the obligation to pay the price was indubitable, and the duty to enforce it not 
disp~~table. This is true because the sale and the obligations which arose from i t  
depended upon a distinct contract with reciprocal considerations moving between the 
parties, -- the receipt of the goods on the one hand and the payinelit of the price on 
the other. And this is but a form ofstating ihe ele~nentarypro~iosilion that courts may 
not refiiilse to enjorce an otherwise legal contract because ofsoi7ze ir?di~ect benefit to 
a wrongdoer which ~ ) o u l d  be aSfordedfioin doing so or sonie renzote aid to the 
crcconaplishitzent ofa tvrongwlzich nzightpossibly result -- doch?izes o f s~~c l t  uiziver.sa1 
acceptunce thal no citation of authority is needed fo deiizonstrate their e,~isterzce .... 
D. R. WilderMfg. Co, v. ComProducts RefiniliaCo., 236U.S. 165,171-172 (U.S. 391S)(e111phasis 
addecl). 
Like the lnanufactwing cornpalty in D.R. Wilder Mfp. Co., that was liable under its contract with 
the Refining Company despite the asserlion that the Refining Con~pany had no legal existence, 
Cornerstone is liable for the $750.00per lot fee regardiess of wltether APS allegedly violatedElUSA 
or IRA laws. 
The D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. Court, in reaching the above decision, relied heavily upon 
Connollvv. UilionSewer Pioe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1'902). I11 Co~ulolly, the defendant was attempting 
to escape its contractual obligations of paying for pipe sold to it by plaintiff, by asserting tliat 
plaintiff was a trust or combination of persons and corporations organized for the express purpose 
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of u~~lawfully carrying out restrictions in trade. @. at 541. In holdi~lg the contract was enforceable 
between the parties, the C,ourt stated that even if the con~bination was illegal, the illegality did not 
eliminate the defendant's obligation to pay for the pipe. Id. at 545. "[Tlhe buyer could not justify 
a ref~~sal  to pay for what he bough1 and received by proving that the seller had previously, in the 
prosecution of its business, entered into an illegal cornbination with others in reference generally to 
the sale of Akron pipe." Id. 
111 support of its position the Supreme Court then cited a string of cases supporting its 
position. In National Distilling Co. v. Cream Citv Importing Co., 86 Wiscollsill 352 (1893), 
defendants attempted to escape their contractual obligatio~ls due to plaintiff allegedly being involved 
ill illegal conduct or conduct opposed to public policy. Id. at 355. The Cou~? held that even if all 
ofthe illegal acts were true, "there is no, nevertheless, no allegation showi~lg or tending to show that 
the contract of sale between the plaintiff was tainted with ally illegality, or was contrary to public 
policy." Id. "The plaintiffs cause of action is in no legal sense dependent upon, or affected by the 
alleged illegality of the tlx~st or combination, because the illegality, ifany, is entirely collateral to the 
transaction in question, and the court is not calledupol~ in this action to enforce any contract tainted 
with illegality, or contrary to public policy." Id. 
The Comolly Court then explained, as is applicable in this case, that the cause of action by 
plaintiff was to enforce defendant's co~ltractual obligation to pay for the pipe. Colunolly, 184 U.S. 
at 549. The action was not one to enforce or involved the enforcement of the aIleged arrangemerlt 
or combinatiovl between the plaintiff and other corporations in relation to the sale of Akron pipe. 
Id. "The purchases by the defendants had no necessary or direct connection with the alleged illegal -
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combination; for the contracts between the defendants and the plailltiff could have been proven 
without any reference to the arrangement whereby the later became an illegal combination." Id. 
The foregoing cases and analysis are entirely applicable in this action. In no situation can 
it be argued that APS's intevllal operations and administration had anytiling lo do with the contract 
entered into by Coixerstone with AFS. Cornerstone readily admits tllat it entered into contract with 
APS. It is that contract that is the issue of this case. Cornerstone's allegatior~s of illegality by APS 
have no connection or affect 011 the $750.00 per lot contract between APS and Cornerstone, 
11. APS's Conduct in 'This Action Is Legal. 
Comerstone's opposition to APS' Second Motion for Sunlmary Judgment attempts to 
identifL the esistence of an "illegality" relative to the relationships between APS and the IRAs. This 
effort fails. First, the agreements and understandings between APS and its clients as the 
administrator for IRAs is not at issue in this litigation. APS is not seeking to enforce the a, =reements 
between itself m d  the IRAs, thus those relatioiiships are not relevant. Second, the failure to obtain 
a tax benefit does not rise to the level of engaging in an act which is prohibited by statute and t11~1s 
arguably "illegal." Third, Cornerstone fails to identiFy any illegality. 
1. ERISA Has No Relationship To This Case And There Are No ERISA Violations 
In its response brief, Cornerstone continues to discuss the Elnployee Retirenlent Illconle 
Security Act of 1974, as amei~ded ("ERISA"). ERISA is not at issue in this case. IRAs are at issue 
in this case. See generally (Aff. of Curtis DeYoung, Aff. of Dean DeYouilg, Aff. of Drew Downs, 
Aff. of Dale Henderson, Aff. uf E-Iarry Segura, Aff. Of Michael D. Gaffney 12, Ex. A). IRAs are 
governed by Internal Revenue Code Section408, etseq. and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 
i .e. ,  26 CFR 1.408, et seq. ERISA, and particularly'the ERISA provision cited by Cor11ersto11e in its 
briefings, applies oidy to "employee benefit plans" as that term is defined in Section. 3(3) ofERISA. 
See ERISA Section 4. An "employee benefit plan" in most cases requires sponsorship, which is not 
present here, 
Cornerstone engages in a misguided discussion regarding the relationship betweeti ERISA 
and the Internal Revenue Code. Cornerstone colnpletely misunderstands and misrepresents the 
structure and relationship between the Inte~lial Revenue Code and ERISA. ERISA is a law that was 
passed in 1974 and has since been amended many times. ERISA is codified in Title 29 of the U.S. 
Code. For exairuple, ERISA Section 4 is codified at 29 U.S.C. Section 1003. The Internal Revenue 
Code is codified in Title 26 of the U.S. Code. Title IT of ERISA anlends portions of the Inte~nal 
Revenue Code. Elowever, this does not make ERISA broadly applicable to all issues addressed iit 
the Internal Revenue Code. As an example of the absurdity that would result -- ERISA does 1101 
apply to require that lRAs k n i s h  sunlmary plan descriptions or file atult~al Fornls 5500 under 
ERISA Sections 101 and 104.' 
III its briefing, Co~llerstone cites 29 CFR 2550.404(c), a regulation pro~:~uIgated under a 
provision contained in Title 1 of ERISA. Cornersto~~e vaguely and inaccurately asserts a violation 
of this ERISA regulation. The regulation and the corresponding statute (ERISA Section 404(c) (29 
U.S.C. 1 104(c))) provide a safe harbor that allows (not mandates) enzployee benefitplan fiduciwies 
to avoid liability for invesrilaent losses resuItilig from a participant's exercise of control over his or 
her own a c c o ~ n t . ~  This oplioncrl safe harbor is often used by ERISA defined contribution plans so 
Assuming an ERISA plan failled to file a Form 5500 for a year (or filed it late), such would not result in the plan's 
inability to recover plan assets and gains relative to investtnei~ts wit11 third parties. 
ERlSA Section 404(c) is under Title I of ERISA. ERISAjSectio11404 is under Pan 4 of Title I of ERISA. Part 4 is 
titled "Fiduciaiy Responsibility." ERISA Section40i(a)(l) states "[t]bispart shall apply Lo any emnploj~ee benefitplan 
described in Section 4(a). . ." (emphasis added). It is clear that ERISA Section 404(c) and the associated regulations 
PL,trmiFI:'s REPLY RIEMORANDUIII IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAZNTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG&lENr- Page 5 
that employers do not incur liability for illvestinetlt losses resultillg from a participailt's own 
investrnetlt decisions; however, tlie safe harbor has no relationship to this case by a11alogy or 
othe~wise. F~rs t  and foremost, there is no einployee benefit plat1 at issue here - just I M s  - aid  thus 
29 CFR 2550.404~ does not apply in a iy  fashion. Second, APS is not seeking the protections of the 
safe harbor provided uilder ERISA Section 404(c). Third, no claims are being made against APS 
by employee benefit plan participants. Fourth, the iiistarlt case does not iilvolve ally claim of 
investment losses by any ei~lployee benefit plan participants against einployee benefit plan 
fiduciaries. 
ERISA and the cited regulation do not apply to this matter because there are no employee 
benefit plans iilvolved in this case. Fui-them~ore, t11e cited regulation only inandates actions 
necessary to take advantage of a safe harbor that is not at issue here. That is, even if the regulation 
had some relationship to this case, which it absolutely does not, this regulatioil only serves to provide 
optional protection to employee benefit plan fiduciaries --- it would be i~llpossible for ail employer 
to "violate" such a provision and give rise to an illegality. There is no requiremeilt that participant 
directed plans utilize the protectiolls afforded by ERISA Section 404(c). 
Accordingly, ERISA does not apply and there was 110 violation of any ERISA provision. 
2. There Are No Ille~alilies Associated With The IRGs 
Cor~~erstone's briefing uses the term illegality, but does not lii~k any particular facts to any 
particular violation of law that would allow it to be relieved of its obligatioi~s that are at issue in this 
case. The followil~g will discuss the asserted irregularities relative to the Code. However, assuming 
noncoi~~pliance wit11 the Internal Revenue Code (which inay result in adverse tax consequences), 
do not apply. 
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there is still no support to Comerstone's argument that there is an "illegality" which would allow 
Cornerstone to avoid its $750.00 per lot contractual obligation to APS. 
a. IRA Assets May Be Illvested 
Cornerstone states that "[glenerally the IRA account must be held by a bank." See (DePs. 
Br. Supplementing. Second Mot. Sumin. J. and Opp'n Pl's. Second Mot. For Sumn. 3. at 11). It 
appears Cornerstone may be asseiting that it is illegal to invest IRA. assets. It is comm~~on kilowledge 
that IRA assets are invested. IRAs can invest in alyihing, however, there are certain tax 
consequences for investing it1 collectibles and life iilsurance contracts. See Code Sectioils 408(a)(3) 
and 408(m). Even if such investnlents were made, it is completely without basis to characterize such 
investments as an "illegality" that would allow the entity or person with who111 the IR4 made such 
an investment to breach the agreement - however, this is Cornerstone's theory (for which it does not 
cite any precedent). 
For example, if an IRA invested $100,000 in a painting, which is a collectible, with the 
9; 100,000 to be repaid to the IRA along with a shareof the profits associated wit11 the subsequent sale 
of the painting to a third party, tlle investment would not be void simply due to the potential adverse 
tax consequences that might apply to the IRA for iilvesting in a collectible. Coi11erstone is arguing 
that it is relieved from its contractual obligations because of some vaguely asserted irregularities with 
the maintenance of the IRAs. Taking the exainple a step further based on Cori~erstone's logic, the 
$100,000 would not have to be returned to the investor because the agreement is not enforceable due 
to the so-called illegality. 
b. APS Is An IRA Administrator 
Co~uerstone notes that the inaster trust agreement utilizes the word "trustee" in a single 
instance in relation to APS. (DeFs. Br. S~~pplernenting. Second Mot. Sunun. J. and Opp'n PI'S. 
Second Mot. For Suinm. 5. at 13). The assertion of APS acting as a trustee is factually incorrect; 
additionally; the mechanics regarding the establishment and the maintenance of the IRAs is not 
relevant to this case. 
Cornerstone recognizes and argues tl~roughout its briefings that APS is not and cannot be an 
IRA trustee. More importantly, APS is clearly identified tlwougl~out he APS Master Individual 
Retirement Trust Agreement as the Administrator. (Aff. Michael D. Gaffney q/ 2, APS Master 
I~~dividual Reliren~et~t Trust Agreement, opening q/) First Utah Bank is clearly identified tlxoughout 
illat agreement as the Custodian (in contrast to Cornerstone's statenlent on page 5 of its brief that 
"a bank was not acting as a trustee or custodian of t l~e  funds afier they were loaned to Cor~~erstone"). 
Id. The fact that APS is the Administrator for the IRAs and not the trustee is not in dispute and does 
not give rise to any illegality. 
c. There Are Written I~istruments Governing tile IRAs 
Conlerstone appears to assert there is an illegality because tl~ere are no written IRA 
agreements. (Def s. Br. Supplementing. Second Mot. Summ. J. and Opp'n Pl's. Second Mot. For 
Summ. J. at 13). This contention, too, is factually incorrect. 
Each of the IRA holders executed adoption agreements. (Aff. Michael D. Gaffney 7 2). The 
adoption agreements in palt establish IRAs in the for111 of the APS AiIaster Individual Retirement 
Trust Account ("?i.ust") and incorporate the terms of ihe Trust. These adopt io~~ agreelnents were 
provided iil response to Defendant's Second Set of Discovery. The APS Master Individual 
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Retirement Trust Agreement is the inost recent version of the master trust agreement. It was 
submitted to the Internal Revenue Service for review and approval, as are most IRA documents as 
they are revised from time to time. (Aff. Michael D. Gaffley 1 2 ,  Ex. A, pg. 21, lines 4-14, Ex.1) 
See Internal Revenue Service Revenue Procedure 87-50. Tlte trustee or custodian has changed over 
time. (Aff. Michael D. Gaffley ij 2, Ex. A, pg. 37-38). The update to the inaster prototype 
doculllent does not result in the absence of a written instrument or any illegality. 
d. There Are No Identifiable Prohibited Transaclio~is 
APS establishes in its moving papers that there are no prohibited transactions. Cornerstone 
does not appear to dispute this assertion. This issue is only addressed here in an abu i~da~~ce  of 
caution. In its argument tunder the heading "Cornerstone is entitled to assert its illegality defense as 
it relates to standing,'' Cornerstone cites two Code sections that describe prohibited transactions (29 
U.S.C. Sections 4975(c)(l)(E) and (F)). See (Def s. Br. Suppleinenting. Second Mot. Sunun. J. and 
Opp'n Pl's. Second Mot. For Slunm. J. at 9). Cornerstone appears to cite these sectio~ls only for the 
proposition that APS is not the real party in interest because iJ'APS benefitted in co~ulection with 
the transactions and thus was a party seeking to recover the $750 per lot on its ow11 behalf that it 
perltaps engaged in a prohibited transaction. In this regard, Cornerstone states "[tJhe illegality 
defense is being asserted in this instance as an additional reason for APS not being allowed to claim 
it is a proper party plaintiff. If it is a proper party plaintiff it must have an interest in the $75011ot 
fee." See Defendant's Brief Supplernentiug its Second Motion for Su~nnla~y  Judgtnent and in 
Opposition to PlaintifPs Second Motion for Sum~llary Judgn~ent, page 10. 
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APS is seelting to recover the $750 per lot as the adnninistrator for the IRAs. Thus, there is 
no prohibited transaction. This is detailed in APS' briefing on its Second Motion for Sumnary 
Judgment and is not refuted by any facts or law in Cornerstone's opposition 
CONCLUSION 
Cornerstone's arguments that APS violated ERISA or the Internal Revenue Code do not 
affect Coinerstone's $750.00 per lot contractual obligation. APS respectfully seeks this Court's 
Order that the contract between APS and cornerstone is legal and binding. 
DATED t h i s g  day of July, 2007. 





STEPHEN J. MUHONEN @ Attor~iey for Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY blEi\lORANDUi\.I IN SUPPORT OF 
PL/\lYTIFF'S SECOND MOTlON FOR SUMMARY .IUDG&lEN1 -Page 11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I H E m Y  CERTIFY that on t h e z  day of July, 2001, I served a true and conect copy 
of the above and foregoii~g docunient to tile following per~on(s) as follows: 
Penelope North-Shaul [ ] U.S.Mai1 
LAW OFFICES, PLLC Postage Prepaid 
P. 0. Box 277 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Righy, Idaho 83442 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[&I Facsimile - 745-81 60 
[ ] Email 
Winston V. Beard [ ] U. S. Mail 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. Postage prepaid 
2105 Coronado Street [ ] Hand Delively 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ Facsimile - 529-9732 
1' ] Email 
I~,AINTIFF.S REPLY %lERlOR&NDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
pLhl~l I ~ p ~  SECOND MOTION FOR SUR1I)IARI. .JUDG*lEN* - Page l2 
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Idaho for tho County o f  BomcviUe, and hereby ratify and confirm the actions of APS in said 
litigation and autbonize APS to continue to p\usue the claim against Cornexsbne Home Buildets, 
x. 
I W K m  AFFlANT S A l T H  NAUGHT. 
DATED this @day of July, 2007. 
DALE HENDERSON 
.* 
SUBSCRnSED AND SWORN TO before me tbisz day of July, 2007. 
7 
. . 
J U ~  26 2007 7 : 3 3 ~  G R S E R J E T  F R X  2 I... . ,. ,- .. , , . 
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Idaho for the Counfy of Bonneville, and hereby rarify add oonfum the avtions of APS in said 
litigation and aurborizc MS to oontinue to pursue the claims againsi Cornerstone Hame Builders, 
LLC. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAETH NAUOHT. 
DATED chis @zy of  July, 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this &fdvof MY, 2007. 
Residing at: kbm,'/h*1 
My Comnission ex pi"^: - 
Idaho for the County of Bonneville, and hereby ratify and confirm the actions of APS in said 
litigation and authorize APS to continue to pursue the claims against Cornerstone Home Builders, 
LLC. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DATED this a day of July, 2007. 
SUBSCRiBED AND SWORN TO before me this a day of July, 2007. 
SECOND AFmAVlT OFHARRY SEGURA - Page 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
FiMERICrW PENSION SERVICES, INC . , 
I 
Plaintiff is), ) 
) MINUTE ENTRY 
vS . j 
) CASE NO. CV-06-140 
CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant (s) . ) 
1 
On the 1st day of August, 2007, cross-motions for summary 
judgment came before the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District 
Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Stephen Muhonen and Mr. Jeffery Mandell appeared on 
behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Winston Beard and Mrs. Penny North Shaul appeared on 
behalf of the Defendant. Mr. Scott Talman appeared as a 
representative of Cornerstone. 
Mr. Muhonen presented Plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment. Mr. Mandell presented further argument on behalf of 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Mr. Beard presented 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Mr. Mandell presented 
rebuttal argument. Mr. Muhonen presented additional rebuttal 
argument. 
The Court granted Plaintiff's second motion for summary 
judgment against Cornerstone's illegality. Mr. Muhonen wi.ll 
prepare a proposed order for the Court's signature. 
The Court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment in 
part as to lack of standing on the part of APS and granted the 
motion in part as to requiring Harry Segura, Dean DeYoung, Dale 
Henderson, Curtis DeYoung, and Drew Downs to be joined as 
plaintiffs. Mr. Beard will prepare a proposed order for the 
Court's signature. 
Co~~rt was thus adjourned . 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of liugust, 2007, that 
I mailed or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the 




Daniel C. Green 
Stephen J. Muhonen 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
(P1 - American Pension Services, Inc. ) 
Jeffery M. Mandell 
PO Box 853 
Boise, ID 83701 
(P1 - APS) 
Penny North Shaul 
PO Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(Defendant) 
Winston V. Beard 
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
(Defendant) 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB No. 2903 
Penny North Shaul, Esq., ISB No. 4993 
David L. Brown, Esq., ISB No. 7430 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Winston V. Beard, Esq., IS8 No. 1138 
Michael Gaffney, Esq., ISB No. 3558 
Lance J. Schuster, Esq., ISB No. 5404 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. 
2 105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-517 1 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
t Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, 1 Case No. CV-06-140 
mc. ,  1 
Plaintiff, 1 ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. ) 
1 






Both parties filed their second motions for summary judgment and oral argument was 
I 
held August 1,2007. Pursuant to the reasons stated in open court and on the record, the Court 
I 
ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 1 
orders as follows: 
1. cornerstone Home Builders, LLC's defense of illegality is dismissed; 
2. The following individuals shall be joined as Plaintiffs by American Pension Services, 
hc.: 
a. Drew Downs 
b. Dale Henderson 
c. DeanDeYoung 
d. Harry Segura 
e. Curtis L. DeYoung 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Stephen Muhonen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CO DATED this -day of August, 2007. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Attorney for Defendant 
ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 2 
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08/02/2007 1 4 : 3 0  FAX 208 232 6 RACINE, OLSON ~0001/0001 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  
' 2085235069 Beard SL.Clalr 
. . . . . . . . .  . , >  . .  : . . . . .  . . .... '.... . . ;. 
orders as'h~ows: 
1. Comerstone Home Builders, LI;C's defense of illegality is disrni~sed; 
2. The following individuals shall be joined as Plaintiffs by American Pension Services, 
Inc.: 
s. Drew Downs 
b. Dale Henderson 
, . ....... .............. ,,.- ................. ............................. ................. 
c. Dean DeYoung 
d. Hany Segura 
e. Curtis L. DeYowg 
APPROVED AS TO F O M  APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
d/~i$2fLWI-. 
Stephen Muhonen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
GQ 
Attorney for Defendant 
. . 
DATED this - day of August, 2007, . . . . .  , .. . . . . . . .  ............... . .  ...,*... 
Honorable Richard T. St. Clair 
ORDER REREOARDING MOl'IONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 2 
PI 1 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/ o  I certify that on August, 2007, I served a true and wnect copy of the ORDER 
REGARDING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the following by the method of 
delivery designated below: 
Stephen J. Muhonen d S .  Mail a and-delivered a Pacsimile 
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
FAX: (208) 232-61 09 
Penny North Shaul 
Dunn Law Office 
d . S  Mail a and-delivered 0 Pamimile 
PO Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
FAX: (208) 745-81 60 
Michael D. Gaffney &.S. Mail 0 Courthouse Box a Facsimile 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney 
2105 Covonado Sheet 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
FAX: (208) 529-9732 
Clerk of the Court 
By: 
Deputy dlerk 
ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 3 
.- ,. 
Beard Shaunie Bell Legal Assistant 
St. Clair 2105 Coronado Street. Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Caffney Telephone (208) 523-51 71 Direct L~ne  (208) 557-5298 Fax (208) 529-9732 9 
AEmq2 
Attorneys admrlted in 
Idaho Oregon Washrngton Wyomlng 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
August 6,2007 
Civil Court Clerk 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Re: American Pension Sewices v. Corrzerstone Honte Builders, CV-06-140 
Dear Clerk: 
Enclosed please find 
1- 4 copies of the proposed Order Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment; 
2- Postage paid return envelopes for the parties. 
Please present this proposed Order to the Judge for his signature, conform the signed 
Orders and return them to the parties in the enclosed envelopes. If you have any questio~ls, please 
do not hesitate to contact me. 
Legal Assistant 
Enclosures as stated 
Cc: Stephen J. Muhonen w/ enclosures 
Penny Norfh Shaui wi enclosures 
7'3 
www.beardstclair.com 
. .. --.. s-. r ~ ~ N n n a r a  Gre(rory C. Caider Ja~in 0. Hammer 
July 18,2007 
Certified Court Reporting 
P.O. Box 51020 
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83405 5,&qqQ,r _ -, pK I : ; I 
Winston V. Beard, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY MCNAMARA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-749 
Re: State of Idaho, County of Bonneville 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES vs. CORNERSTONE HOME 
Case No. CV-06-140 
Deposition(s) of: Curtis L. DeYoung 
Taken: July 13,2007 
Dear Mr. Beard: 
Pursuant to Rule 30 (0 (I), I have enclosed the original and your certified copy of the transcript 
for the deposition taken in the above captioned matter. The E-Transcript has been electronically 
sent. 
Mr. Green has been sent a certified copy of the transcript along with the Verification sheet to 
obtain the witness' signature for the deposition taken in the above captioned matter. The 
E-Transcript has been electronically sent. 
If you have any questions, please contact our office 
John Terrill 
Enclosures 
cc - Daniel C. Green, Esq. 
Clerk of the Court 
File 
Offices at: 525 Park Avenue Q Suite 1E Idalio Falls, ID 83405-1020 
--- ------Tw -nQ X V Q  Ed91 * 800.529.5491 . FAX 208.529.5496 
BOkit.d~yi,\  '. f i :Q'iGTY 
. . . L .  
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB No. 2903 .7 . I, ""57. ., 
Penny No& Shaul, Esq., No. 4993 
David L. Brown, Esq., ISB NO. 7430 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Wiston V. Beard, ISB No. I38 
Michael Gafhey ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. C W R  GAFFNEY P.A. 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: wiaston@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN 7'1% DISTRICT COURT OF TI3E SEVENTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, ) Case No. CV-06-140 
INC.. 'l 
Plaintiff, 
1 NOTICE OF 
) OFFER OF JUDGMENT 








COMES NOW, Defendant, by and through the undersigned, and OFFERS 
JUDGMENT TO BE TAKEN AGAINST IT, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 68. This Notice is only 
provided to the court with the original offer provided to counsel for the plaintiff. 
NOTICE OF 
OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
t-, i 
f' -i- 4 
ORIGINAL 
@ DATED this J!-.- day of August, 2007- 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
NOTICE OF 
OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIN that on the &day of August, 2007, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was delivered to the followiog persons(s) by: 
- Hand Delivery 
Postage-prepaid mail 
- Facsimile Ttansmission 
Stephen J. Muhonen, Esq. 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHTD. 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Winston V. Beard, Esq. 
Michael Gafhey, Esq. 
BEARD ST. C W R  G A F m  P.k 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
-"*.. . --.. - -  ,AS, P U C  
OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
Daniel C. Green (ISB No. 3213) 
Stephen 1. Muhonen (ISB No. 6689) 
RACTNE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208) 232-61 0 I 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Jeffery Mandell (1SB No. 5807) 
The ERISA Law Group, P.A. 
P. 0. Box 853 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Teieplione! (208) 342-5522 
Fax: (208) 342-7672 
Attorneys For Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, 
N C . ,  DREW DOWNS, 
CURTIS L. DEYOUNG, HARRY 
SEGUARA, DEAN G. DEYOUNG, 
and E. DALE HENDERSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Case No. CV-06-140 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
I 
CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, ) 
LLC. 1 
) . .  . 






.. .. .: .. . .,: .. 
COMES NOW, Stephen J. Muhollen of the firm Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, . , - .  
Chartered, pursuant to the Court's oral ruling on August 1, 2007 as well as its order dated August 
10, 2007, and hereby enters an appearance on behalf of the Plaintiff Drew Downs in the above 
matter. Pursuant to Rule 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Drew Downs hereby 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - Page 1 
0 8 / 2 1 / 2 0 0 7  1 4 : 2 1  F A X  208 2 3 2  - 9  RACINE.OLSON 
ratifies and adopts by reference the corn~nencement ofthe action by American Pension Services, Inc. 
and all pleadings, motions, and filings by American Pension Services, Inc., including without 
limitation witness and exhibit lists. 
DATED this 3 day of August, 2007. 
RACME, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
J ! i ,  
/ Attorney for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - Pegc 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
;ar I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the - day of August, 2007, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing document to the followi~lg persoti(s) as follows: 
Jeffery Mandell 
The ERISA Law Group, P.A. 
P. 0. Box 853 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
[ ] U, S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delive~y 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ \/j Facsimile - (208) 342- 7672 
[ ] Email 
Penelope Noith-Shaul [ ] U.S.Mai1 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC Postage Prepaid 
P. 0. Box 277 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 [ ] Ovelnight Mail 
[ 4 Facsimile - 745-8160 
[ 1 Emaii 
Winston V. Beard [ ] U.S.Mail 
BEARD ST. CLAlR GAFFNEY P.A. Postage Prepaid 
2105 Coronado Street [ ] Wand Deliveiy 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ L/l/ Facsi~nile - 529-9732 
[ ] Email 
NOTICE OP APPEARANCE - Page 3 
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Daniel C. Green (ISB No. 3213) 
Stephen J. Muhonen (ISB No. 6689) 
WCINE,  OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208) 232-6101 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Jeffery Mandell (ISB No. 5807) 
The ERISA Law Group, P.A. 
P. 0. Box 853 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-5522 
Fax: (208) 342-7672 
Altonleys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVISNTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TI-IE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, 
INC., DREW DOWNS, 
CURTIS L. DEYOUNG, HARRY 
SEGUARA, DEAN G. DEYOUNG, 
and E. DALE HENDERSON. 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, 
LLC 
1 Case No. CV-06-140 
1 
1 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
Defendant. f 
J 
COMES NOW, Stephen J,  Muhonen of the firm Racirte, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, 
Chartered, pursuant to the Court's oral ruling on August 1,2007 as well as its order dated August 
10, 2007, and hereby enters an appearance on behalf of the Plaintiff Kavry Segura in the above 
matter. Pursuant to Rule 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff I-Iarry Segura hereby 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - Paae i 
06 /21 /2007  1 4 : 2 1  FAX 208 232 9 RACIN6.0LSON 
ratifies and adopts by reference the commencement of the action by American Pension Services, Inc. 
and all pleadings, motions, and filings by American Pension Services, Inc., including without 
limitation witness and exhibit lists. 
da& 
DATED this 2 day of August, 2007. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
' # I  
Attorney for Plaintiff 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - Pnge 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERWCE 
a r I I-IEREBY CERTIFY that on the -day of August, 2007, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing docunlent to the following ~erson(s) as follows: 
Jeffery Mandell [ ] U. S. Mail 
The ERISA Law Group, P.A. Postage Prepaid 
P. 0. Box 853 [ J Hand Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83701 [ 1, Overnight Mail 
[l/j Facsimile - (208) 342-7672 ' i l ,  " " 1  0 
[ ] Emaii 
Penelope North-Shaul [ ] U. S. Mail 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC Postage Prepaid 
P. 0. Box 277 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 '4 Overnight Mail I Facsimile - 745-81 60 
] Emaii 
Winston V. Beard [ ] U. S. Mail 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. Postage Prepaid 
2 1 05 Coronado Street [ ] Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 Overnight Mail Ir/: Facsimile - 529-9732 
[ 1 Email 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - Page 3 
Daniel C. Green (ISB No. 3213) 
Stephen J. Muhonen (ISB No. 6689) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208) 232-6101 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
.ieffery Mandell (ISB No. 5807) 
The ERISA t a w  Group, P.A. 
P. 0. Box 853 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-5522 
Fax: (208) 342-7672 
Attorneys lor Plaintiifs 
IN THE DISTXCT COURT OF TIHE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, ) Case No. CV-06- 140 
INC., DREW DOWNS, 
CURTIS L. DEYOUNG, HARRY ) NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
SEGUARA, DEAN G. DEYOUNG, ) 









COMES NOW, Stephen J. Muhone11 of the firin Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, 
Chartered, pursuant to the Court's oral ruling on August 1,2007 as well as its order dated August 
10,2007, and hereby enters an appearance on behalf of the Plaintiff Dean G. DeYoung in the above 
matter. Pursuant to Rule 17(a) of f i e  Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Dean G. DeYoung 
NOTICE OIi APPEARANCE - P a g e  1 
hereby ratifies and adopts by reference the commencement of the action by American Pension 
Services, Inc. and all pleadings, motions, and filings by American Pension Services, Inc., including 
without limitation witness and exhibit lists. 
DATED this day of August, 2007 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
NOTICIT. OF APPEARANCE -Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ^ z  day of August, 2007, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoi~lg docutnent to the following persorl(s) as follows: 
Jeffery Mandell [ ] U, S. Mail 
The ERISA Law Group, P.A. Postage Prepaid 
P. 0. Box 853 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83701 [ ] Overnigllt Mail 
[ b'f Facsilnile - (208) 342-7672 ( 0 ,  f b 
[ ] Email 
pellelope North-Shaul j ] U. S. Mail 
DIJNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC Postage Prepaid 
P. 0. Box 277 [ 1 Hand Delivery 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 Ovenlight Mail 
Facsimile - 745-81 60 
[ ] Email 
Winston V. Beard [ ] U.S.Mai1 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. Postage Prepaid 
2 105 Coronado Street [ ] HandDelivery 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 [ ] Ovenlight Mail 
Facsimile - 529-9732 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE -Page 3 
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Daniel C. Green (ISB No. 3213) 
Stephen J. Muhonen (ISB No. 6689) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
R: BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208) 232-6101 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Jefiery Mandell (ISB No. 5807) 
The ERISA Law Group, P.A. 
P. 0. Box 853 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-5522 
Fax: (208) 342-7672 
Ariorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, ) Case No, CV-06-140 
INC., DREW DOWNS, ) 
CURTIS L. DEYOUNG, HARRY 1 NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
SEGUARA, DEAN G.  DEYOUNG, ) 
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COMES NOW, Stephen J. Muhonen of the firm Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, 
Chal-tered, pursuant to the Court's oral ruling on August 1,2007 as well as its order dated August 
10,2007, and hereby enters an appearance on behalf of the Plaintiff E. Dale Henderson in the above 
matter. Pursuant to Rule 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff E. Dale Henderson 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - Page t 
hereby ratifies and adopts by reference the commencement of tlie action by American Pension 
Services, Inc, and all pleadings, motions, and filings by American Pension Services, Inc., including 
without limitation witness and exhibit lists. 
DATED this 3 day of August, 2007. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - Page Z 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVLCE 
I I -IEREB~ CERTIFY that 011 the 2 day of August, 2007,I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing docurnent to the following person(s) as follows: 
Jeffery Mandell [ ] U. S. Mail 
The ERISA Law Group, P.A. Postage Prepaid 
P. 0. Box 853 [ ] Nand Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83701 Overnight Mail 
Facsimile - (208) 112-7672 
[ ] Eniail 
Penelope North-Shaul [ ] U,S.Mail  
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC Postage Prepaid 
P, 0. Box 277 [ ] Hmd Delivery 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 OvernigI~t Mail 4 Facaiznile - 745-8160 
[ ] Elnail 
Winston V. Beard [ 1 U, S. Mail 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. Postage Prepaid 
21 05 Coronado Street [ ] I-land Delivery 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 [ J, Overnight Mail 
] Facsimile - 529-9732 
[ ] Elnail 
NOTICE OF APPEAMNCE - Page 3 
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& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pacatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208) 232-6101 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Jeffery Ma~idell (ISB No. 5807) 
The ERISA Law Group, P.A. 
P. 0. Box 853 
Boise, Ida110 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-5522 
Fax: (208) 342-7672 
Attorneys for Plainties 
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STATE OF IDAI-IO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, 1 Case No. CV-06-140 
INC., DREW DOWNS, ) 
CURTIS L. DENOUNG, HARRY 1 NOTICE OF APPEAEUNCE 
SEGUAIW, DEAN G. DEYOUNG, 1 










COMES NOW, Stephen J.  Muhonen of the firm Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, 
Chartered, pursuant LO the Court's oral ruling on August 1, 2007 as well as its order dated August 
10, 2007, and hereby enters an appearance on behalf of the Plaintiff Curtis L. DeYoung in the above 
matter Pursuant to Rule 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Curtis L. DeYoung 
, , 
NOTICE OF APPEAIMNCE - Page 1 
08/21/2007 1 4 : 2 1  FAX 208 232 
CERTIFICATE OF S E R W E  
a\ I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the - day of August, 2007, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing document to the followi~lg person(s) as follows: 
Jeffery Mandell 
The ERISA Law Group, P.A. 
P. 0. Box 853 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
[ 1 U,S.Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ b'f Facsimile - (208) 342-7672 
[ 1 Einail 
Penelope Nol-th-Sha~il [ ] U. S. Mail 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC Postage Prepaid 
P. 0. Box 277 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ Facsimile - 745-81 60 
[ ] Einail 
Winstoll V. Beard [ ] U. S. Mail 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. Postage Prepaid 
2105 Coronado Street [ ] HandDelivety 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 [ J Ovemigl~t Mail 
[ ] Facstmile - 529-9732 
[ ] Email 
NOTlCE OF APPEARANC~ - Page 3 
DWNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Duni~, Esq., ISB No. 2903 
Peilny No& Slraul, Esq., ISB No. 4993 
David L. Brown, Esq., ISB No. 7430 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Winston V. Beard, Esq., ISB No. 1138 
Michael Gaffhey, Esq., ISB No. 3558 
Lance J .  Schustel-, Esq., IS% No. 5404 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5 171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTNCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVlLLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, 1 Case No. CV-06-140 
INC., 1 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
1 NOTICES OF APPEARANCE 
VS. ) 
1 




Defendant. through couiisel, respectfully liloves this Court for ail order striking the 
Notices of Appearance filed by the individual plaintiffs in the above entitled matter. The basis 
Defendant's Motion to StrilteNotices of Appearance Page I 
74-18 
Defendant's Motion to Strike Notices of Appeara~lce Page 2 
?:I=- 19 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I am a licensed attorney in the State of Idaho and on August 24, 2007, I 
served a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRlKE NOTICES OF 
APPEARANCE on the following by the nlethod of delivery designated below: 
Stephen J. Muhonen C] U.S. Mail 0  and-delivered ? Facsinlile Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey PO Box 1391 Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
FAX: (208) 232-6109 
/ 
Penny North Shaul C] U.S. Mail C] I-Iand-delivered 
Dunn Law Office 
PO Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
FAX: (208) 745-81 60 
BoilnevilIe County 
/ 
Defendant's Motion to Strike Notices of Appearance Page 3 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB No. 2903 
Penny North Shaul, Esq., ISB No. 4993 
David L. B1.0~11, Esq., ISB No. 7430 
P.O. Box 277 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (1) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Wiilsto~l V. Beard, Esq., ISB No. 1138 
Michael Gafb~ey, Esq., ISB No. 3558 
Lance .I. Schuster, Esq., ISB No. 5404 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. 
21 05 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Telephoile: (208) 523-5 171 
Facsiinile: (208) 529-9732 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-SE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, 1 Case No. CV-06-140 
n\ic., 1 
> 
PlaintiFf, 1 DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
1 SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE 
VS. ) . NOTICES OF APPEARANCE 
) 





Defendant, through counsel, subtllits the following t~lernora~ldum in support of its tnotion 
to strike notices of appearance. 
Defendant's Memoraildurn ill Support of Motion to Strike Notices of Appea~ance Page 1 
'74- 29 
PROCEDURALBACKGROUND 
1. At the August 1, 2007 summary judgme11t hearing the Court found that Drew Downs, 
Dale Henderson, Dean DeYoung, Harry Segura, and Curtis DeYoung were necessary parties 
(collectively itldividual plaintiffs) 
2. On August 10, 2007, the Court entered an order requiri~lg the plaintiff, Ainerican 
Pension Services, Inc. (APS), to join the individual plaintiffs as parties. 
3. APS has failed to add the individual plaintiffs as parties. 
4. On August 21, 2007, counsel for APS filed rzotices of appearance on behalf of all the 
individual plaintiffs. 
5. The individual plaintiffs have not filed ally type of corx~plaint or claim. 
ARGUMENT 
The notices of appearance of the individual plaintiffs should be stricken. Since the 
individual plaintiffs llave not been joined by APS, this action warrants dismissal. APS has 
indicated that it only filed this lawsuit as an agent and that it has no interest in the outcome. 
DeYoung Dep. pp. 49, 64. "An agent does not acquire real party status and rnay not bring suit on 
behalf of another." 4-17 JAMES WM. MOORE T AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL 7 
17.10(3)(t) (3d ed. 2007). The corllplaint as presently constituted fails to state a clairn because it 
only seeks relief on behalf of APS. Because of this problem, the Court ordered APS to add the 
individual plaintiffs as parties. 
To date APS has failed to add the individual plaintiffs as parties. Instead cou~lsel for APS 
has filed notices of appearance 011 behalf of all of the individual plaintiffs. This action by APS is 
problematic for several reasons. A notice of appearance is a documeilt that is filed by a 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Notices of Appearance Page 2 
defendant not a plaintiff. Writtell  lol lice of appearance is a statemeilt ill writing by a defendant or 
his attorney whereby plaintiff is infor~lzed that defendant has appeared, geilerally or specially, in 
the case and has submitted himself to jurisdiction of the court. Donzer I?. Sfone: 27 Idaho 279, 
149 P. 505 (1915). The hllction of a notice of appearance is ihr a defe~ldailt o put a plaintiff on 
notice that he or she is appearing in order to prevent a default judgment being entered. Thus, the 
notices of appearances filed by coul~sel for APS are procedurally improper and should be 
stricken. 
Eve11 if filing a notice of appearance is procedurally proper for a plaintiff, it does not 
constitute a pleading and does not state a claim. "Notice of appearance does not constitute 
pleading." 10-55 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL 7 55.10(2)(c) 
(3d ed. 2007). The iildividual plaintiffs' failure to enter pleadings it1 this case is fatal to their 
clai111s. Counsel for APS attempted to incorporate pleadings filed by APS into the notices of 
appearance filed on behalf of the individual plaintiffs. Since a notice of appearance is not a 
pleading, such a11 attempt 111ust fail. The individual plaintiffs must file a complaint or some other 
type of claim. Thus, the notices of appearance should be stricken. 
Cornerstone does not know w-hat claims are being asserted by the individual plai~ltiffs 
because no c l a i i~~s  have been asserted. Even if the i~ldividual plaintiffs were able to incorporate 
APS's pleadings though a notice of appearai~ce, the action should be dismissed. The existing 
co~~~pla i i l t  o111y seeks relief for APS. No claims are brought on behalf of the individual plaintiffs. 
There is 110 indication in the complaint that the i~ldividual plaintiffs are even involved. Since 
APS has acknowledged it has no interest in this lawsuit, a claim must be made by the individual 
plaintiffs. Such a claim has not beell asserted. Thus, the notices of appearance should be 
Defendant's Memorandum in Suppolt of Motion to Strike Notices of Appearance Page 3 
slricken and this case warrants dismissal 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the defelldallt respectfully requests that the notices of appearance 
filed by counsel for APS alf of the individual plaii~tiffs be strickell and that this matter be 
Defendant's Memorandurn in Suppol? of Motion Lo Slrike Notices of Appearance Page 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE 
I certify that I all1 a licensed attorney in the State of Idaho and on August 24, 2007,I 
served a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE NOTICES OF APPEARANCE on the following by the n~etliod of 
delivery designated below: 
/ 
Stephen .J. Muhonen [ZI U.S. Mail C )  Hand-delivered ~a&csimile 
Raciile Olson Nye Budge & Bailey / 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
FAX: (208) 232-6109 i 
Pelmy Nortlz Shaul 
Dunn Law Office 
PO Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
FAX: (208) 745-81 60 
a U.S. Mail 0 Hand-delivered ~ $ a c s i i l l i k  
/' 
Boi~neviile Count 0 US.  Mail 0 Facsimile 
Defendant's Memorartdu~n in Support of Motion to Strike Notices of Appearatice Page 5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff (s) , i 
) MINUTE ENTRY 
VS . ) 
) CASE NO. CV-06-140 
CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant (s) . ) 
On the 28th day of August, 2007, a court trial came before 
the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District Judge, in open court 
at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Stephen Muhonen and Mr. Lane Erickson appeared on behalf 
of the Plaintiff. Mr. Curtis DeYoung was present at counsel 
table as a representative of APS. 
Mr. Michael Gaffney and Mrs. Penny North Shaul appeared on 
behalf of the Defendant. Mr. Scott Tallman was present at 
counsel. table as a representative of Cornerstone 
The Court granted the motion to shorten time. 
Mr. Gaffney presented Defendant's motion to dismiss and 
motion to strike notices of appearances. Mr. Muhonen argued in 
opposition to the motions. Mr. Gaffney presented rebuttal 
argument. Further discussion was heard 
The Court denied the motion to strike appearances and denied 
the motion to dismiss 
Mr. Muhonen presented Plaintiffs' [notion co quash subpoena 
of Mark Poole. Mr. Gaffney ?resented argument in opposition to 
the motion. The Court will take the motion under advisement and 
see if Mr. Poole can be worked into the trial schedule. 
Mr. Gaffney orally moved to sequester witnesses. There was 
no opposition from the Plaintiffs. The Court granted the motion. 
Trial recessed for morning break. 
Trial continued at 11:40 a.m. with all parties present. 
Mr. Muhonen presented Plaintiffs' opening statement. 
Mr. Gaffney reserved Defendant's opening statement. 
Mr. Martin Pool was called to the stand and placed under 
oath by the clerk. Mr. Muhonen inquired on direct examination. 
Trial recessed for lunch break. 
On the 28th day of August, 2007, court trial reconvened 
before the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District Judge, in 
open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Stephen Muhonen and Mr. Lane Erickson appeared on behalf 
of the Plaintiff. Mr. Curtis DeYoung was present at counsel 
table as a representative of APS. 
Mr. Michael Gaffney and Mrs. Penny North Shaul appeared on 
behalf of the Defendant. Mr. Scott Tallman was present at 
counsel table as a representative of Cornerstone. 
Mr. Martin Pool retook the witness stand. He was still 
under oath. Mr. Muhonen continued direct examination of Mr. 
Pool. Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 was marked and presented to the 
witness. Exhibit 14 was offered and admitted without objection. 
Plaintiff's Exhiblt 1 was marked, offered ana admitted without 
objection. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 23, 24 and 25 were 
admitted by stipulation. Exhibits 1 and 14 were already 
admitted. 
Defendant's Exhibits A, B, C, D(1), E, F, G, H, 1, J, K(14), 
L , M , N , O , P , Q , R , S , T , U , V , X , Y , Z , A A , B B , C C , D D , E E , F F ,  
GG, HH, 11, JJ, KK, LL, MM, NN, 00, QQ(14), PP(14), RR(14), 
SS(14), TT(14), W(14), W(14), LLL, MMM, NNiT, 000, EEEE, FFFF, 
GGGG, 1111, JJJJ were admitted by stipulation. 
Mr. Pool was excused from the witness stand. 
Mr. Curtis DeYoung was called as a witness and placed under 
oath. Mr. Muhonen inquired of Mr. DeYoung on direct examination. 
plaintiff's Exhibit 7 was marked and presented to the witness. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 was offered and admitted without objection. 
Mr. DeYoung was excused. 
Trial recessed for afternoon break. 
Trial resumed at 4:00 p.m. with all parties present. 
Mr. Brad Kendrick was called as a witness and placed under 
oath. Mr. Muhonen inquired on direct examination. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 28 was marked and presented to the witness. Exhibit 28 
was offered, objection raised, objection sustained and denied 
admission. Mr. Muhonen offered to modify the document, offered 
it for admission. Mr. Gaffney objected; the Court sustained the 
objection and denied admission. 
Trial recessed for the evening. Trial will continue at 9:00 
a.m. on Wednesday, August 29, 2007. 
On the 29th day of August, 2007, a court trial continued at 
9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District 
Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Stephen Muhonen and Mr. Lane Erickson appeared on behalf 
of the Plaintiff. Mr. Curtis DeYoung was present at counsel 
table as a representative of APS. 
Mr. Michael Gaffney and Mrs. Penny North Shaul appeared on 
behalf of the Defendant. Mr. Scott Taliman was present at 
counsel table as a representative of Cornerstone. 
Mr. Brad Kendrick retook the witness stand. Mr. Kendrick 
was still under oath. Mr. Muhonen continued direct examination 
of the witness. Plaintiff's Exhibit 30 was marked and presented 
to the witness. Mr. Muhonen moved to admit Exhibit 30. Mr. 
Gaffney objected. The Court sustained the objection. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 27 was marked and presented to the witness. 
Exhibit 27 was offered, objection raised, the Court overruled the 
objection and admitted the document. Plaintiff's Exhibit 10 was 
marked, offered, objection raised, objection overruled and 
Exhibit 10 was admitted. 
Mr. Gaffney cross-examined Mr. Kendrick. The Deposition of 
Brad Kendrick pubiished and presented to the witness. 
Trial recessed for the mid-morning break. 
Trial resumed at 10:55 a.m. with all parties present. Mr. 
Gaffney continued cross-examination of Mr. Brad Kendrick. 
Trial recessed for the morning. Trial will continue at 1:00 
On the 29th day of August, 2007, a court trial continued at 
1:10 p.m. before the Honorable Richard T. St. clair, ~istrict 
Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Stephen Muhonen and Mr. Lane Erickson appeared on behalf 
of the Plaintiff. Mr. Curtis DeYoung was present at counsel 
table as a representative of APS. 
Mr. Michael Gaffney and Mrs. Penny North Shaul appeared on 
behalf of the Defendant. Mr. Scott Tallman was present at 
counsel table as a representative of Cornerstone. 
Mr. Brad Kendrick retook the witness stand. Mr. Kendrick 
was still under oath. Mr. Gaffney continued cross-examination of 
the witness. Mr. Muhonen inquired on redirect examination. Mr. 
Kendrick was excused from the witness stand. 
Plaintiff rested. 
Ms. Penny Shaul presented an opening statement on behalf of 
the Defendant. 
Mr. Curtis DeYoung was recalled to the witness stand. 
Mr. Muhonen renewed Plaintiff's motion to quash the subpoena 
of Martin Pool. Mr. Gaffney stated that he will call Martin Pool 
at this time. 
Mr. Martin Pool was recalled as a witness. Mr. Pool was 
still under oath. Mr. Gaffney inquired of Mr. Pool on direct 
examination. The deposition of Martin Pool was published and 
presented to the witness. Mr. Pool was excused from the witness 
stand and released from his subpoena. 
Mr. Curtis DeYoung was again called to the witness stand; he 
was still under oath. Mr. Gaffney inquired on direct 
examination. Defendant's Exhibit YYY was marked and presented to 
the witness. Defendant's Exhibit YYY was offered, objection 
raised, objection overruled and admitted into evidence. 
Defendant's Exhibit XXX was marked, offered, objection raised, 
objection sustained and denied admission. Mr. Gaffney addressed 
the objection. The Court denied admission of XXX. Mr. Gaff 
inquired further of Mr. DeYoung and then reoffered Exhibit XXX. 
Mr. Muhonen objected. The Court overruled the objection and 
admitted Exhibit XXX. 
Trial recessed for a mid-afternoon break. 
Trial continued at 2:35 p.m. with all parties present. 
Mr. Michael Gaffney continued direct examination of Mr. 
Curtis DeYoung. The deposition (2 volumes) of Curtis DeYoung was 
published. Defendant's Exhibits AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD and EEE were 
marked and presented to the witness. Mr. Muhonen cross-examined. 
Mr. Gaffney inquired on redirect examination. The witness was 
excused. 
Ms. Wendy Nelson was called to the stand and placed under 
oath. Ms. Shaul inquired of Ms. Nelson on direct examination. 
Ms. Nelson was excused. 
Mrs. Mary TeNgaio was called to the stand and placed under 
oath. Ms. Shaul inquired on direct examination. Ms. TeNgaio was 
excused. 
Trial was recessed for an afternoon break. 
Trial resumed at 4:15 p.m. with all parties present. 
Mr. Scott Tallman was called to the stand and placed under 
oath. Ms. Shaul inquired of Mr. Tallman. 
Trial recessed for the evening. Trial will continue at 9:00 
a.m. on Thursday, August 30, 2007. 
On the 30th day of August, 2 0 0 7 ,  court trial continued at 
9:15 a.m. before the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District 
Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Stephen Muhonen and Mr. Lane Erickson appeared on behalf 
of the Plaintiff. Mr. Curtis DeYoung was present at counsel 
table as a representative of APS. 
Mr. Michael Gaffney and Mrs. Penny North Shaul appeared on 
behalf of the Defendant. Mr. Scott Tallman was present at 
counsel table as a representative of Cornerstone. 
Mr. Scott Tallman retook the witness stand subject to direct 
examination by Ms. Shaul. Mr. Muhonen cross-examined Mr. 
Tallman. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 9  was marked, offered and admitted 
into evidence. Ms. Shaul inquired on redirect examination. Mr. 
Tallman. was excused from the witness stand. 
Defendant rested. 
There were no rebuttal witnesses. 
Trial recessed for morning break 
Trial resumed with all parties present. 
Mr. Muhonen presented an oral motion under Rule 15(b) to 
amend the complaint to conform to the evidence presented at trial 
and add a claim for fraudulent conveyance. Mr. Gaffney requested 
an opportunity to brief the motion. Mr. Muhonen did not oppose 
briefing the matter. 
The Court will allow Mr. Gaffney seven days to file briefing 
in opposition. Mr. Muhonen will have seven days to reply. The 
parties will then have fourteen days to submit any additional 
trial briefing and findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Court was thus  adjourned. 
TRICT JUDGE 
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Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
(P1 - American Pension Services, Inc.) 
Penny North Shaul 
PO Box 277 




2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
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Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB No. 2903 
Penny North Shaul, Esq., ISB No. 4993 
David L. Brown, Esq., ISB No. 7430 
P.O. Box 277 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, Case No. CV-06-140 
INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM RE: 
VS. ) ORAL MOTION TO AMEND PURSUANT 
TO RULE 15(b) 




The defendant, Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC (Cornerstone), through counsel of record, 
Heard St. Clair Gaffney PA, respectfiilly submit the following memorandum regarding the plaintiff's 
oral lnotion to amend pursuartt- to Rule 15(b) of  the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
INTRODUCTION 
Defc~~clant's Mernorand~~m Re: Oral Motion to Anlend Pursuant to Rule l5(b) PAGE 1 
The plaintiff, American Pension Services, Inc. (APS), made an oral motion at trial pursuant 
to Rule 15(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(b) states in part: 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or iinplied consent of the parties, 
they shall be treated in all respects as f they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to confomi to the evidence 
and to raise these issues may be rnade upon motion of any party at any time, even after : ': 
judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. 
IDA[-IO R. CIV. P. 1 S(b) (2007). APS seeks to conforrn the pleadings to the testi~nony elicited at trial 
and suggests that this testimony gives rise to a claim for kaudulent conveyance. FIowever, APS 




. ! cs., 
Cornerstone did not engage in a fraudulent conveyance at any material time. APS' motion 
should be denied for several reasons. 
First, Cornerstone formed the Idaho LLC for convenience and based upon the 
1.ecomrlendation of counsel. The Idaho entity was not formed with an intent to defraud or binder any 
present or future creditors. The actio~is undertaken by Co111erstone were legally equivalcnt to a 
doinestication of a foreign entity. When a foreign entity is domesticated in a state, nothing changes 
except for the law that governs thc internal filnctions of the entity. Though Cornerstone did not 
follow the fonnal doinestic~tion process, the creation of the Idaho LLC is the legally tantamount to 
having done so and APS' motion should be denied. 
Seconci, Cornerstone is wiliing to stipulate ta adding the Idaho LLC as a defendant in the 
lawsuit. This would resolve any issues that APS might perceive could arise Frotn the difTerent 
entities. In this manner, APS would liave the chance to acquire relief from any party from whom 
Defendant's Memorandum Re: Oral Motion to Amend Pursuant to Rule 15(b) PAGE 2 
relief could potentially be found liable. 
Third, the property at issue in this case is real property. Barring a massive acceleration in the 
tectonic activity in Southeastern Idaho, the real property is not going anywhere. it will continue to : 
reside where piesently constituted. Any transaction or conveyarice of that property is readily 
ascertai~lablc and traceable. APS would be able to follow the proceeds of that transaction and would 
IlOt be defrauded of anything should the district court rule in its favor. As a result, the district court, 
can deny APS' motiotl without concern. 
Fourth. in order to establish that a tra~isfer was fraudulent a party has to show scienter. See 
IDAHO CODE ANN. 5 55-913 (2007). APS has not shown, nor can i t  establish, that there was ever an 
actual "intent" to defraud any present or potential creditors tl~rough this transfer. The intent by the 
transferring party tnust be "actual" intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors. Id. None of the 
evidence brought out at trial suggests that Cornerstone acted with this "actual" intent. Instead, the 
tl-ansfer was done for convenience and was a de facto do~nestication of the foreign entity. Absent':iii 
facts that establish a verifiable intent to defraud, hinder, or delay a present or future cr-editor's ';!I. 
interests, such an amendment would be inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
As a I-esult of the foregoing, Cornerstone respectfully requests that the district court deny 
APS' oral motion to a y d .  
w i n s t o ~ ~ y e a r d  
of Beal- St. C h i t  Gaffney PA , i 
Attorneys for the Defendant - / '  
Defendant's Me~vlorandum Re: Oral Motion to Amend Pursuant to Rule 15(b) PAGE 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I ceitify I am a licensed att-olney in the state of Idaho and on September 6, 2007,I served a 
true and correct copy of the DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the following by the rl~ethod of 
delivery designated below: x 
.. /. 
Stephen J. M~thonen 0 U.S. Mail a Hand-delivered a ~ a c s i m i ~ e  
Racille Olson Nyc Budge & Bailey 
/: 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
FAX: (208) 232-61 09 
Penny North Shaul a U.S. Mail 5 Hand-delivered[~~acsirnile 
Dun11 Law Office 
PO Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
FAX: (208) 745-8160 
I-----'-. 
[3 u.s. Mail 0 and-deliverem Facsi~nile 
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Daniel C. Green (ISB No. 3213) 
Stephen J. Muhonen (ISB No. 6689) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-6101 
Fax: (208)232-6109 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
I 
AhlIERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC.;) Case No. CV-06-140 
CURTIS DEYOUNG, an individual; DEAN) 
DEYOUNG, an i~ldividual; DALE) 
HENDERSON, an individual; HARRY) PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF IN 
SEGURA, an individual; DREW DOWNS,) SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' RULE 




CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, ) 
LLC., 1 
Defendant. 
This matter came on for trial on the 28'h, 29'" and 30"' of August, 2007, before the Honorable 
Richard T. St. Clair, Seventh Judicial District Judge. Present for the Plaintiffs was Curtis DeYoung, 
in his capacity as President of American Pension Services, Inc. (APS) and in his individual capacity. 
I Stephen J. Muhonen and Lane V. Erickson were both present as counsel for Plaintiffs. Tlte 
I Defendant Cornerstone E-Iome Builders, LLC (Cornerstone) was present through its n~e~nbel Scott 
I Tallman. Michael D. Gaffney and Penny North Shaul were both present as cou~~sel for Defendant. 
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Following the sub~nissioll of the evidence and after both parties had rested their cases, Plaintiffs 
made the following  notion 
Plaintiffs moved the Court, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(b) to amend the Anlended Complaint to 
conibiln to the evidence presented at trial and to allow Plaintiffs to add a claim or cause of action 
for fraudulent conveyance. During the direct testimony given by Mr. Tallman, on behalf of 
Cornerstone, Mr. Tallman testified that this lawsuit began in Ja~~uary  2006. Mr. Tallillan also 
testified that Cornerstone was a Utah LLC and that he dissolved the corporation after Januaiy 2006. 
Mr. Tallman also testified that he created a new Cornerstone LLC in Idaho after Janualy 2006. Mr. 
Tallrnan then testified that the new LLC did not adopt or transfer any of the liabilities from the Utah 
LLC into the newly created Idaho LLC. Mr. Tallman testified on cross examination, without 
objection, that the development property, which is the main asset of the Utah LLC was transferred 
into the Idaho LLC. Mr. Tallman then finally testified that his own corporation, S.R. Talinian 
Construction, Inc. is the new Idaho LLC's only menlber. All of the elements necessaly to evidence 
and maintain a claim or cause of action for fra~~dulent conveyance have been presented as evidence 
at the trial of this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs I.R.C.P. 15(b) niotion was properly raised and should be granted by this Court. 
Rule 15(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
Amendments to conform to tlle evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised 
in the pleadings. Such amend~nellt of the pleadings as may be necessruy to cause 
thein to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made up011 motion 
of any palty at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to anlend does not affect 
the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
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pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of tlie merits 
of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecti~ig pa~iy fails to satisfy the 
court that the adnlission of such evidence would prejudice the party in maintaining 
the party's action or defense upon tlie merits. The couli inay grant a contini~ance to 
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
IDAHO R. CIV. P. 15(b). 
Case law, too, suppolis Plaintiffs ability to bring this motioti and this Courts granting of said 
motion. In Stecklein v. Montgomery, 98 Idaho 671,570 P.2d 1359 (1977), a trial was had wherein 
aprescriptive easement was not originally pled by defendant in its counterclaim. The Supreme Court 
held that since evidence concerning the prescriptive easement came into tlie record without 
objection, the provisions ofRule 15(b) could be iiivobed. "When issues not raised by the [pleadings] 
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they 
had been raised in the pleadings." u. at 674,570 P.2d at 1362. LYIIC~I v. Cheney, 98 Idaho 238,561 
P.2d 380 (1977) is also insightful and instl-c~ctive in this Courts granting of Plaintiffs' lnotio~l to 
amend the pleadings. "A motion to amend pleadings to confoilli to the evidence under Rule 15(b) 
should be granted 'when issues not raised by tlie pleadings are tried by express 01 inlplied consent 
of the parties, . . ." When confronted with a Rule 15(b) motion, the trial court must detem~ine 
\vl~etlier the issue was in fact tried with the express or implied consent of the parties." Id. at 241,56 1 
P.2d at 383. 
Idaho Code 355-91 3 specifically pertains to fraudulent transfers and reads: 
5 55-913. Transfers fraudulent as to present and future creditors 
(1) A transfer made or obligatioii incurred by a debtor is fraudulellt as to a creditor, 
whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: 
(a) Wit11 actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; 01 
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(b) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or 
obligation, and the debtor: 
1, was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for 
which the remaining assets of the debtor were uixeasonably small in relation to the 
business or transaction; or 
2. intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he 
or she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they becanle due. 
(2) In determining actual intent under subsectioll (l)(a) of this section, consideration 
may be given, among other factors, as to whether: 
(a) The transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) The debtor retained possession or control ofthe properly transferred after the trru1sfe1-; 
(c) The transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(d) Before the transfer was made or obligation was inc~~sred, the debtor had been sued 
or threatened with suit; 
(e) The transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
(0 The debtor abscounded [absconded]; 
(g) The debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) The value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent 
to the value of the asset transfelled or the amount of the obligation incurred; 
(i) The debtor was insolvent or becanle insolvent shortly after the transfer was made 
or the obligation was inc~med; 
6) The transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was 
incusred; and 
(k) The debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who 
transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. 
IDAHO CODE S 55-913 (Michie 2007) 
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In the trial of this matter, Mr. Tallman testified with consent, under direct testimony, 
answering questio~~s from his attorney, the following: That as the sole remaining member of 
Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC, after learning of the lawsuit against it, he intentionally dissolved 
the Utah LLC, that Cornerstone was, when sued. Still in his direct testimony, Mr. Tallman testified 
that post-suit, he created Colllerstone Ilorne Builders, LLC, ill Idaho. See Exhibits A and C. Mr. 
Tall~nan testified that the sole member of the new Idaho LLC was S.R. Tallman Construction, Inc., 
a compaily he operates as President. Mr. Tallman also testified, without objection, that upon his 
dissolvi~lg the Utah LLC, he transferred the major asset of the LLC, pai?icularly the real property 
identified in Exhibit 14, into the new Idaho LLC. While still in his direct testimony: and what should 
be of peculiar interest to this Court, Mr. Tallman testified he voluntarily DID NOT transfer or adopt 
ally of the liabilities ofthe Utah LLC into the Idaho LLC. 
Cornerstone, in its response to Plaintiffs' 15(b) motion, stated that Cornerstone, when 
becoming an Idaho LLC, was merely trying to become dolllesticated ill Idaho and just didn't follow 
the domesticatio~l process. This argument is without merit and is easily disposed of by analyziilg 
Cornerstone's own Exhibit G (marked as 7) and Plaintiffs' Exhibits 23 and 24, all w l ~ c h  were 
admitted as evidence. Exhibits G, 23 and 24 are Cor~lerstone's ow11 Applications for Registration 
ofForeign Limited Liability Company, with the Idaho Secretary of State's stamped receipt on them 
dated 0110912004 and 061 271 2005, respectively. Cor~lerstone had already become domesticated. 
By cornparing the voluntary testimony of Mr. Talllnan at trial to the requisite ele~nents of a 
fraudulent transfer, a fra~tdulent ransfer has occurred. The Plaintiffs are creditors to Cornerstone. 
Mr. Talllnan demoilstrated his intent to hinder, delay or defraud Plaintiffs by voluntaily testifying 
h a t  he purposefully did not adopt or transfer the liabilities d t h e  Utah LLC into the newly, post-suit 
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created, Idaho LLC; all the \vl~iIe transfell-ing the only major asset of the Utah LLC into the Idaho 
LLC. The factors to determine actual intent, found in section two (2) of $55-913 are met by Mr. 
Tallman's own voluntary testimony. The transfer was to an insider (to the newly created LLC, 
created by Mr. Tallman with his own company being the sole inember of the new LLC); Mr. 
Tallman, tlu-ough his corporations, retained possession or control of the propel-ty transfe~~ed after 
the transfer; the transfer was not known of until Mr. Tallman voluntarily disclosed it, without 
objection, on cross examii~ation; before the transfer was made, Cornerstone had been sued; the 
transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; Mr. Tallman, the sole renlaining member of 
Cornerstone removed its assets; and the debtor Cornexstone becanle insolvent shortly affer the 
transfer was made due to the major asset now being removed and then dissolved. 
CONCLZJSION 
For these reasons, Plaintiffs' Rule 15(b) motion sl~ould be granted. The fraudulent transfev 
was not plead in the Amended Complaint, b~ l t  was volu~ltaily tried by the parties by Cornerstone's 
implied consent. Cornerstone, tl~rough Mr. Tallman, voluntarily placed the evidence to sustain the 
cause of action into evidence and on the record. Pursuant to Rule 15(b), this C o a t  should freely 
allow the amendment to the pleadings since the presentation ofthe evidence rnerits such amendment. 
DATED this J$$ day of September, 2007 
RACME, OLSON, NYE; BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CIIARTERED 
By: 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13 day of September, 2007, I served a true a l~d  correct 
copy of the above and foregoing docunlent to the followillg person(s) as follows: 
Penelope North-Shaul 1/1' U. S. Mail 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC Postage Prepaid 
P. 0. Box 277 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsi~nile - 745-81 60 
)/I-* Elnail 
Winstoll V. Beard 6 [,?* U. S. Mail 
Michael D. Gaffley Postage Prepaid 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. [ ] Hand Delivery 
2 105 Coronado Street [ ] Overnight Mail 
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